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Abstract 
My placement was with the Zoonoses, Foodborne and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
section in the Office of Health Protection at the Australian Government Department of 
Health during 2014-2015. I focused on the following five projects. 
I described the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in 
Australia and identified risk factors and risk groups, from an analysis of outbreak data 
recorded from 2001 to 2013. The main risk factor for bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks is temperature abuse (storage between 4°C and 60°C) of solid 
masses of foods, such as lasagna. Residents of aged care facilities were the group at 
highest risk of illness and death from bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks. 
Few outbreaks were identified with food prepared at home. 
As part of the national response to the large outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in 
West Africa (2014-2015), a national surveillance system was established to enable 
reporting and to provide information to jurisdictions to assist monitoring of travellers at 
risk of contracting EVD. I conducted an evaluation of this system. The system was 
considered useful and achieved its aims; however, a coordinated central, online 
database would improve reporting and ease of use.  
Culture independent diagnostic testing (CIDT) for bacterial causes of gastroenteritis is 
becoming commonly used in pathology laboratories in Australia. These tests are rapid, 
cheap and require less technical expertise than traditional culture based laboratory 
tests. However, these tests do not provide the subtyping information required for public 
health surveillance, including outbreak detection. For the time being, laboratories are 
continuing culture in addition to CIDT. My project documents this transition in 
Queensland. 
In May 2014, three cases of bacteraemia caused by Ralstonia species were diagnosed 
in South Australia. The only common exposure was propofol, a sedative. An 
investigation into the cause of this cluster of cases was led by the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA) as the agency responsible for the regulation of propofol. 
Additional cases were identified from Queensland (four cases), and Victoria (one case). 
I was part of the epidemiology team assisting and advising the TGA. The investigation 
incorporated evidence from the case series, molecular analysis of isolates (including 
whole genome sequencing), assessment of causal association and expert consultation 
through the Delphi method. The cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia were determined to be 
associated with at least two separate exposures. Cases in Queensland were linked to 
contaminated bottled water, while cases in South Australia and Victoria were 
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associated with propofol. The mechanism of contamination of the propofol was unable 
to be determined. 
During a multi-jurisdictional investigation into an outbreak of hepatitis A associated with 
consumption of frozen mixed berries in 2015, a national case control study was 
conducted. I assisted OzFoodNet Queensland with interviewing controls and 
conducted a sub-analysis of cases and controls from Queensland. Frozen mixed 
berries were the only food exposure with a statistically significant association with 
illness, supporting the implication of frozen mixed berries as the source of the outbreak, 
as indicated by traceback and microbiological evidence. 
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Chapter 1 – Masters of Applied 
Epidemiology (MAE) experience 
I was placed within the Zoonoses, Foodborne and Emerging Infectious Diseases 
(ZoFE) section in the Office of Health Protection at the Australian Government 
Department of Health (Department of Health) in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, 
2014-2015. This was my first real foray into public health and epidemiology after a 
career in academia, and I loved it. Being placed in the Department of Health, rather 
than a jurisdictional health department, gave me a great overview of how public health 
works in Australia. Now I’m looking forward to getting experience from the jurisdictional 
side in my future career as an epidemiologist. 
During my MAE I had the opportunity to participate in many activities in addition to the 
core requirements of the MAE. I was able to attend Rapid Assessment Team (RAT) 
and Monitoring and Investigation Team (MIT) meetings for the Australian Government 
response to Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa (2014), Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Korea (2015) and hepatitis A virus associated with 
frozen berries in Australia (2015). Two of these responses (EVD in Chapter 3 and 
hepatitis A in Chapter 6) formed the basis of two of my core MAE competencies.  
My placement in Health also allowed me to be involved in the activities of the National 
Incident Room (NIR). In addition to being part of the workforce for NIR activation for the 
outbreak of hepatitis A associated with frozen berries (Chapter 6), I was also a Watch 
Officer for the NIR. As part of this role, once or twice a month I would be responsible 
for responding to any incidents reported through the health emergency phone number. 
Incidents usually related to passenger exposures to an infectious disease on 
international flights, such as measles and tuberculosis. Responding to incidents 
required contacting the airline to obtain passenger manifests, contacting the Australian 
Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection to obtain incoming 
passenger cards, and sending information on the passengers exposed to their home 
jurisdictional health department and international focal points if passengers were from 
overseas. This behind the scenes experience was a valuable insight into what happens 
in cross jurisdictional incidents. 
Another valuable experience I had in my placement was being an associate editor for 
Communicable Diseases Intelligence, the peer reviewed, Medline indexed journal 
edited and published by members of ZoFE in association with an external editorial 
advisory board. I had previously written and reviewed papers for journals, but had 
never experienced the inner workings of a journal before. I also wrote the sections on 
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gastrointestinal diseases and zoonoses for the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System 2013 Annual Report, to be published in Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence. 
Coming from academia, I had no idea about government committees and their 
associated secretariats. During my placement I was able to attend meetings, both via 
teleconference and face to face, of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
(CDNA), OzFoodNet and the National Arboviruses and Malaria Advisory Committee 
(NAMAC).  NAMAC in particular appealed to me due to my previous experience in 
arbovirus research. I was able to attend and present at a face to face meeting of 
OzFoodNet held in Adelaide in June 2015. At this meeting I also actively participated in 
the structured audit (debrief) for the hepatitis A outbreak – another new experience. 
I was lucky enough to attend two different scientific meetings during my MAE. I 
attended the 2015 Communicable Diseases Control Conference in, Brisbane. I 
presented my study findings on bacterial toxin associated foodborne outbreaks 
(Chapter 2) at this meeting. I also attended a symposium held in Melbourne about the 
introduction of genomics into public health and epidemiology – “Embracing the 
genomic revolution – applied microbial genomics in public health and clinical 
microbiology”. As a molecular biologist moving into epidemiology, with experience in 
next generation sequencing, this was of great interest to me. 
My MAE experience has been a varied and wonderful introduction to epidemiology. I 
look forward to my career in epidemiology, applying all I have learned during my two 
years in Canberra, in my placement and through coursework at the Australian National 
University. 
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Epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne gastroenteritis outbreaks in 
Australia, 2001 to 2013 
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
Bacterial toxin mediated foodborne illnesses are a neglected cause of foodborne 
illness. Unlike commonly reported foodborne bacterial pathogens, including Salmonella 
and Campylobacter, the epidemiology of bacterial toxins have been less frequently 
studied. A single study from the United States (US) focused exclusively on the 
epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in the US (1). Other studies (2, 3) 
included bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in an overall review of foodborne 
outbreaks. Data on all foodborne outbreaks in Australia, including those confirmed or 
suspected to have been caused by bacterial toxin producing bacteria are collated in the 
Outbreak Register by OzFoodNet.  
My role 
I developed (in consultation with my supervisors) and wrote the initial proposal for this 
study. I cleaned and analysed the data, provided recommendations to improve the 
Outbreak Register and presented my research findings to the national Communicable 
Diseases Control Conference in Brisbane, 1-2 June 2015, and the 46th OzFoodNet 
face to face meeting in Adelaide, 22-23 June 2015. I am also the first author on a 
manuscript on this study submitted to Communicable Diseases Intelligence. 
Lessons learned 
The most important lesson I learned during this study was that even if someone tells 
you that the data is complete up to a certain date, check the data by year before you 
start the work, and if the numbers look odd, chase it up! Also, Stata “do files” are a 
lifesaver when you have to repeat all of the data analysis from the beginning. I learned 
so much about using Stata during this analysis. It is such a powerful program, and the 
community of Stata users online is very helpful. 
Using the Outbreak Register taught me a lot about design of forms and databases. The 
huge amount of recoding I had to do, both by hand in Excel and “automatically” through 
Stata, made me really appreciate well designed questions with defined responses 
rather than free text into which anything and everything could be entered.  
Similarly, the symptom questions where “yes” was the only answer (no options for “no” 
or missing or unknown) caused problems in recoding and determining the meanings of 
the responses – questions should always have no and unknown options! Indeed, 
calculating the percent of symptoms was not the simple matter I first thought it would 
be. It seems obvious – number of people with the symptom divided by the total number 
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of people ill. However, these outbreaks are difficult to investigate, and often many 
people are not interviewed individually. This problem has been acknowledged through 
an extra question asking how many were interviewed about the symptom. But again, 
this was not straightforward. Missing or inconsistent information (fewer people 
interviewed than had the symptom) made this ostensibly simple calculation very 
complicated. 
Although I haven’t had the opportunity to enter data into the Register myself, through 
using the data from the Access-based Register, and using NetEpi and EpiInfo for other 
projects, I have gained a real appreciation of the fact that there are other, better options 
for databases than Access. An online database would mean that jurisdictions could 
enter data directly, rather than waiting to send it. The database would always be up to 
date, instead of still missing some 2013 outbreaks in early 2015.  
Although the OzFoodNet epidemiologists are always helpful, it took time to chase up 
some missing or inconsistent information from the original source; information that 
would hopefully have been entered correctly if entered immediately into a centrally 
available database. 
Public health implications of this work 
This study has provided OzFoodNet with information about the risk factors associated 
with bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks. This information can be used in the 
future to inform changes to public health policy to help prevent these outbreaks. 
Suggestions for improvement of the Outbreak Register will result in a more streamlined 
and useful tool. 
Acknowledgements 
Big thanks go to my two supervisors, Dr Ben Polkinghorne and Dr Emily Fearnley. And 
thanks also to all the members of OzFoodNet who have contributed the data over the 
years. Thanks also to John Bates with whom I had a very informative chat about 
laboratory testing methods for bacterial toxins. 
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Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity 
requirement 
Analysis of a public health dataset such as surveillance data. 
Literature review that demonstrates skills in conducting a targeted literature search and 
synthesis. 
Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a national or international 
peer-reviewed journal (Appendix 3). 
Abstract and oral presentation of the project at a national or international scientific 
conference (Appendix 4). 
Abstract 
Foodborne outbreaks caused by bacterial toxins such as Clostridium perfringens, 
Staphylococcus aureus and Bacillus cereus are an often overlooked cause of 
morbidity. This study aimed to describe the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia between 2001 and 2013, and to identify high risk 
groups and risk factors to inform prevention measures.  
All foodborne and suspected foodborne outbreaks in Australia are collated in the 
OzFoodNet Outbreak Register. Data on all confirmed or suspected bacterial toxin 
mediated foodborne outbreaks notified to the register and investigated between 2001 
and 2013 inclusive were included. Descriptive analyses were undertaken using 
StataSE 13. 
There were 272 confirmed or suspected toxin mediated outbreaks reported, of which 
107 (39%) were laboratory confirmed. These outbreaks affected 4066 people, including 
70 hospitalisations and 13 deaths, 12 of which occurred in aged care facility residents. 
Clostridium perfringens was suspected or confirmed as the causative agent in 171 
(63%) outbreaks. Commercial food service businesses (145 outbreaks, 53%) and aged 
care facilities (99 outbreaks, 36%) were the most commonly reported settings for 
outbreaks. Only seven outbreaks (3%) were associated with food prepared in private 
residences. Inadequate temperature control of pre-cooked foods was reported as a 
contributing factor in all confirmed and suspected toxin mediated outbreaks where this 
information was available.  
Bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks cause significant preventable morbidity 
in Australia, and disproportionately affect residents of aged care facilities, a particularly 
vulnerable population. Public health efforts aimed at improving storage and handling 
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practices for pre-cooked and re-heated foods could help to reduce the magnitude of 
this problem. 
Introduction 
While many studies have examined the epidemiology of outbreaks of pathogens such 
as Salmonella, few have focused on bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks (1). Some 
detailed analyses have included the bacterial toxin producers in larger studies of all 
causes of gastroenteritis (3), although in these cases, due to the focus on more 
common causes of gastroenteritis, such as Salmonella and norovirus, the description 
of the epidemiology of the bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks can be less visible. All 
infectious causes of gastroenteritis are underestimated in Australia as confirmation 
requires at least some of those affected to submit a faecal specimen for testing. The 
multiplication factor to account for underestimation depends on numerous factors 
including severity of illness and ease of testing (4-6). Outbreaks caused by toxin 
producing bacteria are often less severe and have a shorter duration than those 
caused by other pathogens making sufferers even less likely to be tested (1). Testing 
for bacterial toxin producing bacteria is difficult in both food and faecal samples, and is 
only performed at a few laboratories in Australia (John Bates, personal 
communication). A recent study estimating underreporting of gastroenteritis in Australia 
estimated the multiplier for each of the three bacterial toxin mediated illness to be 104 
(5). 
Bacterial toxin mediated gastroenteritis can be caused by two different modes of 
action. The preformed toxin is, as its name suggests, formed by the bacteria in the food 
prior to consumption. Because the toxin has already been formed, onset of illness is 
rapid and can be as little as 30 minutes. Vomiting is commonly associated with 
intoxication caused by preformed toxin (7). Growth of the bacteria and the production of 
toxin occurs before the cooking kill step, and the toxin itself is heat resistant (7, 8) 
meaning further heating will not render the food safe to eat. Staphylococcus aureus 
and Bacillus cereus can produce preformed toxins (9, 10). Foodborne disease caused 
by a pre-formed B. cereus toxin is known as “emetic B. cereus” due to the predominant 
symptoms of nausea and vomiting.  
In contrast, the in vivo toxin is formed after consumption of contaminated food. The 
incubation period of this form of intoxication is longer than that for preformed toxins, but 
shorter than many other types of foodborne illness (which are in the order of several 
days), and ranges from six to 16 hours (11, 12). Clostridium perfringens and B. cereus 
cause this type of intoxication. Foodborne disease caused by in vivo B. cereus toxin is 
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known as “diarrhoeal B. cereus” due to the predominant symptoms of cramping and 
watery diarrhoea. The bacteria grow rapidly in food held at ambient temperature (10-
54⁰C), and produce enterotoxin after ingestion (13). Although further cooking can kill 
the vegetative cells, both bacteria can produce heat-resistant spores which can then 
regerminate after cooking.  
All three toxin producing bacteria are ubiquitous in the environment, and in the case of 
S. aureus, is a normal component of human flora (14). A third type of foodborne toxin is 
the neurotoxin produced by Clostridium botulinum. This toxin is formed in the food 
before consumption and causes neurological illness (15). C. botulinum toxin is one of 
the most poisonous biological substances known and as such botulism is listed on the 
Australian National Notifiable Diseases List. However, few cases of C. botulinum are 
reported in Australia, and although a single case of botulism can be considered an 
“outbreak”, these single cases are reported via the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System (NNDSS), and are not entered into the OzFoodNet Outbreak 
Register and thus are not discussed further in this chapter.  
In Australia, infection with S. aureus, B. cereus and C. perfringens are not notifiable 
diseases, so cases of gastroenteritis due to these pathogens are only reported in the 
OzFoodNet Outbreak Register as part of an outbreak, defined as two or more cases of 
the same illness with a common source. 
OzFoodNet began entering data into the Outbreak Register in 2001. The Register is a 
Microsoft Access database maintained by OzFoodNet Central (located in the Australian 
Government Department of Health). Jurisdiction-based OzFoodNet personnel are 
responsible for entering the details of their outbreak investigations into their own 
jurisdiction-specific Access database, and are required to transmit their data to 
OzFoodNet Central quarterly. The Outbreak Register contains information about all 
outbreaks of gastroenteritis and other outbreaks that are investigated by OzFoodNet. In 
addition to foodborne outbreaks, this includes waterborne, animal-to-person, person-to-
person and environmental outbreaks. The data collected are diverse, and include 
information about the illness, possible source, transmission, causes (distal, e.g. 
process failures and proximate, e.g. aetiology), and information about the level of 
evidence for these categories. Summaries of outbreaks are published in OzFoodNet 
quarterly and annual reports, available in the publication Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence. 
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The aim of this study was to describe the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia between 2001 and 2013, and to identify high risk 
groups and risk factors to inform prevention measures. 
Methods 
Data collection and analysis 
All data were extracted from the Microsoft Access Outbreak Register into a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet on 2 February 2015. At this date, data entry for outbreaks from 
2001 to 2013 inclusive had been completed. Preliminary cleaning (application of 
inclusion and exclusion criteria) was performed in Microsoft Excel, while further data 
cleaning was performed in StataSE 13 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX, USA). Missing 
data, nonsensical data and answers of “unknown” were treated as unknown responses. 
Specific data cleaning steps are outlined below. All changes to the data were made on 
the data extract only, but the extract and the data cleaning queries used were provided 
to OzFoodNet at the end of the process. Completeness for all variables was defined as 
useable data, i.e. values other than missing or unknown. A data dictionary for the 
variables used in this analysis is included in Appendix 1. 
Case definitions 
Bacterial toxin mediated foodborne or suspected foodborne outbreaks with onset 
between 2001 and 2013 were included in the study. To retain only outbreaks caused 
by, or suspected to be caused by bacterial toxins, all outbreaks confirmed or suspected 
to be caused by a different aetiology were removed. The free text remarks field of all 
outbreaks with an unknown aetiology were read and any outbreaks with a suspected 
toxin mediated aetiology recorded in the remarks field, and not already recorded in the 
aetiology field were entered into the aetiology field in the downloaded data. All 
remaining outbreaks with an unknown aetiology were removed. A summary of this 
process is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Flowchart showing inclusion categories 
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Six aetiology categories were created: 
1. “Bacillus cereus” – B. cereus was listed as the sole aetiology 
2. “Clostridium perfringens” – C. perfringens was listed as the sole aetiology 
3. “Staphylococcus aureus” – S. aureus was listed as the sole aetiology 
4. “Preformed toxin” – the aetiology was listed as preformed toxin, or both S. 
aureus and B. cereus were listed as possible or confirmed aetiologies 
5. “In vivo toxin” – both C. perfringens and B. cereus were listed as possible or 
confirmed aetiologies 
6. “Toxin” – a bacterial toxin was suspected but no further information was 
provided in any field 
The aetiology of outbreaks was further categorised as “confirmed” or “suspected”, 
based on simplified US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines 
(16). In short, the aetiology of the outbreak was considered confirmed if the agent was 
isolated or enterotoxin detected in clinical specimens from two or more cases, or at 
least 105 organisms were isolated per gram of epidemiologically implicated food. 
Suspected outbreaks were those where only a toxin or toxin producing bacteria were 
isolated from only one case or at low levels in food, or where symptoms and food 
vehicle indicated a toxin mediated aetiology to the investigators, leading to mention in 
the remarks field.  
The set of outbreaks with unknown aetiology that was removed above was reassessed 
for outbreaks with an unknown aetiology that may have been unidentified toxin 
mediated outbreaks. Only outbreaks with no known or suggested aetiology were 
included in this dataset. The outbreaks with unknown aetiology and an incubation 
period less than or equal to 18 hours were suspected to be toxin mediated due to the 
short incubation period. These outbreaks were analysed as outbreaks of “unknown” 
aetiology. Due to a paucity of information, these outbreaks were not included in most 
analyses and were not categorised as above. 
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Vehicle attribution 
Investigators enter food vehicle information into a dedicated field in the Outbreak 
Register database. However, sometimes the food is listed as unknown if the evidence 
is weak. In these outbreaks, the suspected food may be entered into the free-text 
remarks field. To maximise the amount of information available for food attribution, the 
remarks field was examined and any food with a reasonable level of suspicion (i.e. the 
only food eaten) was added to the food vehicle field in the downloaded data.  
The suspected foods were grouped according to how they were prepared using the 
categories proposed by Weingold et al (17). These categories are shown in Table 1. 
The best estimate of category was used based on the information provided in the food 
vehicle field. Only the information provided by the investigators was used and no 
assumptions were made about complementary foods that were not specifically 
mentioned, such as rice that is often, but not always, served with curries. Two 
additional mutually exclusive food attribution variables were also created; one variable 
was based on reporting of rice or noodles as implicated vehicles (yes or no), and the 
other was based on the type of meat reported as an implicated vehicle (seafood, 
poultry or meat).  
The evidence obtained to implicate the food vehicle is entered in five different non-
mutually exclusive fields of the Outbreak Register (see Appendix 1). To create one 
variable for analysis, the most robust level of evidence for each outbreak was 
determined. The levels of evidence were ranked with laboratory evidence (isolation of 
the pathogen from the food) as the highest level, followed by statistical evidence 
(analytical study), then compelling descriptive evidence, other evidence and finally no 
evidence. 
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Table 1: Description of food categories. Adapted from (17) 
Category Description Example foods 
Foods eaten raw or 
lightly cooked 
Foods that are served without being cooked 
at a temperature high enough to kill 
pathogens 
Raw oysters, raw egg 
aioli 
Cook/serve foods Limited and rapid (<30 min) preparation 
steps including a cooking step, at a high 
enough temperature to kill pathogens 
Pizza, steak, chicken 
pieces, stir fry 
Solid masses of 
potentially 
hazardous foods 
Dense foods that are cooked and may be 
held hot for a time before serving 
Lasagne, casseroles, 
rice 
Roasted 
meat/poultry 
Solid pieces of meat, roasted or baked 
(cooked >30 min) 
Roast beef, whole 
chicken 
Salads with one or 
more cooked 
ingredients 
One or more of the ingredients in the salad 
is cooked prior to combining with the salad. 
Salad is then served cold 
Pasta salad, chicken 
Caesar salad 
Salads with raw 
ingredients 
Salad with no cooked component Green salad, fresh 
tomatoes 
Baked goods Baked or cooked, with some cold or hot 
holding. May be iced, filled etc. 
Meat pies, cake, bread, 
icing 
Sandwiches Hot or cold ingredients served between two 
pieces of bread or other baked goods. This 
category is selected if investigation suggests 
that contamination likely occurred during 
assembly or consumption of the sandwich 
Hamburger, hot dog, 
panini, sandwich 
Liquid or semi-solid 
mixtures of 
potentially 
hazardous foods 
Combination of multiple ingredients before 
or during cooking, followed by hot holding 
and service 
Sauce, soup, gravy 
Beverages Liquid foods, with or without ice Soft drink, milk, alcohol 
Commercially 
processed foods 
Food processed in a processing facility Pasteurised milk, 
precooked meat, 
canned fruit, ice cream 
Multiple foods Multiple foods implicated, do not fit any 
other category 
Buffet 
Other Food does not fit any other category  
Unknown Food vehicle unknown  
 
Other data cleaning 
Additional data cleaning steps included: 
x As specified in the data dictionary, for some variables a value containing 9s (i.e. 
9, 99, 999, or sometimes 998) is the code for unknown answers. These 
responses were recoded as unknown for this analysis. 
x Nonsensical values in all variables were recoded as unknown. 
x The setting in which the food was prepared is the most likely location for 
contamination with toxin producing bacteria. The Outbreak Register has fields 
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for both the place the food vehicle was prepared (preparation setting) and the 
place where the food vehicle was consumed (setting eaten). The data dictionary 
recommends a “preparation setting” of “not applicable” only if the outbreak is 
not foodborne or suspected foodborne. In outbreaks where the “preparation 
setting” was listed as “not applicable”, “preparation setting” was replaced with 
the value in “setting eaten” in order to allow analysis of the setting in which 
contamination most likely occurred as it is likely that the food was prepared and 
eaten in the same setting.  
Data analysis 
Medians and ranges were calculated for all numerical variables including number of 
cases, number of hospitalisations, number of deaths, median age, percentage of each 
gender, median incubation period and duration and percentage for each symptom. 
Since this is aggregated data, this means that the medians presented may be medians 
of medians (for example, the median of median incubation periods).  
Histograms were constructed in Microsoft Excel using outbreak data aggregated by 
year based on onset date of the outbreak. Overall rates for each jurisdiction were 
calculated using population data downloaded from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(18), and compared using Poisson regression. A p-value less than 0.05 was 
considered significant for all analyses.  
x Percent incidence of symptoms was calculated using the number of cases 
reporting the illness as the numerator, and the number of cases interviewed 
about the symptom as the denominator, with the exception of the following: 
o For outbreaks where the number of cases reporting the symptoms was 
higher than the number interviewed, the total number ill was used as the 
denominator. 
o Similarly, if the number of cases reporting a symptom had a value, but 
the number of cases interviewed about the symptom was missing, the 
total number ill was used as the denominator. 
o If an outbreak had no information for any symptom, the percentage of 
each symptom for this outbreak was recoded as missing. 
x Three different questions in the Outbreak Register were used to record the 
factors that contributed to an outbreak; “major contaminating factors”, “factors 
for microbial growth” and “factors for microbial survival”.  The category “major 
contaminating factors” refers to the factor that led to contamination of the food 
vehicle, and thus to the outbreak. “Factors for bacterial growth” refers to how 
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the pathogen grew in the food after contamination, and “factors for microbial 
survival” refers to how the pathogen survived food preparation procedures 
(such as cooking) to be consumed by the case. For all three categories of 
contributing factor, two different options can be selected, potentially resulting in 
percentages adding up to more than 100%. “Unknown” was only used for 
outbreaks where no other option was selected.  
x To assess the role of temperature abuse on growth of the bacteria and 
production of toxin, the number of outbreaks that reported at least one growth 
factor involving temperature abuse was calculated. These growth factors were:  
o delay between preparation and consumption 
o foods left at room or warm temperature 
o inadequate refrigeration 
o slow cooling 
o inadequate thawing 
o insufficient cooking 
x To assess the role of temperature abuse on survival of the bacteria and toxin, 
the number of outbreaks that reported at least one survival factor involving 
temperature abuse was calculated. These survival factors were: 
o inadequate thawing and cooking 
o insufficient time or temperature during reheating 
o insufficient time or temperature during cooking 
x The number of outbreaks where the food was prepared in a food service setting 
(“food service business”) was calculated using those outbreaks where 
“preparation setting” was listed as: 
o restaurant 
o commercial caterer 
o fair/festival/mobile service 
o take-away 
o grocery store/delicatessen 
x Outbreaks involving aged care facilities were analysed by calculating the 
number of outbreaks where “preparation setting” and/or “setting eaten” was 
aged care. 
x For further attribution of B. cereus and other suspected outbreaks, the following 
criteria were used for probable case definitions: 
o Emetic B. cereus  
 incubation period ≤ 6 hours 
 ≥ 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
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o Diarrhoeal B. cereus  
 incubation period ≥ 6 hours 
 < 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
o Preformed toxin 
 incubation period ≤ 6 hours 
 ≥ 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
 if incubation period is < 2 hour, and the suspected food vehicle 
includes rice, classify as probable emetic B. cereus 
o In vivo toxin 
 incubation period ≥ 6 hours 
 < 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
Results 
Descriptive epidemiology 
A summary of the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in 
Australia is shown in Figure 2 and Table 2. A total of 272 outbreaks were confirmed or 
suspected to have been caused by a bacterial toxin producing pathogen. Of these, 107 
(39%) were laboratory confirmed. A single case was positive for a toxin producing 
bacteria in 28 (17%) of the suspected outbreaks. The remaining 137 outbreaks were 
considered suspected toxin mediated outbreaks based on investigator suspicion. A 
total of 4066 people were ill as a result of bacterial toxin outbreaks, of which 2219 
(55%) cases were within laboratory confirmed outbreaks. A total of 13 deaths were 
reported during laboratory confirmed outbreaks, 12 (92%) within aged care facilities. 
Not all outbreaks had data entered for the number of hospitalisations, number of 
deaths, number at risk (used to calculate percent ill), median age or median per cent of 
each sex. The symbols in Table 2 represent completeness of each variable, as shown 
in the footnote.  
The frequency of outbreaks by year is shown in Figure 3, and a breakdown of the 
number of outbreaks per state is shown in Figure 4. An additional 180 outbreaks were 
identified as possible toxin mediated outbreaks with unknown aetiology, based on an 
incubation period of 18 hours or less. These outbreaks are included for comparison in 
Figure 3. There is no obvious trend over time for any of the categories of toxin 
mediated outbreaks, although in 2005, 2010 and 2011 more outbreaks were reported 
in all categories (Figure 3). The rate of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks per one 
million people reported per jurisdiction is shown in Table 3. If the rates for the 
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jurisdictions with 50 or more outbreaks reported are compared, Victoria (VIC) reported 
2.5 times as many bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks than New South Wales (NSW), 
and 2 times as many outbreaks as Queensland (QLD) (both comparisons significant 
with p-values <0.001).  
 
Figure 2: Flow chart showing inclusion criteria for this study. The number of outbreaks 
remaining at each step is shown in brackets. 
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Table 2: Epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in Australia, 2001 – 
2013 
Confirmed Suspected All 
Number of outbreaks 107 165 272 
Total number of cases 2219 1847 4066 
Number of cases per 
outbreak, median (range) 12.0 (2-272) 8.0 (2-125) 9.0 (2-272) 
Hospitalisations 47† 23* 70* 
Deaths 13* 0* 13* 
Percent of outbreaks 
associated with one or 
more deaths 
5.7* 0* 2.2* 
Ill median percent (range) 20.4 (0.7-100)† 18.2 (2.2-100) ‡ 19.1 (0.7-100) † 
Age median 63.5† 43.5‡ 52.5† 
Sex median 
percent 
Male 37.0† 42.0† 40.0† 
Female 63.0† 58.0† 60.0† 
* ≥90% complete 
† 75 – 89% complete 
‡ 50 – 74% complete 
 
 
Figure 3: Confirmed and suspected bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks, and outbreaks with an 
unknown aetiology and incubation period of 18 hours or less, by year, Australia, 2001 to 2013 
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Figure 4: Distribution of confirmed and suspected bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks 
by jurisdiction and year, Australia 2001-2013. ACT – Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New 
South Wales; NT – Northern Territory; QLD – Queensland; SA – South Australia; TAS – 
Tasmania; VIC – Victoria; WA – Western Australia 
Table 3: Rate of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks reported per million people for each 
Australian jurisdiction, 2001 to 2013 
Jurisdiction* Number of outbreaks 
Rate per 1 
million people 
Incidence 
rate ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval p-value 
ACT 5 1.11 0.61 0.25 – 1.48 0.27 
NSW 67 0.75 0.41 0.30 – 0.55 <0.001 
NT 2 0.71 0.39 0.10 – 1.56 0.18 
QLD 50 0.93 0.51 0.37 – 0.71 <0.001 
SA 4 0.19 0.11 0.04 – 0.29 <0.001 
TAS 1 0.16 0.08 0.01 – 0.61 0.014 
VIC 124 1.83 reference reference reference 
WA 19 0.68 0.37 0.23 – 0.60 <0.001 
* ACT – Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New South Wales; NT – Northern Territory; QLD – 
Queensland; SA – South Australia; TAS – Tasmania; VIC – Victoria; WA – Western Australia 
Table 4 shows the general epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks, 
separated into aetiology categories. Of the laboratory confirmed outbreaks, 76% were 
caused by C. perfringens, 15% were caused by S. aureus and 6% were caused by B. 
cereus. Only outbreaks associated with S. aureus had more confirmed outbreaks than 
suspected (70% confirmed). Outbreaks associated with confirmed S. aureus infection 
had fewer cases on average than outbreaks caused by other confirmed aetiologies. 
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Almost all deaths (92%) were associated with confirmed C. perfringens outbreaks. 
Completeness of the data was variable, with some fields having less than 50% useable 
answers (not unknown). In Figure 5, the frequency of outbreaks each year is divided 
into aetiology and confirmation status.  
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Symptomology 
Table 5 shows information about the illness caused by the different toxin producing 
bacteria. Similar to the general epidemiology variables, completeness was variable. 
S. aureus outbreaks had the shortest median incubation period (3 hours for confirmed 
outbreaks, 6 hours for suspected outbreaks) and C. perfringens outbreaks had the 
longest (12 hours for both confirmed and suspected outbreaks). The median incubation 
period for B. cereus was 8.5 hours. Duration of illness was comparable between 
pathogen groups, although both confirmed and suspected S. aureus outbreaks had a 
shorter median than the other categories.  
Diarrhoea was the most commonly reported symptom in all outbreaks. Vomiting and 
nausea were most common in outbreaks associated with S. aureus and in the 
preformed toxin category. Fever, bloody diarrhoea, reverse temperature and joint and 
muscle pain were infrequently reported. Numbness and tingling, itching, and rash were 
not reported in any outbreaks. 
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Food vehicle attribution 
A wide variety of foods were implicated or suspected to be implicated in bacterial toxin 
mediated outbreaks. To simplify analysis, foods were categorised and are shown in 
Table 6. A food vehicle was suspected for all confirmed outbreaks caused by S. 
aureus, B. cereus, preformed and in vivo formed toxins. In contrast, almost half of the 
outbreaks confirmed to be caused by C. perfringens had an unknown or missing food 
vehicle. Completeness for suspected outbreaks ranged from 39% for suspected C. 
perfringens outbreaks to 91% for suspected B. cereus outbreaks. The category of 
“solid masses of potentially hazardous foods” was the most frequently implicated 
category for all aetiologies (29%; Table 6), followed by the category of “liquid or semi-
solid mixtures of potentially hazardous foods” (11%). 
Of those outbreaks with a food vehicle listed, 26% were confirmed through laboratory 
evidence. Another 19% of outbreaks showed a statistical link with the food through an 
analytical study such as case control or cohort and 23% had compelling evidence to 
implicate the food. Of the outbreaks associated with solid masses of potentially 
hazardous foods, in 31% the implicated pathogen was isolated from the food vehicle. In 
19%, the investigators were able to obtain statistical evidence that implicated the food 
vehicle. In an additional 26% of the outbreaks, the investigators were able to obtain 
compelling evidence implicating the food. 
The type of meat present in the food vehicle is shown in the top section of Table 7. 
Seafood is rarely implicated. Meat (beef, pork and lamb) is reported more frequently 
than poultry. Also shown in Table 7 is the presence of a starch containing product such 
as rice, noodles or pasta. With the exception of outbreaks of C. perfringens, starch 
containing foods are common in all outbreak types.
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Contributing factors 
All three of the contributing factor fields were poorly completed, as shown by the high 
number of unknown values in Table 8. Only 21% of outbreaks had a major 
contaminating factor listed (other than “unknown”). Of those with a response, the most 
commonly reported major factor was the generic category “other source of 
contamination”. Other categories frequently reported were “person to food to person”, 
“food handler contamination”, “cross contamination from raw ingredients”, “inadequate 
cleaning of equipment”, “storage in contaminated environment” and “toxic substance or 
part of tissue”. Few of these major factors were confirmed; 56% of those with an 
answer were assumed or suspected contamination factors. Of those confirmed, 22% 
were confirmed with measured evidence, 3% were confirmed verbally during inspection 
and 19% were confirmed by observation during inspection. 
Factors for microbial growth had the highest rate of completeness of the three 
contributing factor variables, with 43% of outbreaks having at least one response 
(Table 9). All of these outbreaks reported a factor for microbial growth that can be 
considered temperature abuse. The only factor for bacterial growth selected that was 
not related to temperature abuse was “anaerobic packaging/modified atmosphere”, and 
this was only selected in one outbreak, suspected to have been caused by an in vivo 
toxin. The growth factors in this outbreak were confirmed by observation during 
inspection. Of those outbreaks with growth factors listed, 48% were assumed or 
suspected, 23% were confirmed by observation during inspection, 23% were confirmed 
verbally during inspection and 7% were confirmed with measured evidence. 
Completeness of the factors for microbial survival was also low; only 28% of outbreaks 
had at least one response. Of the outbreaks with a response, 82% of the factors for 
microbial survival involved a type of temperature abuse, including “insufficient 
time/temperature during cooking”, “insufficient time/temperature during reheating” or 
“inadequate thawing and cooking” (Table 10). Of those outbreaks with survival factors 
listed, 69% were assumed or suspected, 13% were confirmed by observation during 
inspection, 13% were confirmed verbally during inspection and 5% were confirmed with 
measured evidence.
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Food preparation and consumption settings 
The setting in which contamination of the food vehicle may have occurred is listed in 
two categories – the setting in which the food was prepared (Table 11) and the setting 
in which the food was consumed (Table 12). For 77% of the outbreaks, the implicated 
food was eaten and prepared in the same location. In the other 23% of outbreaks, the 
food was prepared in a commercial location such as a take-away shop and eaten at 
home.  
The types of settings in which bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks occur can be divided 
into two dominant types depending on the pathogen involved. Outbreaks caused by C. 
perfringens, both confirmed and suspected, were most commonly reported in aged 
care facilities (51% and 60% for confirmed and suspected respectively, when both 
setting where food was prepared and setting where food was consumed is taken into 
account, Table 13). There were no reports of outbreaks caused by the other bacterial 
toxin aetiologies in aged care facilities with the exception of two outbreaks suspected to 
be due to a toxin, and one outbreak confirmed to involve both C. perfringens and B. 
cereus. The other aetiology groups were more likely to be reported in outbreaks where 
food was prepared by a commercial enterprise, such as a restaurant, fast food/take 
away, grocery store, delicatessen, commercial caterer, fair, festival, mobile service 
(Table 13). The food vehicles for few outbreaks (3%) were prepared in a private 
residence. 
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Further attribution of suspected aetiologies 
The Outbreak Register does not provide information on the type of toxin produced by 
B. cereus. Table 14 attempts to utilise the information available, such as incubation 
period and percent of cases reporting vomiting, to assess which outbreaks may have 
been caused by the emetic toxin and which ones may have been caused by the 
diarrhoeal toxin. One confirmed outbreak was likely to be caused by the emetic toxin, 
based on a short incubation period and high rates of vomiting. Five confirmed 
outbreaks were likely to be caused by the diarrhoeal toxin based on longer incubation 
periods and lower rates of vomiting.  
Of the 11 outbreaks suspected to be caused by B. cereus, four had incubation periods 
less than six hours. In three of these outbreaks, all cases reported vomiting and these 
outbreaks can be considered likely outbreaks of the emetic type. The fourth outbreak 
had only 33% of cases reporting vomiting. Three of the remaining seven outbreaks had 
median incubation periods between 10 hours and 14 hours. No cases reported 
vomiting in any of these outbreaks, and are likely to be diarrhoeal toxin type outbreaks. 
Two outbreaks had long incubation periods of 24 and 31 hours. These outbreaks may 
not be toxin mediated. The remaining two outbreaks had no data for incubation period 
and one had no data for numbers of cases reporting vomiting.  
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Table 14: Informative variables and assessment of probable toxin type for confirmed and 
suspected B. cereus outbreaks (emetic or diarrhoeal), Australia 2001 to 2013 
Confirmation Incubation (hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Probable 
toxin type 
Confirmed 2 100 0 Fried rice and honey chicken Emetic 
Confirmed 6 0 100 Multiple foods Diarrhoeal 
Confirmed 8 16 100 Boiled gefilte fish (fish balls) Diarrhoeal 
Confirmed 9 67 67 Mashed Potato & Gravy Diarrhoeal 
Confirmed 10 3 97 Rice Diarrhoeal 
Confirmed 12 13 96 Rice (and/or beef curry) Diarrhoeal 
Suspected 2 100 33 Fried rice Emetic 
Suspected 4 100 100 Chicken katsu Emetic 
Suspected 4 100 100 
Chicken teriyaki 
sushi roll (nori 
roll) 
Emetic 
Suspected 4 33 100 Cold chicken salad Diarrhoeal 
Suspected 10 0 100 Kebab/hummous Diarrhoeal 
Suspected 11 0 86 Cooked Chicken Diarrhoeal 
Suspected 14 0 100 Naan/rice Diarrhoeal 
Suspected 24 100 84 Rice Unknown 
Suspected 31 - - Meat Unknown 
Suspected - 0 100 Unknown Insufficient information 
Suspected - - - 
Chicken and 
bacon/meatlovers 
pizza 
Insufficient 
information 
* - indicates no information provided for variable 
Tables showing a similar analysis for all other suspected outbreaks are shown in 
Appendix 2, separated by suspected aetiology. Of the seven suspected S. aureus 
outbreaks, and 90 suspected C. perfringens outbreaks, 32 had symptoms and 
incubation period consistent with the aetiology suspected by investigators (four S. 
aureus outbreaks, 28 C. perfringens outbreaks). An additional outbreak suspected by 
investigators to be caused by S. aureus was more likely to be caused by an in vivo 
toxin. All other outbreaks did not have enough information to allow characterisation, or 
had symptoms inconsistent with a bacterial toxin mediated outbreak.  
A total of 57 outbreaks were suspected to be caused by an unnamed bacterial 
intoxication. Of these outbreaks, two were assessed as likely caused by the B. cereus 
emetic toxin, 15 due to a preformed toxin (S. aureus or emetic B. cereus) and 29 due to 
an in vivo formed toxin (diarrhoeal B. cereus or C. perfringens). A further 12 outbreaks 
had insufficient information supplied, or the details were inconsistent with what is 
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known about bacterial intoxications. All but one (90%) of the outbreaks assessed as 
probable in vivo toxin outbreaks by investigators were probable in vivo outbreaks by 
the case definition. Only one outbreak had no median incubation period reported, 
although symptoms were consistent with an in vivo toxin outbreak. Nine of the 14 
outbreaks (64%) assessed as probable preformed toxin outbreaks by investigators met 
the probable preformed toxin case definition. Of the remaining five outbreaks, three 
met the probable in vivo toxin outbreak case definition, and two were inconsistent with 
any probable bacterial toxin case definition. Similarly, 24 of the 33 outbreaks (73%) 
identified by investigators as caused by a toxin (type of toxin not specified) fitted the 
probable toxin case definition (eight probable preformed toxin outbreaks, 16 probable 
in vivo toxin outbreaks). Of the remaining nine outbreaks, two were not consistent with 
a bacterial intoxication and seven had insufficient information to allow an assessment.  
In total, 87% (82 of 94 outbreaks with complete information) of outbreaks with a 
suspected aetiology and a known median incubation period, percent vomiting and 
percent diarrhoea were categorised correctly. However, of these, 26% (24 outbreaks) 
that were reported as “toxin” outbreaks could have been fully categorised based on 
symptomology.   
Of the 180 outbreaks with unknown aetiology and incubation periods of 18 hours or 
less, 40 outbreaks had incubation periods of seven hours or less, and 50% or more 
cases reporting vomiting. These outbreaks are probable preformed toxin outbreaks 
according to the case definition. Another 44 outbreaks had incubation periods between 
six hours and 18 hours, less than 50% of cases reporting vomiting and 50% or more 
cases reporting diarrhoea. These outbreaks are probable in vivo outbreaks. The 
remaining 86 outbreaks did not follow this pattern, so no conclusions could be made on 
aetiology. 
Discussion 
This analysis was able to establish a greater understanding of the epidemiology of 
bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in Australia between 2001 and 2013. The 
incidence of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks during the thirteen-year 
period under study was variable. Similarly, there was no obvious trend for any specific 
aetiology or confirmation status, although 2010 and 2011 had more C. perfringens 
outbreaks than other years. The number of outbreaks per jurisdiction was too small in 
most jurisdictions for meaningful calculations of rate, as a single outbreak in a small 
jurisdiction makes a big difference to the rate. However, comparing outbreaks in the 
larger states, VIC reported more than twice as many outbreaks (adjusted for 
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population) than any other state. While classification of outbreaks as “suspected” rather 
than “unknown” may contribute to this higher incidence of toxin mediated outbreaks 
(i.e. epidemiologists in VIC may be more willing to assume a toxin aetiology in an 
unconfirmed outbreak), VIC also has a higher incidence of confirmed toxin outbreaks 
than other jurisdictions. From the data available, it is unclear whether this was due to a 
higher incidence of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in VIC, or if other unknown 
factors were involved.  
The median incubation period for the confirmed S. aureus outbreaks was shorter than 
for all other aetiologies (median 3 hours, range 2 hours to 7 hours). In contrast, the 
median incubation period for C. perfringens outbreaks was 12 hours (range 6 hours to 
17 hours). These incubation periods are similar to the expected incubation periods for 
these illnesses, one to seven hours for S. aureus (19) and 16 hours for C. perfringens 
(11).  
The median incubation period for outbreaks suspected to be due to C. perfringens was 
the same as that reported for confirmed outbreaks (median 12 hours). However, the 
upper bound of the range was much larger (24 days). Completeness of median 
incubation periods for suspected C. perfringens outbreaks was poor (33%). Of the 60 
outbreaks with no median incubation period listed, 53 occurred in aged care facilities, 
highlighting the difficulty investigating outbreaks in this setting (20). Onset of illness can 
be difficult to identify in elderly cases due to a higher incidence of diarrhoea from other 
causes, such as medication use (21). All but two of the suspected C. perfringens 
outbreaks with median incubation periods reported have incubation periods consistent 
with that expected for this pathogen (11). The two outbreaks with long incubation 
periods (5 and 24 days) both had moderate growth of C. perfringens from a single 
case, probably contributing to the investigator’s suspicion that these outbreaks were 
caused by C. perfringens. For confirmation, growth is required from at least two cases, 
and in these outbreaks the growth of C. perfringens may have been incidental and the 
aetiology of the outbreak some other unidentified agent. Indeed, it is common for 
elderly people to have elevated levels of C. perfringens in their faeces without 
associated illness (22).  
The median incubation period and range for confirmed B. cereus outbreaks of 8.5 
hours (range 2 hours to 12 hours) is reflective of the inability to separate the emetic 
and diarrheal forms of the illness based on the information provided. The emetic 
disease is expected to have an incubation period between 30 minutes and six hours, 
while the diarrhoeal disease is expected to have an incubation period of six to 15 hours 
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(12). Of the six confirmed B. cereus outbreaks, 83% (5 outbreaks) were likely to have 
been caused by the diarrhoeal toxin. The remaining outbreak had a suspected food 
vehicle that included rice, consistent with the emetic form of B. cereus as rice is a 
commonly reported vehicle for emetic B. cereus (8, 10, 23). Of the eleven suspected B. 
cereus outbreaks, 27% (three outbreaks) were likely caused by the emetic toxin and 
45% (five outbreaks) were likely diarrhoeal toxin. This distribution of a greater number 
of diarrhoeal outbreaks than emetic is consistent with the epidemiology of B. cereus in 
North America and Northern Europe, and different to that seen in countries with high 
rates of rice consumption such as Japan (10). 
A wide variety of foods (confirmed through isolation or epidemiological evidence, or 
suspected due to common consumption) were implicated in toxin mediated outbreaks. 
The food source for confirmed C. perfringens outbreaks was not identified for 47% of 
outbreaks. This is in contrast with other confirmed aetiologies and may be due to the 
setting in which these outbreaks occurred. Of these 38 confirmed C. perfringens 
outbreaks, 29 occurred in aged care facilities, and six occurred in hospitals or other 
institutions. Determining the food eaten in these settings is often difficult due to poor 
recall on the part of the cases, contributing to the difficulty investigating outbreaks in 
aged care facilities, as discussed above (20). 
The food vehicles implicated in bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks most frequently fall 
into the two food categories that are likely to spend a longer period of time at 
temperatures that promote bacterial growth than other types of foods (“solid masses of 
potentially hazardous foods” and “liquids or semi-solid mixtures of potentially 
hazardous foods”). This is different from the US study, which reported “roasted meat or 
poultry” as the most commonly reported food category for bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks (1). No other studies of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks were found that 
used food categories to examine food preparation rather than the ingredients 
themselves.  
The evidence for the implication of these food vehicles varies from isolation of the 
pathogen from a sample of the food to no specific evidence other than that the food 
was eaten and the investigators suspected it may have been implicated. More than two 
thirds of the outbreaks that had a food vehicle listed had evidence to support the 
implication of this food. This includes outbreaks where the pathogen was isolated from 
the food, an epidemiological link was shown statistically through an analytical study, or 
the evidence was “compelling”, such as outbreaks where only one food item was eaten 
by a case. Given the difficulty confirming outbreaks caused by the bacterial toxin 
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producing pathogens, especially in food, this level of confidence in the food vehicle is 
satisfactory, although there is room for improvement. 
The most commonly reported major contamination factor in all outbreaks was the 
generic description “other source of contamination”, in 6% of all outbreaks. 
Contamination of food directly from a person rather than the environment (person to 
food to person or food handler contamination; no outbreak reported both) was most 
commonly reported in outbreaks caused by S. aureus (63% of S. aureus outbreaks that 
reported a major contributing factor). This is consistent with the ubiquitousness of S. 
aureus on human skin, and previous studies showing that S. aureus outbreaks are 
commonly associated with contamination from food handlers (1, 7, 9, 24). Surprisingly, 
few outbreaks of S. aureus or B. cereus had a major contamination factor of “toxic 
substance or part of tissue” (6% of confirmed S. aureus outbreaks, no B. cereus or 
suspected S. aureus outbreaks), a category that according to the Outbreak Register 
data dictionary includes preformed toxin outbreaks. 
All of the outbreaks with a factor for microbial growth listed reported at least one factor 
that relates to temperature abuse of the food. Similarly, 82% of outbreaks reporting a 
bacterial survival factor included at least one factor relating to temperature abuse. 
Temperature abuse of food occurs when the food is held at a temperature between 4°C 
and 60°C, the optimal temperature for growth of many microorganisms. Temperature 
abuse is a commonly reported contributing factor for bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks, as this allows the pathogen to grow in the food, and in the case of 
preformed toxin or bacterial spores (S. aureus and B. cereus, and B. cereus and C. 
perfringens respectively), subsequent cooking of the food does not remove the threat 
(7, 10, 13).  
Contamination of the food that caused foodborne outbreaks can occur in three main 
parts of the food chain: contamination during primary food production (e.g. Salmonella 
in eggs), contamination during preparation of food products for consumption, or 
contamination at the location where the food is consumed. The latter two categories 
are reported in the Outbreak Register and are relevant for bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks. As the same setting for preparation and consumption was assumed when 
“not applicable” was entered as the preparation setting, the analysis may overestimate 
the association with these settings as the food may have been prepared elsewhere. 
However, this is unlikely, as the food must have been prepared somewhere, and if the 
food had been prepared elsewhere the investigator should have entered this 
information rather than selecting “not applicable”. More than half of the outbreaks 
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(53%) were associated with preparation of food at food service businesses, such as a 
restaurant or commercial caterer. Few outbreaks were associated with preparation of 
food in private homes (3%). This is in contrast to that reported in a study in the US, 
which found that 16% of outbreaks were associated with private homes (1). 
Aged care facilities were implicated, either as the location for food preparation and/or 
the location for consumption, in 56% of outbreaks associated with C. perfringens, but 
none of the outbreaks caused by S. aureus or B. cereus. However, this is not 
necessarily a true reflection of the incidence of these other toxin producing bacteria 
and may be due to measurement bias. Indeed, only three of the suspected outbreaks 
in the toxin category and none in the in vivo toxin categories were associated with aged 
care facilities compared with 54 of the 90 suspected C. perfringens outbreaks, 
suggesting that investigators may assume C. perfringens in aged care outbreaks. In 
addition, bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks are less likely to be recorded or 
investigated in the community (underreporting), as the illness is mild and short 
compared with other forms of gastroenteritis, whereas in aged care facilities the illness 
may be more severe, leading to greater vigilance, detection and investigation. C. 
perfringens is more likely to cause large outbreaks that are noticed and investigated 
(1), suggesting that even if small S. aureus or B. cereus outbreaks are occurring in 
aged care facilities, they are not necessarily investigated. Completeness of data is 
lacking in these investigations, particularly for incubation period and food vehicle. 
However, few outbreaks report high rates of vomiting among cases, suggesting that it 
is unlikely that these are misattributed S. aureus outbreaks. Aged care was not 
reported as a notable risk factor for bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in US studies, 
only included in an “other” category (1, 25). 
All but one of the deaths that occurred during bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks 
occurred in an aged care facility. It is difficult to know whether these deaths were 
caused by the outbreak associated illness or incidental to the outbreak. This is 
consistent with other studies showing higher mortality during foodborne outbreaks in 
aged care facilities (20, 22, 26, 27). However, improving the investigation of all 
outbreaks of gastroenteritis in aged care facilities is an important component of 
maintaining the health of this vulnerable group. Community outbreaks of bacterial 
toxins are likely to remain underreported. 
Many of the outbreaks investigated here were the result of temperature abuse of “solid 
masses of potentially hazardous food”, a category of food that can be difficult to heat or 
cool appropriately. A simple measure to reduce the incidence of these outbreaks is 
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greater awareness around keeping foods at appropriate temperatures, and promoting 
awareness that some types of foods require extra care when heating or cooling. 
Although 87% of outbreaks with a suspected aetiology and sufficient information for 
categorisation were categorised correctly by investigators, four outbreaks were 
incorrectly categorised, based on the criteria used here. Of the 87% of outbreaks, 26% 
were toxin outbreaks that could have been further categorised as preformed or in vivo 
toxins. The inconsistency between the aetiology suspected by the investigator and the 
probable case definitions, and the missed opportunity of further categorising toxin 
outbreaks suggests that including these definitions as a guide in the Outbreak Register 
would help investigators to suggest a probable aetiology based on their investigation. 
Given that bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks are often not confirmed, this will increase 
discrimination of outbreaks of unknown cause. 
The design of the question in the Outbreak Register asking if a symptom was reported 
by any cases is flawed. The only option is to check the box marked “yes” (leading to 
additional questions asking the number of cases reporting the symptom), or leave it 
unchecked. This second option means that there is no way to distinguish between 
outbreaks where the symptom was not reported in any cases, and outbreaks where 
cases were not asked about the symptom at all, leading to measurement bias. For this 
study, it was assumed that outbreaks where the box was not checked truly had no 
cases reporting the symptom, unless no information was entered for any symptom. In 
this latter case, the data was treated as missing. This method of analysis potentially 
leads to lower median percentages when the data from outbreaks are combined (i.e. by 
aetiology), especially for less frequently reported symptoms. The use of median rather 
than mean for these calculations attempts to counteract this measurement bias, and 
the range allows for an assessment of accuracy.   
One of the limitations of this study was choosing which outbreaks to include for 
analysis in addition to the confirmed outbreaks. The suspected outbreaks consisted of 
a combination of outbreaks in which a toxin producing bacteria was isolated from only 
one clinical sample or in low levels from food (i.e. not meeting CDC guidelines) and 
outbreaks where the symptomology and incubation periods led the investigators to 
suspect a toxin mediated outbreak with enough confidence to mention it in the remarks 
section. Without confirmation, it is possible that these outbreaks may have been 
caused by a pathogen other than a bacterial toxin, leading to selection bias, and may 
reflect differences in the way individual investigators perceive risk and the differences 
in the knowledge of investigators (28). This selection bias has been mitigated by 
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separating out the analysis of the outbreaks with a laboratory confirmed aetiology from 
the outbreaks with a suspected aetiology, and comparing these analyses. This study 
then attempts to assess whether the suspected outbreaks are true bacterial toxin 
mediated outbreaks by comparing symptomology of the suspected outbreaks with the 
distinctive symptomology of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks.  
In addition to the outbreaks designated as confirmed or suspected bacterial toxin 
mediated outbreaks, there were also 180 outbreaks with a median incubation period 
less than 18 hours. These outbreaks were not included in the analysis as no suspicion 
of a bacterial toxin aetiology was mentioned by the investigators. These outbreaks may 
not have been investigated beyond a basic report, or the investigator didn’t feel 
comfortable mentioning suspicions in the remarks. At least 94 of these outbreaks could 
be considered to fit the pattern for a preformed or in vivo toxin outbreak. A further 86 
outbreaks did not have enough information to make an assessment or the 
symptomology was incompatible with bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks. These 
“unknown” outbreaks were not analysed with the suspected and confirmed outbreaks, 
as selecting them based on incubation period rather than aetiology and categorising 
them by symptomology may bias the analysis (selection bias). However, given that it is 
likely that some of these outbreaks are true bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks, their 
absence from the analysis may in turn bias the conclusions drawn away from 
characteristics that are unique to bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks.  
Analysis of data collected and entered by multiple people over many years, such as the 
data in the Outbreak Register, always requires assumptions of what those who entered 
the data meant, especially in free text fields. In this analysis, assumptions were made 
about the foods implicated in the outbreak, based on what was written in the free text 
food vehicle field. Assumptions were kept to a minimum by only including foods listed. 
However, this may result in underestimation of foods that are common 
accompaniments, such as rice. 
Another assumption made for this analysis was that if the food preparation setting was 
listed as not applicable, then it was assumed to be the same as the setting in which the 
food was eaten. This may result in an overestimation of the proportion for some food 
preparation settings. However, for analysis of the two main settings associated with 
bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks (aged care and food service businesses), 
both food preparation and food consumption setting were combined, minimising the 
effect of misattribution of the food preparation setting. 
 
 
 
59 
 
The outbreaks reported here are likely to be only a small proportion of the true 
incidence of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks. Since these outbreaks frequently have 
a short incubation period, short duration and comparatively mild illness, they are often 
not reported and/or investigated. In addition, testing for these pathogens is only 
conducted at a small number of laboratories in Australia, so outbreaks due to bacterial 
toxins are often not laboratory confirmed. A limitation of studies into the epidemiology 
of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks is that because these toxins cause a mild and 
short lived illness, outbreaks are often not reported and investigated.  
Conclusion 
Bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks are a completely preventable form of 
foodborne illness. Most outbreaks are associated with foods in the category “solid 
masses of potentially hazardous food” and improper temperature control was 
associated with all outbreaks where contributing factor information was available. The 
primary group of people at greater risk of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne disease 
outbreaks are those residing in aged care facilities. In this setting, foods are often 
prepared in advance and are often in the “solid masses of potentially hazardous foods” 
category, a category that includes many foods that are easy to prepare for large groups 
of people and often refrigerated and reheated. In addition, deaths from usually mild 
gastroenteritis are more likely in elderly people. Public health efforts aimed at 
improving pre-cooked food storage habits could help to reduce the magnitude of this 
problem, especially by focusing the public health efforts in institutional settings, in 
particular aged care facilities.  
Recommendations for the Outbreak Register 
The OzFoodNet Outbreak Register is an extremely useful tool for understanding the 
epidemiology of and ultimately preventing gastrointestinal outbreaks in Australia. 
However, to reach its full potential, some improvements should be made, mostly in 
order to increase completeness and ease of use.  
The Outbreak Register is currently an Access database. While Access is a useful tool, 
and was the best available option when the Outbreak Register was established in 
2001, there are now many other options for a database such as this. Online databases 
allow users to enter the data directly, rather than the current method of sending the 
jurisdictional databases to OzFoodNet Central for compilation. Online databases are 
also more secure than using email to transfer the data and can allow for automated 
validation checks. 
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Many fields in the Outbreak Register are free text fields, meaning that investigators can 
enter any data they wish. However, many of these fields, such as aetiology, could be 
defined categories. By having a set of options from which investigators can select, 
misspellings and ambiguous answers can be avoided. This also improves the ease of 
use and time taken to enter the data. Including an option of “other”, with a free text field 
that follows will permit the entry of novel pathogens or responses. By retaining the 
current free text “remarks” field, investigators are still able to enter any extra 
information that couldn’t be entered elsewhere. 
Food vehicles in outbreaks can vary greatly, and it is important to retain a free text field 
to record the confirmed or suspected food involved. However, including additional 
questions to categorise these foods would assist in comparison between outbreaks. 
The investigators are often aware of more specific information about the meals than 
what is entered into the Outbreaks Register, so categorising foods during later 
analyses may miss some nuances. Including a food categories question, as used in 
this study, along with a question about food types (e.g. eggs, meat, poultry, rice, 
legumes, berries) would assist future analyses. This latter question would need to be a 
checkbox question, allowing investigators to select multiple options if required. 
Some questions are redundant and/or not used correctly. These questions could be 
redesigned to improve clarity. For example, the variable “food_evidence” asks what 
type of evidence was obtained to implicate the food vehicle. The following five 
questions then ask about each of these types of evidence individually as a yes or no 
question. As a result, “food_evidence” is frequently not completed. It is not necessary 
to include this field in the Register as the same information is entered into the individual 
evidence fields. 
Well-designed questions should have multiple options, covering all possible responses. 
By only allowing a “yes” response for the questions about symptoms, it is impossible to 
distinguish between a true no (i.e. no cases reported having the symptom), and a 
missing or unknown response. 
 In conclusion, this study has examined the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia and assessed the useability of the OzFoodNet 
Outbreak Register. The recommendations for improvement of the Outbreak Register 
have been shared with the OzFoodNet Outbreak Register Working Group. Future 
improvements of the Register will allow easier comparison of outbreaks.  
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Appendix 1: Data dictionary for Outbreak Register fields used 
Data field Description Example responses 
state Jurisdiction reporting the outbreak 
ACT 
NSW 
NT 
QLD 
SA 
TAS 
VIC 
WA 
onset_date Date of onset of first case date 
aetiology Implicated bacteria or bacterial group 
Bacillus cereus 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Clostridium perfringens 
preformed toxin 
in vivo toxin 
toxin 
confirmation Confirmation of aetiology Confirmed Suspected 
ill Number of cases Numeric 
hospitalisations Number of cases hospitalised during outbreaks Numeric 
deaths Number of deaths of cases Numeric 
age Median age of cases Numeric 
male Percent of cases who were male Numeric 
female Percent of cases who were female Numeric 
incubation Median of the incubation periods reported by cases Numeric 
duration Median of the duration of illness reported by cases Numeric 
nausea Was nausea reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_nausea How many people reported nausea Numeric 
nausea_number How many people were interviewed about nausea Numeric 
vomiting Was vomiting reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_vomit How many people reported vomiting Numeric 
vomit_number How many people were interviewed about vomiting Numeric 
diarrhoea Was diarrhoea reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_diarrhoea How many people reported diarrhoea Numeric 
diarrhoea_number How many people were interviewed about diarrhoea Numeric 
bloody Was bloody diarrhoea reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_bloody How many people reported bloody diarrhoea Numeric 
bloody_number 
How many people were 
interviewed about bloody 
diarrhoea 
Numeric 
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Data field Description Example responses 
fever Was fever reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_fever How many people reported fever Numeric 
fever_number How many people were interviewed about fever Numeric 
abdo Was abdominal pain reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_abdo How many people reported abdominal pain Numeric 
abdo_number 
How many people were 
interviewed about abdominal 
pain 
Numeric 
reverse Was reverse temperature reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_reverse How many people reported reverse temperature Numeric 
reverse_number 
How many people were 
interviewed about reverse 
temperature 
Numeric 
pain Was joint and muscle pain reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_pain How many people reported joint and muscle pain Numeric 
pain_number 
How many people were 
interviewed about joint and 
muscle pain 
Numeric 
numb Was numbness and tingling reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_numb How many people reported numbness and tingling Numeric 
numb_number 
How many people were 
interviewed about numbness 
and tingling 
Numeric 
itch Was itching reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_itch How many people reported itching Numeric 
itch_number How many people were interviewed about itching Numeric 
rash Was rash reported by any cases? Yes 
sym_rash How many people reported rash Numeric 
rash_number How many people were interviewed about rash Numeric 
food_vehicle What food was implicated in the outbreak free text 
lab_evid 
Was there any laboratory 
evidence to implicate the food 
vehicle? i.e. isolation of 
pathogen from food 
Yes 
No 
stat_evid 
Was there any statistical 
evidence to implicate the food 
vehicle? i.e. analytical study 
resulting in an OR or RR 
Yes 
No 
comp_evid 
Was there any compelling 
evidence to implicated the food 
vehicle? e.g. telltale symptoms, 
only one food eaten by all cases 
Yes 
No 
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Data field Description Example responses 
etc 
other_evid Was there any other evidence to implicated the food vehicle? 
Yes 
No 
cont_factor1 
cont_factor2 
The major factors contributing to 
contamination of the food 
vehicle. Two can be listed 
Cross contamination from raw ingredients 
Food handler contamination 
Inadequate cleaning of equipment 
Ingestion of contaminated raw products 
Other source of contamination 
person to food to person 
Storage in contaminated environment 
Toxic substance or part of tissue 
Unknown 
grow_factor1 
grow_factor2 
The major factors contributing to 
growth of the contaminant in the 
food vehicle. Two can be listed 
Foods left at room or warm temperature 
Slow cooling 
Inadequate refrigeration 
Delay between preparation and 
consumption 
Insufficient cooking 
Inadequate thawing 
Inadequate hot holding temperature 
Anaerobic packaging/modified 
atmosphere 
Other source of contamination 
Unknown 
surv_factor1 
surv_factor2 
The major factors contributing to 
survival of the contaminant in 
the food vehicle. Two can be 
listed 
Insufficient time/temperature during 
cooking 
Insufficient time/temperature during 
reheating 
Inadequate or failed disinfection 
Inadequate acidification 
Inadequate thawing and cooking 
Other source of contamination 
Unknown 
contevid1 
contevid2 
growevid1 
growevid2 
survevid1 
survevid2 
The level of evidence obtained 
for the contaminating factor 
(contevid1 and contevid2), 
growth factor (growevid1 and 
growevid2) and survival factor 
(survevid1 and survevid2) 
Assumed/suspected 
Confirmed by observation during 
inspection 
Confirmed verbally during inspection 
Confirmed with measured evidence 
Unknown 
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Data field Description Example responses 
preparation setting Setting in which the implicated food was prepared 
Aged care 
Camp 
Child care 
Commercial caterer 
Commercially manufactured 
Fair/festival/mobile service 
Grocery store/delicatessen 
Hospital 
Institution 
Military 
National franchised fast food restaurant 
Other 
Private caterer 
Private residence 
Restaurant 
School 
Take-away 
Unknown 
setting eaten Setting in which the implicated food was eaten 
Aged care 
Camp 
Child care 
Commercial caterer 
Community 
Cruise/airline 
Fair/festival/mobile service 
Function 
Health spa/resort 
Hospital 
Institution 
Military 
National franchised fast food restaurant 
Other 
Picnic 
Private residence 
Restaurant 
School 
Unknown 
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Appendix 2: Tables showing assessments of probable toxin 
types for suspected outbreaks 
Table 15: Informative variables and assessment of probable toxin type for suspected S. aureus 
outbreaks 
Incubation 
(hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle Probable toxin 
2 40 80 Unknown Unknown 
3 100 60 Multiple including rice, meat (roast) S. aureus 
4 80 100 Vietnamese pork rolls S. aureus 
6 0 100 Meatballs, rice, chicken souvlaki in vivo toxin 
6 100 75 Unknown S. aureus 
6 67 67 Sushi Roll S. aureus 
8 67 56 Ham pizza S. aureus 
Table 16: Informative variables and assessment of probable toxin type for suspected C. 
perfringens outbreaks 
Incubation 
(hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Aged 
Care 
Probable 
toxin 
6 0 100 Curry No C. perfringens 
8 0 100 Beef Rendang and coconut rice No C. perfringens 
8 0 100 Pea and ham soup No C. perfringens 
9 0 100 Lamb curry No C. perfringens 
9 2 100 Curry No C. perfringens 
10 0 100 Curried rice and tofu curry No C. perfringens 
10 0 100 Curry No C. perfringens 
10 4 99 Unknown No C. perfringens 
10 4 100 Vegetable and chilli dish No C. perfringens 
11 0 93 Lamb curry No C. perfringens 
12 0 45 Roast beef No C. perfringens 
12 0 100 Unknown No C. perfringens 
12 0 100 Unknown Yes C. perfringens 
12 0 100 Unknown No C. perfringens 
12 4 92 
Various Indian dishes - 
rice, beef madras, butter 
chicken, lamb Rogan 
josh, vegetable curry 
No C. perfringens 
12 14 100 Chicken curry No C. perfringens 
12 30 95 Chicken vol au vents No C. perfringens 
13 0 100 Lasagne suspected No C. perfringens 
13 10 100 
Multiple meat based 
foods, solid masses and 
roast style 
No C. perfringens 
14 0 100 Chicken curry No C. perfringens 
14 0 100 Multiple including curry No C. perfringens 
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Incubation 
(hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Aged 
Care 
Probable 
toxin 
and rice dishes 
14 6 100 Meat curry No C. perfringens 
14 19 94 Spaghetti Bolognaise No C. perfringens 
14 - - Unknown No C. perfringens 
15 0 80 Potato & Gravy No C. perfringens 
15 0 100 Stews and curries No C. perfringens 
17 0 90 Roast meats, salads, desserts No C. perfringens 
17 67 100 Gravy No C. perfringens 
120 0 100 Unknown No not a toxin 
576 0 100 Unknown No not a toxin 
- 0 67 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 79 Yellow rice No insufficient information 
- 0 81 Unknown No insufficient information 
- 0 90 Unknown No insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Roast beef Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown No insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient 
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Incubation 
(hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Aged 
Care 
Probable 
toxin 
information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Lamb chops and roast beef Yes 
insufficient 
information 
- 0 100 Beef/lamb kebab No insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Pork and gravy No insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 0 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 5 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 6 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 7 86 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 8 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 10 90 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 10 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 11 96 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 11 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 11 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 11 100 Unknown Yes insufficient 
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Incubation 
(hr)* 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Aged 
Care 
Probable 
toxin 
information 
- 12 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 13 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 13 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 14 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 17 92 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 17 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 17 100 Vitamised food Yes insufficient information 
- 20 100 Lasagne Yes insufficient information 
- 20 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 25 86 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- 25 100 Unknown Yes insufficient information 
- - - Unknown No insufficient information 
Table 17: Informative variables and assessment of possible toxin type for suspected preformed 
toxin, in vivo toxin and toxin groups 
Category Incubation (hr) 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Probable toxin 
type 
preformed 
toxin 1 100 0 
Fried rice or 
Singapore noodles B.cereus 
preformed 
toxin 2 86 86 Fried rice, pipis B.cereus 
preformed 
toxin 2 100 50 
Crumbed chicken 
pieces, sweet corn 
and chicken soup 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 4 21 64 Lasagne Unknown 
preformed 
toxin 4 50 0 
Japanese food 
including tempura, 
rice, yakitori 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 4 80 0 Unknown 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 4 100 100 Unknown 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 4 100 25 Cooked pasta 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 5 71 71 Mango sticky rice 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 6 75 75 Unknown 
preformed 
toxin 
preformed 7 17 50 Gravy in vivo toxin 
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Category Incubation (hr) 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Probable toxin 
type 
toxin 
preformed 
toxin 7 40 80 Unknown in vivo toxin 
preformed 
toxin 12 100 0 Unknown Unknown 
preformed 
toxin 15 50 100 Unknown in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 11 12 100 Seafood mornay and rice dish in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 12 0 100 Unknown in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 12 0 100 Butter chicken or boiled rice in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 12 0 100 Unknown in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 12 4 100 Potato bake and BBQ chicken in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 14 0 89 Chicken stirfry or beef massaman in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 16 0 100 
Raw capsicum, 
onions, fresh herbs, 
chicken and/or beef 
in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 16 0 100 Roast chicken and/or stuffing in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin 22 25 100 Beef or lamb kebab in vivo toxin 
in vivo toxin - 31 92 Unknown insufficient information 
toxin 1 25 50 Pasta with tomato sauce Unknown 
toxin 2 67 0 Fish and chips and salad 
preformed 
toxin 
toxin 2 100 100 Unknown preformed toxin 
toxin 4 60 80 Unknown preformed toxin 
toxin 4 67 67 Potato salad preformed toxin 
toxin 4 80 40 Feta preformed toxin 
toxin 4 100 100 Special fried rice preformed toxin 
toxin 4 100 100 Fish preformed toxin 
toxin 5 33 67 Sashimi Unknown 
toxin 6 100 100 Rice preformed toxin 
toxin 6 - - Karaage chicken and rice 
Insufficient 
information 
toxin 7 0 100 Pork belly, polenta, shallot tart in vivo toxin 
toxin 8 0 100 Beef taco in vivo toxin 
toxin 8 0 100 Thai fish dish with rice in vivo toxin 
toxin 9 0 100 Chicken and aioli roll in vivo toxin 
toxin 10 0 100 Fried rice in vivo toxin 
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Category Incubation (hr) 
Vomiting 
(%)* 
Diarrhoea 
(%)* Food vehicle 
Probable toxin 
type 
toxin 10 40 100 Beef, chicken, bean and rice dishes in vivo toxin 
toxin 11 0 100 Unknown in vivo toxin 
toxin 12 0 83 Unknown in vivo toxin 
toxin 12 0 100 Lamb curry and rice in vivo toxin 
toxin 12 33 67 Unknown in vivo toxin 
toxin 12 100 60 Pizza (meat lovers or chicken) in vivo toxin 
toxin 13 9 94 Curried Prawns in vivo toxin 
toxin 13 50 50 Unknown in vivo toxin 
toxin 14 0 100 Mushroom sauce in vivo toxin 
toxin 15 100 100 Chicken doner kebab in vivo toxin 
toxin 16 80 100 Unknown in vivo toxin 
toxin - 0 - Unknown Insufficient information 
toxin - 0 100 Unknown Insufficient information 
toxin - 17 100 Unknown Insufficient information 
toxin - 31 46 Smorgasbord with seafood 
Insufficient 
information 
toxin - 54 77 Unknown Insufficient information 
toxin - - - Sweet and sour pork or chow mein beef 
Insufficient 
information 
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Abstract 
Bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks, such as those caused by Clostridium 
perfringens, Staphylococcus aureus and Bacillus cereus, are an important and 
preventable cause of morbidity and mortality. Due to the short incubation period and 
duration of illness, these outbreaks are often underreported. This is the first study to 
describe the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in Australia. Using 
data collected between 2001 and 2013, we identify high risk groups and risk factors to 
inform prevention measures. 
Descriptive analyses of confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks between 2001 
and 2013 were undertaken using data extracted from the OzFoodNet Outbreak 
Register, a database of all outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease investigated by public 
health authorities in Australia.  
A total of 107 laboratory confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks were reported 
between 2001 and 2013, affecting 2219 people, including 47 hospitalisations and 13 
deaths. Twelve deaths occurred in residents of aged care facilities. Clostridium 
perfringens was the most commonly reported aetiological agent (81 outbreaks, 76%). 
The most commonly reported food preparation settings were commercial food 
preparation services (51 outbreaks, 48%) and aged care facilities (42 outbreaks, 39%). 
Bacterial toxin outbreaks were rarely associated with food preparation in the home (two 
outbreaks, 2%). In all outbreaks, the primary factor contributing to the outbreak was 
inadequate temperature control of the food. 
Public health efforts aimed at improving storage and handling practices for pre-cooked 
and re-heated foods, especially in commercial food preparation services and aged care 
facilities, could help to reduce the magnitude of bacterial toxin outbreaks. 
Introduction 
Two different types of bacterial toxins can cause gastroenteritis. Preformed toxins are 
produced by Staphylococcus aureus and Bacillus cereus (emetic toxin). (1, 2) These 
toxins are formed in the food and are resistant to heat, so the risk of illness is not 
removed by cooking. (3, 4) Onset of illness is rapid, between 30 minutes and six hours, 
and vomiting is the most commonly reported symptom. (3) In vivo toxins are produced 
by Clostridium perfringens and B. cereus (diarrhoeal toxin), and are formed in the 
digestive tract after food containing the bacteria is consumed. While adequately 
cooking food can kill the bacteria, both C. perfringens and B. cereus produce heat-
resistant spores which can survive cooking and subsequently regerminate after 
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cooking. Onset of illness is between six and 16 hours. Diarrhoea is commonly reported 
and vomiting is not common. (5, 6) All three toxin producing bacteria are ubiquitous in 
the environment, and S. aureus is a normal component of human flora. (7)  
Individual cases of S. aureus, B. cereus and C. perfringens gastroenteritis are not 
notifiable diseases in Australia, so gastroenteritis caused by these pathogens are only 
reported if they are part of an outbreak, defined as two or more cases of the same 
illness with a common source. Gastrointestinal outbreaks are collated in the national 
OzFoodNet Outbreak Register. 
OzFoodNet was established in 2000 by the Australian Government as a network of 
epidemiologists with representatives in every state and territory. OzFoodNet focuses 
on enhanced surveillance for foodborne illnesses. (8) The OzFoodNet Outbreak 
Register is a Microsoft Access database maintained by OzFoodNet Central (at the 
Australian Government Department of Health), and has been in use since 2001. State 
and territory-based OzFoodNet epidemiologists collect and provide summary data 
quarterly to OzFoodNet Central on all gastrointestinal outbreaks investigated in their 
jurisdiction. Summaries of outbreaks are published in OzFoodNet quarterly and annual 
reports (9, 10). 
The aim of this study was to describe the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia between 2001 and 2013, and to identify high risk 
groups and risk factors to inform prevention measures. 
Methods 
Data collection 
Outbreak Register data were extracted on 2 February 2015. Variables analysed 
included aetiology, laboratory confirmation of aetiology, food vehicle, state or territory 
of outbreak, year of outbreak, number of cases, number hospitalised, number of 
deaths, median age of cases, percent of cases for each gender, median incubation 
period and duration, number of cases reporting each symptom, factors contributing to 
the outbreak (microbial growth and microbial survival), the setting in which food was 
prepared, the consumption setting and the free text remarks variable. Application of 
inclusion and exclusion criteria was performed in Microsoft Excel, and data cleaning 
and analysis was performed in StataSE 13 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX, USA). 
Missing data, nonsensical data and answers of “unknown” were treated as unknown 
responses. Completeness for all variables was defined as useable data, i.e. values 
other than missing or unknown.  
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Case definitions 
OzFoodNet defines an outbreak as foodborne if there was microbiological evidence 
(isolation of the pathogen in the food) and/or analytical epidemiological evidence that 
implicated the meal or food as the source of the outbreak. A suspected foodborne 
outbreak is defined as an outbreak where descriptive epidemiological evidence 
implicated a meal or food as the source of the outbreak. Foodborne and suspected 
foodborne outbreaks were included in this study. 
All confirmed bacterial toxin outbreaks included in this analysis were laboratory 
confirmed according to simplified Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
guidelines for bacterial toxin outbreaks. (11) Outbreaks were classified as laboratory 
confirmed if the aetiological agent was isolated or enterotoxin was detected in clinical 
specimens from two or more cases, or at least 105 organisms were isolated per gram of 
epidemiologically implicated food. (11) Confirmed bacterial toxin mediated foodborne or 
suspected foodborne outbreaks with onset between 2001 and 2013 were included. 
Five aetiology categories were created for analysis: 
1. “Bacillus cereus” – B. cereus was listed as the sole aetiology. 
2. “Clostridium perfringens” – C. perfringens was listed as the sole aetiology. 
3. “Staphylococcus aureus” – S. aureus was listed as the sole aetiology. 
4. “Preformed toxin” – both S. aureus and B. cereus were listed as the confirmed 
aetiology. 
5. “In vivo toxin” – both C. perfringens and B. cereus were listed as the confirmed 
aetiology. 
For further attribution of outbreaks caused by B. cereus, the following criteria based on 
the known characteristics of B. cereus illness were used as probable case definitions 
(2): 
a. Emetic B. cereus  
i. incubation period ≤ 6 hours and 
ii. ≥ 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
b. Diarrhoeal B. cereus  
i. incubation period ≥ 6 hours and 
ii. < 50% of cases reporting vomiting 
Vehicle attribution 
Confirmed or suspected food vehicles with a reasonable level of suspicion (for example 
the implicated food was the only food that was eaten by most or all cases) that were 
detailed in the Outbreak Register in either the food vehicle variable or in the free-text 
 
 
 
77 
 
remarks variable were retained for analysis. To simplify analysis, the food vehicles 
were categorised according to the method of food preparation as proposed by 
Weingold et al. (12) Only the information provided in the Outbreak Register was used 
to apply categories and no assumptions were made about foods commonly served 
together. An additional food variable was created to record if a high starch food, such 
as rice or pasta, was reported. The number and percentage of outbreaks reporting 
each food category are reported. 
Data analysis 
Median values and ranges were calculated for numerical variables including number of 
cases, number of hospitalisations, number of deaths, median age, percentage of each 
gender, median incubation period and duration and percentage for each symptom. 
Histograms were constructed in Microsoft Excel using outbreak data aggregated by 
year based on onset date of the outbreak. Overall rates for each state and territory 
were calculated using population data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (13), and 
compared using Poisson regression using StataSE 13. A p-value less than 0.05 was 
considered significant.  
The percent incidence of symptoms was calculated using the number of cases 
reporting the illness as the numerator, and the number of cases interviewed about the 
symptom as the denominator, where possible. For outbreaks where the number of 
cases reporting the symptoms was higher than the number interviewed, or the number 
interviewed was missing, the total number ill was used as the denominator. If an 
outbreak had no information for any symptom, the percentage of each symptom was 
reported as missing. 
Results 
A total of 107 confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks were reported during the 
period 2001 to 2013, affecting 2219 people across all states and territories with the 
exception of Tasmania. Of these people, 47 were hospitalised and 13 died; 12 deaths 
(92%) were in residents of aged care facilities. The number of outbreaks per year by 
jurisdiction is shown in Figure 1. Victoria (VIC) had more outbreaks than any other 
state (46 outbreaks, 43%), followed by Queensland (QLD; 29 outbreaks, 27%) and 
New South Wales (NSW; 22 outbreaks 21%). The rate of bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks reported per ten million people for each state or territory is shown in Table 1. 
Comparing the rates for the states with 20 or more outbreaks, VIC (6.8 outbreaks per 
ten million) reported 2.8 times as many bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks than NSW 
(2.5 outbreaks per ten million), and 1.3 times as many outbreaks as QLD (5.4 
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outbreaks per ten million). Only the comparison between NSW and VIC was significant 
(p-value <0.001). 
Figure 1: Laboratory confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks by year and state or territory, 
Australia, 2001 to 2013. ACT – Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New South Wales; NT – 
Northern Territory; QLD – Queensland; SA – South Australia; TAS – Tasmania; VIC – Victoria; 
WA – Western Australia 
Table 1: Rate of laboratory confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks reported per ten 
million people for each Australian state and territory, 2001 to 2013 
State or 
Territory* 
Number of 
outbreaks 
Rate per 10 
million people 
Incidence 
rate ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
p-value 
VIC 46 6.8 reference reference reference 
QLD 29 5.4 0.78 0.50 – 1.27 0.34 
NT 1 3.5 0.52 0.07 – 3.77 0.52 
NSW 22 2.5 0.36 0.22 – 0.60 <0.001 
WA 7 2.5 0.15 0.17 – 0.82 0.014 
ACT 1 2.2 0.33 0.05 – 2.37 0.27 
SA 1 0.5 0.07 0.01 – 0.52 0.01 
TAS 0 0 0.00 0 0.996 
* ACT – Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New South Wales; NT – Northern Territory; QLD – 
Queensland; SA – South Australia; TAS – Tasmania; VIC – Victoria; WA – Western Australia 
 
Figure 2 shows the number of outbreaks reported each year, by aetiology. Outbreaks 
caused by C. perfringens were the most frequently reported cause of bacterial toxin 
mediated outbreaks (81 outbreaks, 76%; Figure 2, Table 2). All but one of the deaths 
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associated with a bacterial toxin mediated outbreak was during an outbreak caused by 
C. perfringens (12 deaths, 92%).  
 
Figure 2: Laboratory confirmed bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks, by aetiology and 
year, Australia 2001-2013 
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Symptomology 
Outbreaks caused by S. aureus had the shortest median incubation period (three hours) of 
the three types of bacterial infection (Table 3), while outbreaks caused by C. perfringens had 
the longest median incubation period (12 hours). Duration of illness was comparable 
between outbreaks caused by the different pathogens. Diarrhoea was the most commonly 
reported symptom in all outbreaks. Vomiting and nausea were most common in outbreaks 
caused by S. aureus.  
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Food vehicle attribution 
The most frequently reported category of food associated with bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks was the category of “solid masses of potentially hazardous foods”, 
such as lasagne, which was reported in 31 outbreaks (29%) (Table 4). An additional 17 
outbreaks (16%) were associated with “liquid or semi-solid mixtures of potentially hazardous 
foods”, such as gravy. Half of the outbreaks (13 outbreaks) caused by S. aureus, B. cereus, 
preformed toxin and in vivo toxin had a starch-based food such as rice, pasta or noodles 
listed as part of the implicated food vehicle, whereas only five outbreaks (6%) caused by C. 
perfringens had starch as part of the food vehicle.  
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Contributing factors 
All bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks that had a contributing factor for microbial growth 
recorded (63 outbreaks) had at least one contributing factor for microbial growth that can be 
categorised as temperature abuse, including “slow cooling”, “inadequate refrigeration”, 
“delay between preparation and consumption”, “insufficient cooking”, “inadequate thawing” 
or “inadequate hot holding temperature” (Table 5). Similarly, 85% of outbreaks that had a 
contributing factor for microbial survival (40 of 47 outbreaks) had a contributing factor for 
microbial survival that can be categorised as temperature abuse, including “insufficient 
time/temperature during cooking”, “insufficient time/temperature during reheating” or 
“inadequate thawing and cooking” (Table 6).  
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Food preparation and consumption settings 
The food implicated in bacterial toxin foodborne outbreaks was prepared and eaten in the 
same location for 78 outbreaks (73%). The implicated food in the remaining 29 outbreaks 
(27%) was prepared in a commercial location before being eaten in the home, for example 
eating a take-away meal from a restaurant at home. The most commonly reported food 
preparation locations for all aetiologies were restaurants (21 outbreaks, 20%) and 
commercial caterers (16 outbreaks, 15%; Table 7). Only two outbreaks (2%) were due to 
food prepared in a private home. Food preparation businesses (including restaurants, 
commercial caterers, take-away locations, grocery stores, delicatessens, fairs, festivals and 
mobile food services) were the most commonly reported food preparation setting associated 
with bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks, (51 outbreaks, 48%). A total of 42 
outbreaks (39%), all caused by C. perfringens (alone or with B. cereus in the in vivo toxin 
category), were associated with meals prepared and/or consumed in aged care facilities 
(Table 8). The incidence of aged care associated outbreaks varies from year to year, ranging 
from no aged care outbreaks in 2001 to 75% of outbreaks in 2013 and a median of 25% of 
outbreaks per year.  Restaurants were the second most frequently reported location for 
consumption of food (21 outbreaks, 20%; Table 8). 
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Further attribution of B. cereus outbreaks 
Using the probable case definition, in particular the percentage of cases that reported 
vomiting, one outbreak caused by B. cereus (17%) was likely to have been caused by 
the emetic toxin (incubation period 2 hours, 100% of cases reported vomiting), while 
the remaining five outbreaks were likely to have been caused by the diarrhoeal toxin 
(Table 9). 
Table 9: Informative variables and assessment of probable toxin type for confirmed and 
suspected B. cereus outbreaks (emetic or diarrhoeal), Australia 2001 to 2013 
Probable 
B. cereus 
toxin type 
Incubation 
(hours) 
Symptoms 
Food vehicle  
Vomiting (%) Diarrhoea (%) 
Emetic 2 100 0 Fried rice and honey chicken 
Diarrhoeal 6 0 100 Multiple foods 
Diarrhoeal 8 16 100 Boiled gefilte fish (fish balls) 
Diarrhoeal 9 67 67 Mashed Potato & Gravy 
Diarrhoeal 10 3 97 Rice 
Diarrhoeal 12 13 96 Rice (and/or beef curry) 
Discussion 
This study was the first to examine the epidemiology of bacterial toxin mediated 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia. The incidence of bacterial toxin mediated foodborne 
outbreaks fluctuated over the 13 year analysis period (2001 to 2013), but there was no 
overall trend in the change in incidence. Victoria reported more outbreaks per 100,000 
people caused by bacterial toxins than any other jurisdiction. From the data available, it 
is unclear whether this was due to a higher incidence of bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks in Victoria, or if other factors are involved. 
The median incubation periods and symptomology of S. aureus (14), B. cereus (6) and 
C. perfingens (5) in Australian outbreaks were similar to that observed elsewhere. Only 
one outbreak caused by B. cereus was likely to have been caused by the emetic toxin 
(17%). The food vehicle for this outbreak included rice (fried rice and honey chicken), 
consistent with findings that the B. cereus emetic toxin is associated with rice. (2, 3, 15) 
This distribution of a greater number of diarrhoeal outbreaks than emetic is consistent 
with the epidemiology of B. cereus in North America and Northern Europe, and 
different to that seen in countries with high rates of rice consumption such as Japan. 
(2) 
The two most commonly reported food vehicle categories were “solid masses of 
potentially hazardous foods” and “liquids or semi-solid mixtures of potentially 
hazardous foods”. Without careful temperature control, both of these categories of 
foods can spend a long period of time at temperatures that promote microbial growth 
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due to the density of the food. This finding is in contrast with a study examining 
bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in the United States, which found that 
“roasted meat and poultry” was the most commonly reported food category. (16) 
All outbreaks that reported a contributing factor for microbial growth and 85% of 
outbreaks that reported a contributing factor for microbial survival, reported at least one 
factor that was associated with temperature abuse of the food. Temperature abuse 
refers to inappropriate holding of food products between 4°C and 60°C, which is the 
optimal temperature for growth of most pathogenic microorganisms. (17) This is a 
particular problem with toxin producing bacteria, as even reheating or cooking the food 
does not remove the preformed toxin (S. aureus and emetic B. cereus) or the bacterial 
spores (C. perfringens and diarrhoeal B. cereus). (2, 4, 18) 
The most commonly reported location for preparation of the food vehicle that was 
implicated in bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks was at food preparation 
businesses such as restaurants and commercial caterers (48%), while the implicated 
food was prepared in private homes in only 2% of the outbreaks. This is in contrast to a 
study in the United States, which found that 16% of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks 
were associated with food prepared in the home. (16) Similarly, a study in the 
European Union found that homes were the most commonly reported setting for 
outbreaks of S. aureus and third most commonly reported setting for outbreaks of C. 
perfringens. (19) However, this study did not distinguish between preparation and 
consumption settings. Education of all food preparation services on safe food practices, 
with a focus on increased awareness of temperature abuse of foods that are difficult to 
cool or warm rapidly, including high risk dishes would reduce the incidence of bacterial 
toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in food preparation businesses. 
The most commonly reported location for preparation and consumption of the food 
implicated in C. perfringens outbreaks was aged care facilities (39% of all outbreaks, 
51% of C. perfringens outbreaks). Foods in aged care facilities are often prepared in 
bulk and stored for a period of time before serving, increasing the risk of bacterial toxin 
outbreaks. (20) Food prepared in aged care facilities was not reported as a major risk 
factor for bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in the United States. (16, 21) 
The short duration and mild symptoms associated with bacterial toxin mediated illness 
means that cases and outbreaks in the general community are less likely to be 
detected and investigated than cases and outbreaks in aged care facilities. However, 
residents of aged care facilities are a vulnerable population, and the outcome of 
bacterial toxin mediated illnesses may be more severe in the aged care population and 
as such, staff are trained to be particularly observant of symptoms of gastroenteritis. 
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(22)  Indeed, almost all deaths were associated with bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks 
occurred in aged care facilities (92%), consistent with studies showing higher mortality 
during foodborne outbreaks in aged care facilities. (20, 23-25) Prevention of bacterial 
toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks in aged care facilities through education and 
awareness of ways to avoid temperature abuse of food served in aged care facilities is 
important in protecting this vulnerable population. Food safety in aged care facilities is 
regulated by Food Standards Australia New Zealand Standard 3.3.1 “Food Safety 
Programs for Food Service to Vulnerable Persons” 
(https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/F2012L00290). This standard was introduced in 
2008 and requires implementation of a food safety program by food businesses that 
prepare food for vulnerable people, including the elderly. However, despite the 
introduction of this Standard during the period of this study, there has been no 
decrease in the frequency of bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks in aged care facilities. 
Only outbreaks that were laboratory confirmed to be caused by a bacterial toxin were 
included in this study. As it can be difficult to confirm the causative agent in bacterial 
toxin mediated outbreaks, and few laboratories in Australia are able to test for these 
pathogens, many outbreaks that were possibly caused by bacterial toxins but not 
laboratory confirmed have not been included in this study. This may have biased the 
analysis towards outbreaks that were more likely to be confirmed, such as larger 
outbreaks, outbreaks in vulnerable populations such as aged care or commercial 
enterprises complying with regulations; the results of this study should be considered in 
this context. However, a larger study that incorporated suspected outbreaks showed no 
differences in the epidemiology of confirmed bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks and 
suspected bacterial toxin mediated outbreaks. (26) Similarly, the outbreaks reported in 
the OzFoodNet Outbreak Register are likely to be only a proportion of the total number 
of outbreaks caused by bacterial toxins, as these outbreaks are often not reported or 
investigated due to the short duration and relatively mild symptoms in healthy adults 
compared with other infectious causes of foodborne gastroenteritis such as 
Salmonella. (27) 
In conclusion, bacterial toxin mediated foodborne outbreaks are most frequently 
reported to be associated with dense large volume foods prepared by food preparation 
businesses such as restaurants, and in aged care facilities. As bacterial toxin mediated 
outbreaks disproportionately affect the vulnerable residents of aged care facilities, 
education and training of food handlers in these facilities should be a priority.  
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a nationally notifiable disease under the disease grouping 
of “viral haemorrhagic fever”. In response to the increasing number of cases of EVD in 
West Africa in 2014, a variety of additional enhanced active surveillance measures 
were implemented across Australia, at national and jurisdictional levels, from August 
2014. At the national level, three main components were implemented to provide early 
warning to jurisdictions about possible cases, to prevent potential secondary 
transmission and to facilitate coordinated national reporting. These three components 
were border surveillance and reporting, reporting of jurisdictional laboratory testing and 
temperature monitoring, and an outbreak management system for case reporting. 
My Role 
I designed and developed the NetEpi online outbreak management system for 
recording cases of EVD and their contacts. I was the Australian Government 
Department of Health contact point for jurisdictional representatives to send weekly 
EVD laboratory testing and temperature monitoring data to. I then collated the testing 
and monitoring data, and prepared and distributed the testing and monitoring reports. I 
also distributed the border monitoring reports. In addition, I conducted an evaluation of 
all three components of the national EVD surveillance system. 
Lessons learned 
Establishing a surveillance system that involves several different government agencies 
and all jurisdictions during the peak of a large and politically sensitive outbreak 
provided many lessons. The biggest lesson I learned was that having a basic plan for 
what to do in the event of an outbreak would streamline the response. Hopefully the 
lessons learned during this outbreak will be applied to future outbreaks. 
Through using the system and analysing the data, I also learned a lot about design of 
questionnaires and other data collection tools. For example, while it may look nice and 
convenient to list all the reporting periods in which a person is being monitored in a 
single cell in Excel, when it comes to analysing the absolute number of people being 
monitored in a given week, this becomes less convenient (and requires a lot of fiddling 
in Stata). Excel doesn’t really provide a better way to record these data – an online 
database system would handle this kind of data a lot better due to the ability to handle 
complex and interrelated data.  
Although feedback on a questionnaire is useful, nothing compares with actually piloting 
the questionnaire – even if that means entering some dummy data. During entering of 
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dummy data into both the case and contacts form in NetEpi, I became aware of a few 
things that just didn’t work quite right, including requiring additional questions or options 
within existing questions to clarify meaning, and was able to fix them. 
Public health implications of this work 
By implementing the EVD national surveillance system, Australia is well prepared for 
the public health response associated with a possible importation of a case of EVD. In 
addition, the lessons learned from responding to this outbreak and from the evaluation 
of the national surveillance system can be applied to future outbreaks of a similar 
nature (i.e. where transmission occurs only after symptom onset, so enhanced border 
screening and symptom monitoring is useful) that threaten Australia. 
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Abstract 
In response to the large outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa during 
2014, the Communicable Diseases Network of Australia (CDNA) sought to implement a 
nationally coordinated surveillance system for detection and monitoring of people at 
risk of developing EVD (i.e. returned travellers from countries with transmission of 
EVD) and reporting of those being monitored or laboratory tested. 
Screening of returned travellers at the border was initiated in August 2014, with 
enhanced screening added on 24 November 2014. Border screening was conducted 
by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (Department of Agriculture), 
with line lists of those screened provided to jurisdictional health departments via the 
Australian Government Department of Health. The number of people under monitoring 
or tested for EVD infection was reported to the Australian Government Department of 
Health by jurisdictions weekly, beginning on 10 October 2014. An online case and 
contact data management system was designed for use if a case was detected in 
Australia. 
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Evaluation of the national surveillance system was conducted during the second half of 
2015 using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for 
evaluating public health surveillance systems. Assessment of each of the system 
attributes utilised discussions with stakeholders and analysis of the data in the system. 
In the absence of a case, dummy data were entered into the data management 
system. 
The three components of the system were designed separately, and as a result the 
different components didn’t integrate as seamlessly as a centrally managed online 
database. However, most users agreed that the system achieved the goals of 
coordination and reporting of enhanced border screening and monitoring for EVD 
compatible symptoms in returned travellers in order to detect and prevent 
autochthonous transmission of EVD in Australia. 
Introduction 
On 22 March 2014, what has subsequently become the largest outbreak of Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) in history was first notified to the World Health Organization (WHO) by 
the Ministry of Health, Guinea, as a requirement of the International Health Regulations 
(IHR) 2005. At this point, 49 cases including 29 deaths had been reported (1). Thought 
to have originated from a child in rural Guinea in December 2013 (2), the outbreak 
spread rapidly throughout the West African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. The outbreak was declared a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) by the WHO on 8 August 2014, with 1711 cases including 932 
deaths (3). More than 28 600 cases have been reported, including more than 11 300 
deaths as at 1 November 2015 (4). The largest previously reported outbreak of EVD 
occurred in Uganda in 2000, with 425 cases and 224 deaths (5).  
EVD is an illness of humans and primates caused by a group of five viruses in the 
genus Ebolavirus, family Filoviridae. Four of the five species of ebolavirus cause 
human disease, with case fatality rates varying between 50% and 90% depending on 
the species and the outbreak (6). The incubation period can be between two and 21 
days, and symptom onset begins with non-specific symptoms including fever, 
weakness, diarrhoea, headache, muscle pain, joint pain, vomiting and abdominal pain, 
progressing to loss of alertness, kidney failure, shock and rapid breathing in the later 
stages (7-10). The most well-known symptom of EVD, bleeding, occurs in less than 
45% of patients, and this number is around 26% in the current outbreak in West Africa 
(10). All outbreaks to date have been confined to Africa. However, with the increase in 
the number of cases of EVD in West Africa, the possibility of importation of a case into 
other countries and subsequent autochthonous transmission increased. 
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Epidemiological studies have shown that transmission of EVD occurs only by direct 
contact with symptomatic patients (11-17), with infectiousness increasing over the 
course of the disease (13, 18), suggesting that early intervention (via monitoring of 
contacts and rapid identification and isolation of cases) can prevent ongoing 
transmission. 
By early 2015, importations and secondary transmission of EVD outside of Africa had 
occurred in Spain, United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA), 
highlighting the possibility of importation into any country worldwide. EVD is currently 
notifiable in Australia as viral haemorrhagic fever through the National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) under the National Health Security Act 2007. 
However, a need for coordinated enhanced surveillance in Australia was identified by 
the Chief Medical Officer at a Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) 
meeting on 8 October 2014. Enhanced surveillance allows rapid detection, treatment 
and follow up of cases, including case finding, education and monitoring of contacts, 
with the aim of preventing ongoing transmission of EVD within Australia. Table 1 shows 
surveillance actions relevant to enhanced EVD surveillance arising from the Australian 
Government Department of Health (Department of Health) internal EVD Response 
Plan (19). As of the time the need for a national surveillance system was identified, we 
were in “Standby” and will move to “Response” if a case of EVD is reported in 
Australia. As of 13 November 2015, we have moved down to “Preparedness” in 
response to the decline in cases of EVD in West Africa. 
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Table 1: Sections from the Australian Government Department of Health internal EVD 
Response Plan relevant to the enhanced EVD surveillance system*  
Response level Surveillance Actions 
Preparedness Review existing case definition and testing protocol with CDNA 
Consider activation of surveillance systems to collect enhanced case and 
contact data 
Standby Review and refine existing case definition and testing protocol with CDNA 
Implement data collection system 
Adapt and implement case notification system 
Assess and prepare sentinel and syndromic surveillance systems and 
studies 
Prepare to detect cases in Australia 
Consider the need for co-ordinated national collection of data on 
monitoring of health care workers and others returning from affected 
areas overseas 
Response Maintain and refine enhanced data collection for cases and controls: 
Adapt and implement case notification system 
Enhanced data on all cases and contacts 
Maintain and refine case definition and testing protocol 
Analyse and report Australian data 
Consider the need for co-ordinated national collection of data on 
monitoring of health care workers and others returning from affected 
areas overseas 
Stand Down Assess summary data from all surveillance systems to determine when 
virus no longer presents a significant health risk and assess when to 
cease data collection 
Advise final summary epidemiology, severity and virology 
Review effectiveness of all systems 
* EVD – Ebola virus disease; CDNA – Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
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Aim and objectives 
The aim of this project was to establish and evaluate an active enhanced national 
surveillance system for EVD in Australia. The surveillance system was established in 
order to: 
x Provide information to jurisdictions about incoming passengers from areas of 
ongoing EVD transmission who may have been exposed to EVD. This 
information was used by the jurisdictions to monitor these people for symptoms 
of EVD. 
x Record and provide data to stakeholders about national numbers of people 
screened at the border, tested for EVD and monitored for symptoms of EVD. 
x Provide a central database for recording cases of EVD, and for management of 
contacts of cases of EVD in Australia. 
Design of surveillance system 
Case definition 
The case definitions are defined in the EVD Series of National Guidelines (SoNG), and 
are under revision to respond to the evolving situation. The current version of the 
SoNG, dated 26 June 2015, is available from the Department of Health website at 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-
ebola.htm/$File/EVD-SoNG.pdf (20). Cases of EVD are classified as “suspected”, 
“probable” and “confirmed” based on symptoms, epidemiology and testing as shown in 
Table 2. The definitions shown in Table 2 were current as of the latest revision. 
“Contacts” were people who were under temperature monitoring by jurisdictional 
departments of health due to a higher or lower risk of exposure to EVD, either in 
Australia or overseas. People with a risk category of casual contact were monitored in 
some jurisdictions, but these people were not reported in the national temperature 
monitoring report. Assessment of risk category used the guidelines included in the EVD 
SoNG and are summarised in Table 3.  
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Table 2: Summary of case definitions as per the EVD SoNG* 
Category 
Clinical evidence: 
Fever (≥38°C) or 
history of fever in the 
past 24 hours. 
Unexplained 
haemorrhage or 
bruising, severe 
headache, muscle 
pain, marked 
vomiting, marked 
diarrhoea or 
abdominal pain should 
also be considered 
Epidemiological 
evidence: 
Limited epidemiological 
evidence requires travel 
to an EVD affected area 
(country/region) in the 21 
days prior to onset. A full 
list of the lower risk and 
higher risk exposures are 
defined in table 3 
Laboratory evidence: 
Isolation of virus, detection 
of virus (by nucleic acid 
testing, antigen detection or 
electron microscopy), IgG 
seroconversion or detection 
of EVD IgM. Suggestive 
evidence refers to testing in 
jurisdiction-based labs. 
Confirmation requires 
testing at Victorian 
Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory 
Contact No 
Limited epidemiological 
evidence or lower or 
higher risk exposure 
No 
Suspected 
case 
Yes 
Lower or higher risk 
exposure 
No 
Probable 
case 
Yes 
Lower or higher risk 
exposure 
Suggestive 
Confirmed 
case 
Not required Not required Yes 
* EVD – Ebola virus disease; SoNG – Series of National Guidelines 
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Table 3: Guidelines for assessment of risk category for cases and contacts of EVD* 
Risk 
category 
Criteria 
Casual 
contact 
x No direct contact with an EVD case or body fluids of an EVD case, but 
who may have been in the vicinity of an EVD case or fluids 
Lower risk x Household contact with a confirmed EVD case 
x Worked in a medical or nursing capacity caring directly for confirmed EVD 
cases in an EVD affected area 
x Inadequate PPE or touched skin or body with no visible body fluid of a 
confirmed EVD case (alive)  
x No PPE and potential droplet exposure to a confirmed EVD case (case 
actively vomiting/diarrhoea/cough/aerosol generating procedure – 
downgrade to casual if in a large room and very distant) 
x Direct contact with an ill person or body fluids of a person of unknown 
health status in an EVD affected area 
x Worked in a mine or cave inhabited by bat colonies in an EVD endemic 
region 
Higher risk x Received a needle stick injury from a confirmed case 
x Had inadequate PPE and blood or fluid splash to mucous membrane from 
a confirmed case 
x Had inadequate PPE and skin touched blood, vomit, diarrhoea, urine, 
saliva or semen from a confirmed case 
x Had inadequate PPE and processed blood or body fluids from a confirmed 
case in a laboratory 
x Had inadequate PPE and direct contact with a dead body or fluid from a 
dead body with confirmed EVD, or suspected EVD and unknown cause of 
death in an EVD affected area 
x Had direct contact with sick or dead wild animals in an EVD endemic 
region 
* EVD – Ebola virus disease; PPE – personal protective equipment  
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Stakeholders 
The stakeholders involved in national EVD surveillance are shown in Table 4. The 
relevant stakeholders were consulted throughout establishment and use of the system, 
and during the evaluation. For example, CDNA and jurisdictional departments of health 
were asked for feedback about the case and contact report forms in the establishment 
phase. All feedback was assessed and forms were adjusted as required.   
Table 4: Stakeholders of EVD enhanced surveillance* 
Stakeholder Stake held 
Department of Health (Ebola 
Response Task Force) 
Coordination 
Administration 
Dissemination 
Communicable Diseases Network 
Australia (CDNA) 
Coordination between Commonwealth and 
jurisdictional health departments 
Planning 
Australian Health Protection Principal 
Committee (AHPPC) 
Oversight of response to EVD 
State and territory departments of 
health 
Coordination of state-based response to cases 
(including contact tracing and monitoring) 
Reporting to NNDSS and NetEpi 
Public Health Laboratory Network 
(PHLN) 
Coordination of laboratory testing 
Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) 
Testing of patient samples 
Department of Agriculture Coordination of border surveillance  
Aid organisations†  Reporting of returning aid workers to the Department 
of Health 
* EVD – Ebola virus disease; NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System  
† Médecins Sans Frontières, the Red Cross, the World Health Organization, the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network and Aspen 
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System design 
Surveillance of people deemed to be at risk of developing EVD in Australia occurred 
through a multi-pronged approach at various points after entry into Australia following 
travel to countries with EVD transmission. This approach was used to detect cases of 
EVD sufficiently early to provide treatment and prevent further transmission within 
Australia through public health action. The decisions and processes involved in 
development of the national EVD surveillance system are shown in Figure 1. The three 
components were:  
1. Border surveillance – enhanced screening of travellers returned from countries 
identified as having ongoing and intense transmission of EVD as they pass 
through international airports or seaports. This component was designed and 
managed by the Department of Agriculture, in consultation with other 
stakeholders, and began on 14 November 2014. 
2. Laboratory testing and temperature monitoring – jurisdictions reported the 
number of people they were monitoring each week (lower and higher risk 
exposures only) and the number of laboratory tests for EVD performed. This 
component was designed by Katrina Knope and Tim Sloan-Gardner in the 
Department of Health, in collaboration with CDNA, after the AHPPC decision on 
10 October 2014 to begin formal collection of testing and monitoring data. 
3. Case data management system – a centrally managed online database for 
recording and managing data for cases of EVD and for monitoring of contacts. 
This component was designed and implemented by the author, in consultation 
with other stakeholders, in October and November 2014. 
The border screening line list, laboratory testing data and data for temperature 
monitoring of people with higher and lower risk exposures were collated using 
Microsoft Excel. The case data management system utilised NetEpi, an open source 
online surveillance tool and database (http://sourceforge.net/projects/netepi/) 
administered by the Department of Health. The website is password protected and 
access for relevant national and jurisdictional government staff can be arranged 
through the administrators at the Department of Health via 
http://outbreak.health.gov.au. This component was designed for recording and 
monitoring of both cases and contacts by all jurisdictions. However, some jurisdictions 
chose to use their own surveillance systems for monitoring of contacts. All jurisdictions 
agreed to use NetEpi for case management if there had been a case reported in 
Australia. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of national enhanced EVD surveillance events. Laboratory testing and 
temperature monitoring events are shown in light green, case management system events are 
shown in blue and border surveillance events are shown in purple. Evaluation events are shown 
in red. EVD – Ebola virus disease; WHO – World Health Organization; CMO – Chief Medical 
Officer; AHPPC – Australian Health Protection Principal Committee; GP – General Practitioner; 
SoNG – Series of National Guidelines; CDNA – Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
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Data collection and analysis 
Collection and reporting of data by the Department of Health is summarised in Figure 
2.  
  
Figure 2: Data collected, collated and reported by the Department of Health as part of EVD 
enhanced surveillance. Orange boxes show the progress of a returned traveller through the 
system. Purple boxes show border surveillance data collection and reporting, green boxes show 
laboratory testing and temperature monitoring data collection and reporting, and blue boxes 
show the case data management system. Activities performed by jurisdictional departments of 
health are shown in red. EVD – Ebola virus disease; HQO – Health Quarantine Officer; PHU – 
Public Health Unit 
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Border surveillance 
All people who reported that they had been in an area of EVD transmission within the 
past 21 days (Guinea and Sierra Leone as of 1 November 2015) were screened for risk 
factors via a questionnaire and their temperature taken by agents from the Department 
of Agriculture on arrival in Australia at both airports and seaports (screening at 
seaports began on 1 December 2014). Travellers were asked three questions:  
1. Have you had close contact with someone who has had Ebola or was suspected of 
having the disease? 
2. Have you participated in a funeral which involved direct contact with the deceased 
body? 
3. Have you had a fever in the last 24 hours? 
A response of “yes” to any question or a temperature measured at the time of border 
screening equal to or higher than 37.5°C resulted in referral to a Human Quarantine 
Officer (HQO). A slightly lower temperature than that recommended in the SoNG 
(38°C) was used due to potential inaccuracies in the thermometers used at the border. 
Line listed data from this screening was passed daily to the Department of Health and 
on to jurisdictional departments of health after cleaning. These data were collated and 
reported weekly to the AHPPC and CDNA. The border screening summary was not for 
further distribution. 
Laboratory testing and temperature monitoring 
A risk assessment was performed by jurisdictional representatives, and those people 
assessed as having a lower or higher risk exposure (as outlined in the EVD SoNG and 
summarised in Table 3) were monitored for a temperature equal to or higher than 38°C 
and other symptoms compatible with EVD. Some jurisdictions also monitored people 
assessed as casual risk, but these people were not reported to the Department of 
Health. Monitoring continued twice daily until 21 days after leaving the EVD affected 
country, in some jurisdictions using the “contact” form in NetEpi. These data were de-
identified and sent weekly via email, along with data on laboratory specimen testing for 
EVD, to the Department of Health. The format of the data collection email is shown in 
Appendix 2. Data were then collated for distribution to AHPPC and CDNA members, 
and made available to the media and public as needed. Additional analysis of the data 
from both these sources was performed on an as needs basis.  
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Case data management system (NetEpi) 
In the event of a case, jurisdictions agreed that enhanced information for cases 
(suspected, probable or confirmed as per the EVD SoNG, herein referred to as “cases”, 
see Table 2) would be entered into NetEpi, either directly by jurisdictional staff 
(nominated by jurisdictions) or via importation of data exported from jurisdiction-specific 
databases. Case reporting forms (Appendix 3), containing the minimum national 
dataset were available on NetEpi. For those jurisdictions with their own Ebola 
surveillance database in place (as at 1 November 2015, Queensland, New South 
Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Victoria), case 
data would be emailed to the Department of Health “epi inbox” (epi@health.gov.au) as 
required (or weekly if cases become frequently identified). “Rules” defining which field 
in the jurisdiction based database corresponds to the fields in NetEpi would allow direct 
upload of the data to the NetEpi database by the Department of Health EVD 
surveillance team and data managers. Forms for use with contacts, including risk 
assessment and temperature monitoring were also produced and were available on 
NetEpi. These forms were produced for use by jurisdictions, although jurisdictions were 
unable to share the data collected using these forms with the Department of Health, as 
sharing of identifiable details of well people is not covered under public health 
legislation. Both forms shared the same questions covering demographics, exposure 
history and exposure risk assessment. Figure 3 depicts the flow of information through 
the EVD surveillance system for cases. Forms were finalised and data were able to be 
entered from 27 November 2014. 
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Figure 3: Chart showing the flow of case data information through the NetEpi EVD Surveillance 
system 
Data entered in the NetEpi database was analysed by the EVD surveillance manager 
at the Department of Health on an as needs basis (regularity depended on 
requirements, for example reporting of a case). Jurisdictions were able to access their 
own data for analysis as desired. Data was analysed using StataSE 13. 
Other issues and data sources 
Information from some international aid organisations was provided to jurisdictions in 
advance of the aid worker’s return. The Department of Health and other jurisdictions 
planned to provide assistance with contact tracing and monitoring to jurisdictions if 
numbers exceed jurisdictional capacity. The requirement for assistance was monitored 
and would be provided through discussions with CDNA. 
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Dissemination 
Summary reports were prepared for CDNA and AHPPC on a weekly basis and for 
other stakeholders as required. Current reporting of border screening and EVD testing 
and monitoring will continue until the end of the outbreak in West Africa, or upon advice 
from AHPPC to end active surveillance for EVD.  
Results of national surveillance system 
Methods 
Descriptive analysis of data in all components of the national surveillance system was 
conducted. Border surveillance data and laboratory testing and temperature monitoring 
data as of 30 September 2015 were used for analysis. All data were analysed using 
Excel and StataSE 13. 
Border surveillance 
Although border screening was initiated on 9 August 2014, the current system of 
enhanced screening was implemented on 14 November 2014. Therefore, only data 
from 14 November 2014 was available for analysis. Screening was initially conducted 
on travellers from Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Nigeria. Screening of travellers from Nigeria was terminated on 15 
November 2014, the DRC on 24 November 2014 and Liberia on 15 May 2015 due to 
the end of intense transmission of EVD in these countries. A total of 733 people were 
screened between 14 November 2014 and 30 September 2015. Figure 4 shows the 
number of people screened, by week. The weeks in which screening ended for 
travellers from each country are shown. Termination of screening of travellers from the 
DRC dramatically reduced the number of travellers being screened. The timing of this 
was fortuitous as the number of travellers returning from Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea increased from the following week, although not to the same level.  
Most travellers screened had returned from Sierra Leone (348 people). Only three 
travellers had returned from Nigeria. However, travellers from Nigeria were only 
screened on the first week of enhanced screening. 
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The responses to screening questions and the temperature recorded reflect activities 
undertaken in the country the traveller is returning from, and are shown in Table 5. 
Only one traveller returning from Guinea reported close contact with someone who had 
EVD, and none reported attending a funeral. In contrast, 22% of travellers returning 
from Sierra Leone reported close contact with an EVD patient, and 3% reported 
attending a funeral. Reason for travel is not recorded in the border screening line list, 
so an analysis of why more people had travelled to Sierra Leone was not possible. 
Table 5: Positive traveller responses to airport health screening questions by destination 
jurisdiction and country visited 
 
Sierra Leone 
(n=348) 
Guinea 
(n=207) 
Liberia 
(n=115) 
DRC† 
(n=64) 
Nigeria 
(n=3) 
Screening 
questions 
Close contact 
(%) 75 (22) 1 (0.5) 14 (12) 0 0 
Funeral (%) 9 (3) 0 0 1 (2) 0 
Fever in last 
24 hours (%) 0 0 0 0 - 
Temperature 
(average) 36.5 36.4 36.5 36.3 0 
* “Close contact” – Have you had close contact with someone who has had Ebola or was 
suspected of having the disease?; “Funeral” – Have you participated in a funeral which involved 
direct contact with the deceased body?; “Fever” – Have you had a fever in the last 24 hours? 
† DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo 
Eight airports and no seaports reported screening travellers from areas of EVD 
transmission (Table 6). While the information about country of origin and destination 
jurisdiction is complete, 25% of records were missing information about whether an 
HQO was contacted. An HQO was contacted for 118 travellers, most frequently in 
Sydney (74 times, 30% of travellers). The most common reason for contacting an HQO 
was due to an answer of “yes” to the question about close contact with someone who 
had Ebola or was suspected of having the disease (74 referrals). The second most 
common reason for an HQO referral was a high temperature (26 referrals). No-one 
reported a fever within the last 24 hours, so this category was not included in the 
analysis. 
The final destination for most travellers was the same state where they were screened, 
although both Sydney and Melbourne airports screened the highest number of 
travellers who were travelling on to a second jurisdiction.
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Laboratory testing for EVD infection 
Formalised reporting of laboratory testing for EVD infection began on 10 October 2014. 
Prior to this time, testing information was shared informally between the Chief Health 
Officer in the jurisdiction doing the testing, and the Chief Medical Officer. Testing 
performed prior to implementation of formal reporting was reported retrospectively. 
Between 10 April 2014 and 30 September 2015, 25 people were tested for EVD in 
Australia. Figure 5 shows the number of laboratory tests for EVD by month of testing. 
Testing was sporadic, with four tests performed in some months and no tests in others. 
 
Figure 5: Number of people tested for EVD by jurisdiction, month and year of test. ACT – 
Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New South Wales; QLD – Queensland; SA – South 
Australia; VIC – Victoria; WA – Western Australia 
Temperature monitoring of returned travellers 
From the beginning of reporting on 10 October 2014 until 30 September 2015, 248 
people were under monitoring for a raised temperature and symptoms compatible with 
EVD. This included at least nine people who were monitored in two different 
jurisdictions during a single 21-day monitoring period, making a total of 239 individual 
people under temperature monitoring.  
A summary of the number of people monitored in each jurisdiction and reason for travel 
is shown in Table 7. Victoria monitored more people than any other jurisdiction (139 
people), while NT monitored the least (five people). Most people under monitoring were 
aid workers or health care workers. 
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Table 7: Category of traveller under monitoring for EVD, by jurisdiction, Australia 10 October 
2014 to 30 September 2015 
Jurisdiction* 
Aid or 
Health 
Care 
Worker 
Work 
Refugee 
or 
migrant 
Visitor to 
Australia 
Traveller 
or visitor Unknown Total 
ACT 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
NSW 45 5 0 0 0 0 50 
NT 4 0 0 0 1 0 5 
QLD 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 
SA 6 4 0 0 7 1 18 
TAS 11 0 0 1 2 0 14 
VIC 74 0 10 0 50 5 139 
WA 5 1 0 0 1 0 7 
Total 160 10 10 1 61 5 248 
* ACT – Australian Capital Territory; NSW – New South Wales; NT – Northern Territory; QLD – 
Queensland; SA – South Australia; TAS – Tasmania; VIC – Victoria; WA – Western Australia 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of people being monitored in each jurisdiction during each 
reporting period (ending on Wednesday). Reporting on 7 January 2015 was for a 
period of two weeks due to the Christmas break. As people were monitored for up to 21 
days, each individual appears in the graph for up to four consecutive reporting weeks 
depending on how many days passed between leaving a country with EVD 
transmission and beginning monitoring in Australia. Victoria monitored the largest 
number of people in every monitoring period since December 2014. In contrast, the 
number of people being monitored in New South Wales has decreased over time.
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No specific field asks jurisdictions to specify if a person is lower or higher risk. Many, 
but not all jurisdictions include this information in the comments field. Only one person 
was reported to have higher risk exposures. 
Case data management 
As no cases of EVD were reported in Australia to 1 November 2015, no data were 
available for analysis. Dummy data for cases and contacts were entered between 8 
July 2015 and 21 September 2015 in order to validate and improve the questionnaires 
and for the evaluation of this component of the system. These data are not a true 
representation of the data entered during the outbreak, and thus will not be presented 
here.  
Evaluating the surveillance system 
Methods 
Public health surveillance systems should be evaluated regularly to ensure that the 
aims are being achieved efficiently and effectively. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems (21) are a valuable source of strategies for optimising the quality of any 
surveillance system being established and were used to conduct the evaluation. The 
evaluation examines the characteristics and attributes of the system using both 
quantitative (analysis of surveillance data) and qualitative methods (interviews with 
stakeholders) as below. 
Border screening data, and laboratory testing and temperature monitoring data as of 30 
September 2015 was used for this evaluation. In the absence of a case of EVD in 
Australia, dummy data was entered by Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
students and Department of Health staff enlisted for the purpose into a specially 
designated test area of NetEpi. Attributes of the system were assessed using these 
data, as outlined in Table 9. All data were analysed using Excel and StataSE 13.  
Interviews with CDNA, AHPPC and Department of Agriculture representatives, 
jurisdictional users, Ebola Response Taskforce members, representatives from the 
laboratories and the surveillance data managers at the Department of Health were 
conducted in order to assess the attributes of the three components of the surveillance 
system. Table 8 lists the stakeholders and the method of consultation. Although aid 
agencies were stakeholders of the national EVD surveillance system, they were not 
consulted as the information provided to the Department of Health by aid agencies was 
treated as separate from the national EVD surveillance system. Table 9 summarises 
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the method of evaluation and stakeholder interviewed to address each attribute. A full 
list of the questions asked of stakeholders is available in Appendix 4.  
Table 8: Stakeholders of EVD enhanced surveillance in Australia and method of consultation 
for evaluation, 2014 and 2015* 
Stakeholder Method of consultation for evaluation 
Department of Health (Ebola Response 
Task Force and surveillance data 
managers) 
Face to face interviews with structured and semi-
structured questions 
Communicable Diseases Network 
Australia (CDNA) 
Semi-structured survey via email and online 
Australian Health Protection Principal 
Committee (AHPPC) 
Feedback provided via CDNA 
State and territory departments of health Semi-structured telephone interviews with state 
representatives 
Public Health Laboratory Network 
(PHLN) 
Structured questionnaire via email with PHLN 
representative 
Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference 
Laboratory (VIDRL) 
Structured questionnaire via email with VIDRL 
representative 
Department of Agriculture Structured questionnaire via email with Department 
of Agriculture representative 
Aid organisations including MSF, Red 
Cross, WHO/GOARN, Aspen 
Not consulted 
* EVD – Ebola virus disease; NNDSS – National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System; MSF 
– Médecins Sans Frontières; WHO – World Health Organization; GOARN – Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network 
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Usefulness 
The usefulness of a surveillance system refers to the contribution of the system to the 
prevention and control of the disease. EVD is a severe disease with a high mortality 
rate (6), but with good management it can be easily controlled as it is only 
transmissible by direct contact after onset of symptoms (11-17). Identification and 
isolation of cases soon after symptom onset is essential for prevention and control of 
transmission of EVD. A useful surveillance system for EVD provides efficient case data 
management and contract tracing through a properly managed national surveillance 
system. By monitoring people from when they entered Australia until 21 days after they 
left a country with known transmission of EVD, the three components in the national 
EVD surveillance system aimed to assist public health units to identify cases of EVD 
early enough to prevent transmission of EVD. However, as there were no cases of 
EVD reported in Australia at 1 November 2015, the system has not been truly tested.  
Consultation with CDNA during the preliminary stages of this project suggested that a 
nationally coordinated surveillance system for EVD was useful and desired, especially 
with the escalation of the EVD outbreak in West Africa and the increasing possibility of 
an imported case in Australia. Consultation with stakeholders after the system had 
been in use for nearly a year showed that all three components had varying levels of 
usefulness to different stakeholders.  
The border screening line list was universally considered the most useful component 
by jurisdictional users and CDNA representatives. The contact information provided 
within the line list allowed the jurisdictional public health units to contact people and 
arrange for monitoring.  
“As border protection is managed by the Commonwealth, there would have 
been no other way for States to know who has recently entered” 
“It has been useful for us to be able to tell Emergency Departments and 
ambulance services that we are aware of ‘all’ people coming from an EVD-
affected area…” 
However, a frequent comment from both CDNA and jurisdictional users was that the 
border screening line lists should have been separated by jurisdiction and details only 
sent to the jurisdiction where the person was staying and was assessed and monitored.  
Reporting of the border screening summary was not considered useful for public health 
purposes by jurisdictional users or CDNA representatives beyond occasional interest 
for comparison with other jurisdictions or briefings early in the outbreak response. 
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“We didn’t use this for much other than political purposes and once the 
media lost interest, we really didn’t use it at all” 
However, the Ebola Response Taskforce at the Department of Health used the border 
screening summary for updating Question Time Briefs (QTBs) and other government 
products.  
“From a national perspective it is important that States have a more global 
view” 
Similarly, reporting of the laboratory testing and temperature monitoring summary was 
not considered useful for public health purposes by jurisdictional users and CDNA 
representatives beyond a comparison with other jurisdictions, but was useful to the 
Ebola Response Taskforce for updating QTBs. Indeed, one jurisdiction considered that:  
“(testing and monitoring reporting was) burdensome on jurisdictions. 
Limited in usefulness as reports only some risk groups” 
For the two jurisdictions that used the NetEpi case data management system (SA and 
NT), having the online system available was useful. However, usefulness of the case 
data management system would have been increased from a national perspective if all 
jurisdictions had used it and the data for testing and monitoring was able to be 
extracted by the Department of Health without having to request the data from 
jurisdictions weekly. 
System attributes 
Simplicity 
Simplicity of a surveillance system is assessed by examining the simplicity of the 
structure of the surveillance system and the ease of its operation. In evaluating the 
simplicity of national EVD surveillance, each component was assessed separately in 
addition to the system as a whole. 
Both the border surveillance and the testing and monitoring components utilised 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets containing line lists of people being reported. Considered 
as standalone components, they required few fields of data and Excel was the simplest 
way to collate and share these data. All jurisdictions agreed that sharing de-identified 
laboratory testing and temperature monitoring data by email was the simplest way to 
provide these data in the absence of a central data management system. 
Simplicity of the EVD surveillance system for case data management was optimised 
during implementation for both methods of entering data i.e. direct entry into NetEpi 
and import of data exported from a jurisdictional system. NetEpi is a web-based system 
for epidemiological records management, administered by the data management team 
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in the Department of Health. It is also used for ongoing enhanced data collection for 
listeriosis, for time limited multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigations such as the 2015 
hepatitis A outbreak (Chapter 6) and to record usage of post-exposure prophylaxis 
(hRIg – human rabies virus immunoglobulin) for possible rabies and Australian bat 
lyssavirus exposures. While not user friendly for an inexperienced user, there are many 
staff members in different jurisdictional public health units around the country and in the 
Department of Health with experience using NetEpi.  
The case report form was optimised to keep it as simple as possible while still 
collecting the minimum data required. Because the forms were designed for collecting 
information for the national dataset, as well as allowing the jurisdictions to collect the 
data required for public health action, the case report form was necessarily long. To 
simplify use of the form, fields were marked as either required (national dataset) or not 
required (public health action not required for national data analysis).  
Direct entry of data into NetEpi by jurisdictions was the simplest use of the national 
EVD surveillance system. As NetEpi is used routinely by staff at the Commonwealth 
Department of Health, it was familiar to the staff involved in development of national 
EVD surveillance and was considered the simplest format for hosting the 
questionnaires. However, some jurisdictions had their own systems for recording case 
data and preferred to use their established systems for their own data management. 
These jurisdictions agreed to share their exported data for upload to NetEpi. This mode 
of entry was unavoidably more complex than direct entry. This complexity can be 
minimised by creating import rules based on the data fields of each jurisdiction in order 
to simplify upload of data. However, import rules were not able to be created, as 
jurisdictional case report forms were not made available. The jurisdictions that used 
NetEpi for recording the details of EVD contacts described it as 
“very simple to use” 
“(data was) easy to enter into forms”. 
The system as a whole was complicated by using different formats for the different 
components (i.e. Excel for border surveillance, laboratory testing and temperature 
monitoring, NetEpi for case data management). This was a result of the ad hoc way in 
which the system was assembled in response to the changing priorities during the 
outbreak. If there had been time to plan the system, a single platform could have been 
used. This would have allowed each person in the system to be given a single unique 
identifier, allowing linkage throughout the system. This was also suggested as a way to 
improve the system during almost all interviews with jurisdictional users, CDNA 
representatives and the Ebola Response Taskforce. Optimising surveillance through 
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use of a single national system is a key priority in the National Framework for 
Communicable Disease Control (22). 
Flexibility 
Flexibility of a surveillance system refers to adaptability of the system to changing 
information needs and operating conditions. Using Microsoft Excel and NetEpi as the 
base for the components of the EVD surveillance system allows flexibility. NetEpi was 
designed to accommodate different types of outbreaks and case reporting, and forms 
can be easily changed as required. Adding the enhanced reporting forms for the 
current EVD outbreak to NetEpi required only to make an EVD specific “instance” and 
prepare the questionnaires. Changing the forms for all jurisdictional instances (if 
required) was simply a matter of changing it once as the form was shared. In addition, 
data were able to be imported and exported as a standard comma-separated values 
(.csv) file, allowing data exported from other systems (such as jurisdictional 
surveillance systems) to be imported, and data can be exported for further analysis of 
the data in any program that can read a csv file, including Excel and Stata. However, 
once data had been entered, forms could only be changed in minor ways or there was 
a risk of losing access to data previously entered. New questions and new options 
within questions could be added but more complicated changes may result in loss of 
data. However, by exporting data before changes were made, the data could be re-
entered using the upload feature. Indeed, flexibility of NetEpi was shown through 
changes made to the forms as a result of suggestions made by users during entry of 
dummy data and use of the forms for contact monitoring by SA and NT.  
Although the components themselves were flexible to change, as a national system, all 
proposed changes were required to be cleared through several different bodies, 
including CDNA and AHPPC, leading to reduced flexibility for making changes. 
Data quality 
Data quality of a surveillance system is assessed by examining the completeness and 
validity of the data. The Excel line lists and NetEpi case report forms were designed to 
maximise completeness. Some strategies that were used included keeping the 
required fields to a minimum, and making it obvious these fields were required by using 
the “required fields” option in NetEpi to force a response, and by marking the required 
fields clearly in the data dictionary. In addition, responses to questions were formatted, 
where possible, as check box inputs requiring a single response in order to improve 
validity. 
A snapshot of the data in both the border screening line list and the testing and 
monitoring spreadsheet was made on 30 September 2015. The border screening line 
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list was extracted from an internal database maintained by the Department of 
Agriculture. Jurisdictional representatives reported that contact information for the 
travellers was often wrong or incomplete. In addition, seven fields were empty or poorly 
completed and were excluded from the analysis. Of these fields, most recorded data 
specifically for use by Agriculture (such as number of people travelling together and 
additional comments) and were not required for analysis of data related to public 
health. 
The field recording the action taken was poorly completed; 27% of responses were 
missing. Of those with a response, there was no standard response, and as a result 
responses had different phrasing. However, even after cleaning, the responses implied 
that 70% of people received a leaflet and only 2% of people received a health pack. 
This was in contrast to the endorsed protocol that all travellers were given a pack 
containing information about EVD symptoms and a thermometer, suggesting this field 
was not accurately completed by border officers.  
The triggers for calling an HQO were considered appropriate, although one 
jurisdictional representative described the thermometers used as “random number 
generators” and that nurses called to the airport would ask the traveller to check their 
temperature using the thermometer provided in the pack. Another jurisdictional 
representative suggested that a time frame should be included in the close contact and 
funeral questions, as some travellers had not been near an EVD case in the previous 
21 days. 
All fields in the testing data were 100% complete, with the exception of the “category of 
traveller” field and information about subsequent tests. As most people were tested 
only once or twice, it was not unexpected that information about the second and third 
tests was incomplete. However, the “category of traveller” (e.g. health care worker, 
refugee) field was not well defined and as a result responses required cleaning to 
categorise the responses before analysis. Similarly, all fields in the monitoring data 
were 100% complete with the exception of “country of travel” and “category of traveller” 
as with the testing data. As the data for these Excel spreadsheets were obtained from 
the text of an email and copied into the large spreadsheet maintained at the 
Department of Health, it was difficult to restrict responses to defined categories. 
Suggestions for categories were included in the heading of the table in the email (See 
Appendix 2). Assessed risk category (i.e. lower or higher risk) was often entered into 
either the “category of traveller” field or the “comments” field. However, the risk 
assessment was not always included. A separate field for reporting risk category would 
ensure that this information would be available. The field for “country of travel” was not 
included in the suggested table format in the email. As a result, this field was very 
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poorly completed and with no consistent identifying information, a comparison between 
border screening and monitoring could not be conducted.  
While there were no cases of EVD in Australia during the evaluation period to 1 
November 2015, and as a consequence no real cases were entered into NetEpi, 
dummy data were entered for both cases and contacts. These data were entered by 
several different volunteers, testing the interpretation of the questions by different 
people. Some data for questions that were not marked as required were missing. 
However, this is acceptable as completing these fields was optional.  
The design of the case data management form required calculations of 21 days from a 
given date (the incubation period of EVD) in order to know what period to ask people 
about their exposures. Some users did not calculate this correctly, resulting in 
inaccurate estimates of exposure or infectious periods. Although it was not available in 
NetEpi, an automatically performed calculation would prevent this. In addition, users 
were asked to select the appropriate risk category based on answers to some previous 
questions. Despite clear instructions on how to select the risk category, some users 
selected the wrong category. Again, an automatic assessment of risk category based 
on responses to risk questions would have prevented misallocation. 
Acceptability 
The acceptability of a surveillance system refers to the willingness of people to be 
involved and use the surveillance system. The national EVD surveillance systems and 
forms were designed in consultation with jurisdictions through CDNA and Chief Health 
Officers through AHPPC. Enhanced border surveillance began on 14 November 2014 
and was coordinated by the Department of Agriculture in collaboration with CDNA. 
Reporting of testing and monitoring data was agreed by AHPPC and CDNA on 10 
October 2014. Verbal agreement was obtained on 22 October 2014 from all 
jurisdictions via CDNA to either use NetEpi for EVD case data management directly or 
via importing data from their own surveillance databases. A summary of the case data 
management system was sent to members of CDNA on 12 November 2014 along with 
the forms and data dictionary for feedback, and feedback was received from four 
jurisdictions. 
EVD is a rare, but important disease with a high level of public awareness and a high 
case fatality rate. As a consequence, acceptability for a nationally coordinated EVD 
surveillance system was high. There has been some suggestion that increasing human 
encroachment into formerly forested areas has resulted in an increase in the number of 
EVD outbreaks reported (23). This suggests that the possibility of importation of EVD 
into Australia will not end when this outbreak ends. In the event of another outbreak of 
EVD or a disease with similar epidemiology, the lessons learned through developing 
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and testing the current enhanced surveillance system for EVD will allow surveillance to 
be rapidly implemented. 
Acceptability of the system was high among jurisdictional users and CDNA 
representatives as discussed during interviews.  
“It did the communication job it needed to do in a really timely manner” 
“Probably the best way we’ve got at the moment” 
This reflects the high level of public and political interest in this outbreak. As the 
outbreak has diminished and fallen from the public consciousness, acceptability has 
decreased, especially for the weekly email of people tested and monitored. Some 
jurisdictional users expressed interest in decreasing reporting to fortnightly or monthly. 
Use of a national centralised online database that allows automated reporting of 
numbers tested and monitored would increase acceptability. The most commonly 
reported reason for jurisdictions not using the NetEpi case management system for 
contact management was that they were already using their own surveillance system 
and did not want to enter data twice. 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity refers to the proportion of true cases that were correctly identified as cases. 
Sensitivity also refers to the ability of the system to detect an outbreak and monitor 
changes in the number of cases. A surveillance system with high sensitivity means that 
most true cases are detected, although it gives no information about how many non-
cases were falsely detected as cases (false positives). As EVD is not endemic in 
Australia, active monitoring at the airports and seaports, and surveillance at the border 
(via border surveillance) and within jurisdictions (via laboratory testing and temperature 
monitoring) enables early identification and monitoring of possible imported cases. The 
case definition for EVD, as defined in the EVD SoNG (20), is comprehensive and has a 
high level of sensitivity. It has three different levels of suspicion, “suspected”, 
“probable” and “confirmed”, allowing the capture of all cases of EVD. Although the 
initial stages of EVD are non-specific and similar to many other diseases, the inclusion 
of epidemiological evidence increases the specificity without affecting the sensitivity of 
the case definition. Specificity refers to the proportion of true non-cases that are 
correctly identified as non-cases. An outbreak surveillance system should optimise 
sensitivity preferentially over specificity, especially for outbreaks of diseases with a high 
case fatality rate such as EVD, as detecting all cases is more important than all 
identified cases being true cases. However, if specificity can be improved without 
affecting sensitivity, the burden on public health can be reduced. Monitoring for clinical 
signs of EVD in all people with an epidemiological link to a case (people with a lower or 
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higher risk of EVD) increases the sensitivity of the system to detect a case of EVD 
before extensive transmission occurs.  
A true calculation of the sensitivity of the national EVD surveillance system was not 
able to be done as there have been no cases of EVD in Australia as of 1 November 
2015.  
Positive predictive value 
Positive predictive value (PPV) refers to the proportion of detected positive cases that 
are truly positive. Unlike sensitivity, PPV does tell us the proportion of non-cases that 
are detected as cases. Due to the severe nature of EVD and the high potential of 
transmission of EVD if undetected, high sensitivity is more important than high PPV. 
The surveillance case definition is designed to minimise the probability of missing any 
cases, and as a result can be expected to have a low PPV. However, given the small 
numbers of people who met the case definition, the extra burden on the public health 
system due to a low PPV is acceptable. As of 30 September 2015, no cases have been 
reported, but 25 people have been tested for EVD (all negative) and 248 people have 
been monitored. If we consider the 25 tested people as false positives based on 
symptoms and epidemiology (i.e. before the test result was obtained), the PPV was 
0%. 
Representativeness 
Representativeness of a surveillance system refers to the ability of the system to 
accurately characterise the epidemiology of the disease. The national EVD surveillance 
system was designed for maximum representativeness as it was designed to capture 
all people at risk of developing EVD in Australia through recording and following up all 
passengers returning from EVD affected areas. However, this method relies on self-
reporting of travel history by returning travellers, potentially missing travellers who are 
unwilling to mention travel to these countries.  
An additional comment on representativeness was mentioned during jurisdictional 
interviews. The risk assessment questions (which are based on the risk assessment in 
the EVD SoNG and are shown in Table 3) were skewed towards health care workers, 
and as a result may miss community based exposures, where people were less likely 
to wear personal protective equipment. This may result in non-health care workers 
being categorised as low or casual risk and not being recorded in the national 
surveillance system. 
Timeliness 
The timeliness of a surveillance system depends on the purpose the data is being 
collected. In this case, it can be defined as the time taken to provide data for public 
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health action and can be measured by the time lapse between the different steps of the 
system. As Australia had no cases of EVD in the evaluation period, and direct data 
entry was limited, no mean time lapse can be calculated. However, general comments 
can be made on the different components of the system. 
The inclusion of contact monitoring as a component of this system, along with other 
measures including border monitoring, was designed to capture cases of EVD before 
they develop symptoms. Data collected at the border by Department of Agriculture 
agents could be  
“entered in real time using a tablet or by entering the data manually on a 
regular PC shortly after screening the passenger” 
Referral to an HQO was immediate upon a response of “yes” to any question or 
measurement of temperature equal to or higher than 37.5°C. The border surveillance 
data were shared with Department of Health and on to jurisdictional departments of 
health daily, allowing temperature monitoring to begin immediately.  
Whether jurisdictions were using NetEpi or their own databases for contact monitoring, 
monitoring data (including daily temperature monitoring) were entered in real time. In 
this way, jurisdictions knew immediately if a contact developed EVD or symptoms 
compatible with EVD. As such, the recording of cases of EVD should be timely, and 
reporting would be daily in the event of an outbreak.  
As suspected EVD cases require isolation and there was a high level of public concern 
around EVD, ruling out non-cases was almost as important as confirming actual cases. 
A change to the SoNG on 6 November 2014 added VIDRL in Melbourne as a 
confirmatory laboratory (previously only laboratories in South Africa and USA could 
confirm EVD cases), significantly improving the potential timeliness of confirmation of 
cases and ruling out of non-cases. Laboratory confirmation was prioritised and results 
were returned rapidly. Testing at VIDRL in Victoria for EVD was made available 24 
hours a day and took under three hours from sample receipt to result. Testing in other 
jurisdictions was slower, but a negative result to rule out EVD was able to be obtained 
within a day from sample collection. Positive tests at laboratories other than VIDRL will 
require confirmation of EVD infection at VIDRL. However, as no tests were positive for 
EVD during the course of this evaluation, timeliness could not be directly assessed. All 
jurisdictions that performed laboratory testing for EVD in people being monitored 
reported that isolation and testing of the patient occurred within hours of notification of 
symptoms compatible with EVD. 
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Stability 
The stability of a surveillance system is assessed by determining how often the system 
is unavailable for use. The border surveillance, laboratory testing and temperature 
monitoring components of the surveillance system utilised regular transmission of data 
via email. This system of data transmission is stable, but relies on prompt sending of 
data when requested. During the period of evaluation of the system there were no 
weeks in which data was not received prior to weekly reporting. However, follow up 
emails and phone calls were often required before data was received.  
The Microsoft Excel border surveillance and testing and monitoring data files were 
accessible only from within the password protected Department of Health computer 
system. However, Microsoft Excel is a stable platform and data saved on the 
Department of Health computer system were constantly backed up to servers.  
NetEpi is a web based system that is accessible from anywhere with an internet 
connection. Each jurisdiction using NetEpi had their own section within NetEpi in which 
to enter their data. Access to this section was password protected and access was 
available to any number of relevant government employees required to gather and 
enter these data, as long as an internet connection was available.  
NetEpi has never had an outage since it has been in use by the Department of Health 
(established in 2004). However, the system is not currently undergoing further 
development and upgrading is not possible. The servers are physically located within 
data centres in Canberra, including a backup of the system at a second location. 
Discussion 
This newly established surveillance system was developed in response to a 
surveillance gap identified during the 2014-2015 EVD outbreak in West Africa, in 
particular after autochthonous transmission of EVD occurred in two non-African 
countries. It was established during an outbreak situation, but if maintained, could be 
used to collect enhanced data on all viral haemorrhagic fevers and other acute 
diseases. The current outbreak of EVD has reminded the international community that 
in the modern world of increased globalisation and air travel, introduction and potential 
transmission of severe diseases such as viral haemorrhagic fevers is only a flight 
away. In light of this, evaluation of the newly established national EVD surveillance 
system was essential to learn from experience and be prepared for the next big 
outbreak. 
The national EVD surveillance system was designed over a period of months by 
different people and agencies for different purposes. As a result, the three components 
were not well integrated and there was no linkage between the three components. 
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People were given different identifying numbers in each component, and in different 
jurisdictions. This meant it was not clear when the same person was monitored by two 
different jurisdictions, and border screening data couldn’t be linked to monitoring data. 
Due to privacy concerns, personal information should be restricted in a national 
system, but a single unique identifier would have allowed linkage between the national 
system and individual jurisdictional systems. A single centralised system, where each 
person is entered into the system and given an identifying number immediately upon 
screening at the airport would have allowed easier tracking of the person through to 
jurisdictional screening and reporting back to the Department of Health. In addition, a 
centralised system could have allowed downloading of summary reports without 
sending weekly emails to jurisdictional representatives, relieving the burden of weekly 
reporting from jurisdictions. Indeed, a web-based system designed for monitoring 
returnees for EVD symptoms in Georgia, USA, can automatically notify epidemiologists 
if someone reports a symptom, misses a scheduled monitoring time or if an error is 
reported. This saved the epidemiologists time and allowed just two epidemiologists to 
monitor up to 100 people at a time (24). A similar system used for monitoring of 
returnees in WA, EbolaTracks, utilises automatic messages sent to mobile phones (25) 
allowing WA to monitor large numbers of people with relative ease. 
The most useful component of the national surveillance system were the data collected 
during border screening. These data were the primary source of information used by 
jurisdictions for finding and contacting people for monitoring. The information collected 
by the surveillance system also formed a major component of responses to media 
requests and other reporting to government and the public. 
Summary of recommendations 
The general recommendations for improvement of the national EVD surveillance 
system are as follows: 
x Use of a centralised, online database (such as NetEpi or a system similar to 
that used in Georgia (24)) that can accommodate multiple components, 
including border screening, reporting of laboratory testing and temperature 
monitoring, and case data management. 
x Prepare a generic plan for national communicable disease outbreak 
surveillance that can be adapted for any public health response as required. 
This plan should include guidelines for centralised data management and 
reporting, and was a key priority identified in the National Framework for 
Communicable Disease Control (22). 
Recommendations specific for the components as they are currently implemented are 
as follows: 
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x Ensure accuracy of data collected, especially contact details collected at the 
border by incorporating checks on the data, such as ensuring phone numbers 
have the correct number of digits and addresses exist. 
x Include a “risk category” field in testing and monitoring data. 
x Provide set definitions of reason for travel categories in testing and monitoring 
data collection tool. 
x Redesign the reporting period field in the central Excel database for 
temperature monitoring data by separating out each week the person is 
monitored into separate cells.  
x Specify that the ‘end of monitoring date’ field in monitoring data refers to the 
end of monitoring by the reporting jurisdiction. This field may need to be 
updated if a person unexpectedly relocates to a different jurisdiction or country 
during monitoring. 
x Retain a single unique ID in all systems to allow tracking when a person 
relocates during monitoring. 
Conclusion 
Although there may never be a case of EVD in Australia, there was a need for 
preparedness, including establishment of a coordinated enhanced surveillance system. 
While this surveillance system was useful and provided the surveillance necessary for 
monitoring potentially exposed contacts, the suggested improvements would ensure 
the system would be able to handle the rapid entry of large numbers of actual cases 
and their contacts if required in the future. Application of the recommendations in this 
evaluation to improve this surveillance system, as well as those implemented for future 
outbreaks of a similar nature, will ensure Australia is ready for an infectious disease 
outbreak incident caused by a similar haemorrhagic virus. 
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Appendix 1: Targeted literature review 
Introduction 
With the rapidly increasing number of cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West 
Africa, and the possibility of importation of a case into western countries, the 
Commonwealth Department of Health is currently implementing an enhanced 
surveillance system to monitor contacts and returned health care workers, and to 
collect information about cases of EVD. Currently all messages (media and 
government) state that transmission of Ebola virus (EBOV) only occurs through close 
physical contact with a symptomatic case of EVD. None of these statements reference 
primary articles validating this statement. 
Focused research question 
Are the current Australian guidelines for prevention of transmission of Ebola virus 
disease based on epidemiological evidence of risk of infection and modes of 
transmission? 
Methods for conducting literature search 
PubMed was searched using the search terms shown in Figure 1. The term “ebola*” 
was included in order to find papers that referred to both “ebola” and “ebolavirus”, as 
the terms are interchangeable and vary over time. Only the epidemiology of EBOV in 
humans (not animals) was relevant to the research question. The term “outbreak” was 
chosen over “human” in order to remove experimental studies on animals from the 
search without losing papers that don’t specify “human” as the source of the outbreak. 
“Transmission” and “risk” were both included to restrict the articles to only those that 
examined transmission of EBOV in terms of the risk to contacts. 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of search terms showing number of hits for each search term 
No restriction was placed on time, as EBOV has only been known since 1976, and 
there have been few large outbreaks allowing epidemiological study since that time. 
Reviews were excluded (although recent comprehensive reviews were checked to 
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ensure no important papers had been missed with the chosen search terms) and only 
articles that specifically examined different risk factors were included. Articles on 
transmission in animals and primary transmission from the zoonotic source to the initial 
case were excluded since the research question focuses on transmission between 
human cases in an outbreak setting. 
From the final search of “ebola* AND outbreak AND transmission AND risk”, five 
papers remained relevant to the research question after reading the abstract, and two 
additional papers were found by “snowballing” from these papers. These two 
snowballed papers were referenced in almost all of the papers found through the 
primary search as they are the definitive epidemiological studies of the original two 
outbreaks of EBOV in 1976. See Table 1 for details of papers. 
Synthesis 
Some of the articles are comprehensive discussions of all aspects of the outbreak in 
question. Only results relevant to the research question are discussed. 
The two studies published in 1978 (1, 2) were done when EBOV was a newly 
discovered virus and EVD a newly discovered disease. Although the outbreaks 
occurred concurrently, they were later found to be caused by different strains of EBOV 
(Zaire strain and Sudan strain), and each had slightly differing epidemiology. Both 
studies used a case control design to examine risk factors for transmission. Neither 
study calculated odds ratios (OR), instead basing their conclusions on attack rates 
(AR) alone.  
The outbreak in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) was unique of all the 
outbreaks reported in that the primary mode of transmission, particularly during the 
early part of the outbreak, was due to reuse of needles within the hospital. No specific 
calculations of risk due to injection are presented in the article, although they state that 
85 of the 288 cases had received at least one injection at the hospital. Following 
closure of the hospital, transmission was associated primarily with contact with EVD 
patients. When comparing those cases with no hospital-associated needle 
transmission with controls (age and sex matched, selected from the same village), only 
aiding delivery of a child born to an EVD patient showed a higher attack rate in cases 
compared to controls (case AR = 18.3%, family control AR = 9.5%, village control AR = 
4.5%) (2). During the concurrent outbreak in Sudan, the authors concluded that close 
and prolonged contact, especially nursing a case (AR = 81%), was required for 
transmission, whereas merely being in the same room had a lower risk (AR = 23%) 
and noted that no cases were reported in people with only casual contact (1). 
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The article by Baron et al. (3) utilised a case control study to examine risk factors 
during the 1979 EVD outbreak in Sudan (Sudan strain). Controls in this study were 
asymptomatic family members. However, they state that 21 of the 103 controls had 
antibody to EBOV. Whether these antibodies were due to infection during this outbreak 
or due to previous exposure to EBOV is unknown. Despite these limitations, they found 
that providing nursing care to an EVD case had the highest risk of transmission (OR = 
5.1, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = 1.31-15.48), followed by physical contact with no 
nursing care (OR not reported) (3).  
Two papers examined transmission during the large 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire strain). The first, by Dowell et al (4) is a 
comprehensive cross sectional study of 27 households with at least one primary case 
of EVD. All surviving members of the household were interviewed about their own risk 
factors, and were also asked about the risk factors of deceased family members. The 
questionnaire used was standardised and delivered, via a translator, in Kikongo, the 
local language. Risk factors for each secondary were examined for four different 
periods of possible exposure to a primary case, including the incubation period (when 
cases are not thought to be infectious), home care, hospital care (considered late 
infection) and after death. Crude prevalence rate ratios (PRR) were calculated, 
analogous to relative risk, and adjusted PRR were calculated after stratification and 
logistic regression. Direct physical contact with an EVD case (all cases reported direct 
physical contact with cases so the PRR is undefined) or their body fluids (PRR = 3.6, 
95% CI = 1.9-6.8) remained significant after adjusting for other exposures, and the 
PRR became higher as the disease progressed, whereas there was no exposure 
during the incubation period that was associated with an increased risk of illness. In 
addition, none of the non-cases reported physical contact with symptomatic cases (4). 
The second study of transmission risk factors using data collected during the 1995 
Kikwit outbreak aimed to delve deeper to find a source of infection for 55 patients (5). A 
previous study had traced the outbreak using an assumption of direct person to person 
contact, but had been unable to find the link for these 55 cases (6). This article is not 
included in this review due to this assumption of a risk factor. Roels et al (5) used a 
matched case control study design to elucidate risk factors for 44 of these cases (the 
remaining 11 patients either refused to participate or could not be located). The 
questionnaire was identical for cases (or their proxies) and controls, and made no 
assumptions about risk factors, including factors such as dietary habits and social 
customs. Analysis of the data included exact conditional logistic regression for 
multivariate analysis. In their final model, admission to hospital for an unrelated illness 
(OR = 12, 95% CI = 2.7-76.8) and visiting a person with fever and bleeding (OR = 10, 
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95% CI = 3.2-38.9) remained significant (5). After taking into consideration these two 
risk factors, only 12 cases with an unknown transmission remained from this outbreak 
(out of 316 cases in total). The authors suggest that these cases may have been due to 
transmission via droplets or fomites (5). However, these cases were not confirmed by 
serologic testing, so may not be true cases of EVD, and limitations of the study 
including use of proxies may have missed unrecorded contact with other cases of EVD. 
The largest outbreak of EVD prior to the current outbreak in West Africa occurred in 
Uganda, in 2000-2001 (Sudan strain). A comprehensive study of the risk factors of this 
outbreak was conducted by Francesconi et al (7). The authors traced the outbreak 
back to the primary cases, and then used this information on cases and contacts to 
conduct a case control study, using healthy contacts of cases as controls. All but one 
case reported direct contact with an EVD patient’s body fluids (prevalence proportion 
ratio (PPR) = 4.61%, 95% CI = 1.73-12.29). The remaining case reported only sleeping 
in a blanket belonging to an EVD case. Unique to this study, risk of transmission after 
sharing meals or sleeping on the same mat as a case (commonly considered “casual 
contact”) remained significant after controlling for direct contact. The risk through 
different stages of the course of illness showed that risk of transmission through 
contact with body fluids increased during the later stages of illness and risk increased 
with each additional type of direct contact, i.e. two different types of direct contact was 
associated with a higher risk than only having one type of direct contact (7).  
Wamala et al (8) reported on a case control study conducted during an outbreak in 
Uganda during 2007-2008. This outbreak was the only outbreak of a novel strain of 
EBOV, Bundibugyo. Controls were patients in hospital with negative EVD test results. 
Similarly to the previous studies, contact with cases of EVD was the primary risk factor 
(OR = 2.66, 95% CI = 1.35-5.24), specifically visiting sick people, visiting the hospital or 
participating in funeral rituals (8). 
All studies were conducted under the extreme conditions of an active outbreak of EVD, 
and as a result, all have limitations on the data collected. Most notably, the high case 
fatality rate of EVD and rapid onset of illness required extensive use of proxies in order 
to obtain information about potential exposures, and selection of appropriate controls 
relied more on availability and ease than the robust control selection techniques 
available in other case control studies. Quality of the articles chosen improved over 
time, with the addition of measures of association (the different types of odds ratios) 
instead of attack rates only, but all were applicable to the research question. Despite 
the varying quality of the studies involved, all seven came to the same basic 
conclusion: transmission of EBOV requires contact with a case of EVD. No study found 
evidence of airborne transmission. 
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Conclusion 
The articles reviewed here support the commonly held belief that EVD is transmitted 
via direct contact with actively symptomatic patients. Thus, the current Australian 
guidelines are consistent with the evidence from previous outbreaks. However, there 
has recently been some suggestion of other modes of transmission in the grey 
literature (news articles and blog posts), specifically around infection of nurses in the 
US and Spain while wearing PPE. These suggestions are based on few cases, recall 
bias and are not supported by solid investigations, but if new evidence for alternative 
modes of transmission of EVD becomes proven, the guidelines should be adapted to 
reflect these changes. The epidemiology of EVD if introduced into western countries is 
unknown, but if cases do occur good surveillance systems are required to track and 
manage cases and to understand the differences compared with what is known about 
EVD epidemiology in Africa.  
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Table 1: Table of studies used for targeted review  
Authors Year of 
outbreak 
Country Study objectives Study 
type 
Key risk factor 
Wamala et al. 
2010 (8) 
2007-
2008 
Uganda To determine the 
risks for transmission 
of EVD during the 
2007-2008 outbreak 
in Uganda 
Case 
control 
Handling dead 
bodies without 
PPE 
Francesconi 
et al. 2003 
(7)  
2000-
2001 
Uganda To determine the 
risks for transmission 
of EVD during the 
2000-2001 outbreak 
in Uganda 
Case 
control 
Contact with an 
EVD patient's 
body fluids 
Dowell et al. 
1999 (4) 
1995 Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
To determine the 
risks for transmission 
of EVD during the 
1995 outbreak in 
Congo 
Cross 
sectional 
All secondary 
cases had 
direct physical 
contact with a 
case of EVD 
Roels et al. 
1999 (5)  
1995 Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
To determine the 
source of exposure 
for 55 patients with 
unknown 
transmission in 
Dowell et al.  
Matched 
case 
control 
Admission to 
hospital and 
vising a person 
with fever and 
bleeding 
Baron et al. 
1983 (3)  
1979 Sudan To determine the 
risks for transmission 
of EVD during the 
1979 outbreak in 
Sudan 
Case 
control 
Providing 
nursing care 
WHO/ 
International 
study team, 
1978 (1) 
1976 Sudan To establish the 
epidemiology of the 
newly identified 
disease, EVD, during 
the 1976 outbreak in 
Sudan 
Case 
control 
Close and 
prolonged 
contact 
International 
Commission, 
1978 (2) 
1976 Zaire (now 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo) 
To establish the 
epidemiology of the 
newly identified 
disease, EVD, during 
the 1976 outbreak in 
Zaire 
Matched 
case 
control 
Injection in 
hospital 
(needle reuse) 
or close 
contact with 
another case in 
community 
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Appendix 2: Data collection tool for laboratory testing and 
temperature monitoring 
 
As per the AHPPC decision on 10 October 2014, the Department of Health are 
collecting and collating weekly EVD testing and monitoring data for public 
dissemination. 
 
Case Definitions for weekly testing and monitoring data 
•Tested suspected/probable/confirmed EVD cases: a person with clinical, 
epidemiological and/or laboratory evidence who has been tested in Australia for 
EVD during the reporting period. 
•Persons being actively monitored for signs and symptoms of Ebolavirus disease 
(EVD), following potential exposure to the disease while overseas: a person with a 
higher or lower risk exposure (as define by the Ebolavirus SoNG) for which 
monitoring was initiated or continued by a public health unit or health department 
during the reporting period. 
•Please use only one unique identifier per person (i.e. same identifier for 
monitoring and testing where applicable) 
 
Could jurisdictions please supply linelisted data using the following templates by COB 
Wednesday 30 September 2015: 
 
Data collection templates for weekly testing and monitoring data  
 
Tested suspected/probable/confirmed EVD cases 24/9/15 to 30/9/15 
Date 
notified 
Unique 
Identifier 
Jurisdiction Category 
- e.g. 
HCW, 
returned 
traveller 
Test 
Date 1* 
& 
Result 
Test 
Date 2* 
& 
Result 
Test 
Date 3* 
& 
Result 
Comments 
        
*Only enter multiple test dates if applicable 
 
Persons being actively monitored for signs and symptoms of Ebolavirus disease (EVD), 
following potential exposure to the disease while overseas 24/9/15 to 30/9/15 
Date person 
left ebola 
affected 
country 
End of 
monitoring   
Date 
Unique 
Identifier 
Jurisdiction Category - 
e.g. HCW, 
returned 
traveller 
Comments 
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Appendix 3: Case and contact report forms and data 
dictionaries 
Case report form 
Ebola - dummy data Demographics/Identification 
1 This is an environment for collection of dummy data to assist with evaluation of 
NetEpi EVD surveillance 
2 Surname   
 
3 Given names   
 
4 Notifying state (Mark only one box) 
܆Unknown 
܆Australian Capital Territory 
܆New South Wales 
܆Northern Territory 
܆Queensland 
܆South Australia 
܆Tasmania 
܆Victoria 
܆Western Australia 
 
= Ebolavirus Disease (EVD) Case Form = 
(Version 88) 
1. == This form is for suspected, probable and confirmed cases only == 
1.1. Status of case
Definitions from Ebolavirus SoNG 
Person under investigation 
Requires clinical evidence and limited epidemiological evidence. Note: If a risk 
assessment determines that a person under investigation should be tested for 
Ebola Virus, the person should be managed as a suspected case from that 
point forward regardless of clinical and epidemiological evidence. 
Suspected case 
Requires clinical evidence and epidemiological evidence. 
Probable case 
Requires clinical evidence and epidemiological evidence, AND, laboratory 
suggestive evidence of EVD. 
Confirmed case Requires laboratory definitive evidence only. 
For surveillance purposes, only probable and confirmed cases are 
submitted to NNDSS 
Definitions Clinical evidence requires fever of greater than 38C or history of 
fever in the past 24 hours. Additional symptoms such as unexplained 
haemorrhage or bruising, severe headache, muscle pain, marked vomiting, 
marked diarrhoea, abdominal pain should also be considered. 
Limited epidemiological evidence requires only travel to an EVD affected 
area (country/region) in the 21 days prior to onset. 
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Epidemiological evidence requires a lower risk exposure or higher risk 
exposure as defined below in the 21 days prior to onset. 
Lower risk exposures: 
x household contact with an EVD case (in some circumstances this might 
be classified as higher risk such where the household was in a resource 
poor setting), 
x being within approximately 1 metre of an EVD case or within the case’s 
room or care area for a prolonged period of time (e.g., healthcare 
workers, household members) while not wearing recommended personal 
protective equipment , 
x having direct brief contact (e.g., shaking hands) with an EVD patient 
while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment. 
Higher risk exposures: 
x percutaneous (e.g. needle stick) or mucous membrane exposure to 
blood or body fluids of an EVD patient (either suspected or confirmed) 
x direct skin contact with blood or body fluids of an EVD case without 
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), 
x laboratory processing of body fluids of suspected, probable, or confirmed 
EVD cases without appropriate PPE or standard biosafety precautions, 
x direct contact with a dead body without appropriate PPE in a country 
where an EVD outbreak is occurring, 
x direct handling of sick or dead animals from disease-endemic areas, 
consumption of “bushmeat” in country where EVD is known to occur. 
Note: The presence of higher versus lower risk exposures, and the patient’s 
clinical condition may influence decisions about the need to transfer the patient. 
Note: Exposure to an EVD case in an Australian setting would require the case 
is probable or confirmed EVD according to laboratory criteria. 
 
 Laboratory suggestive evidence includes: 
Isolation of virus pending confirmation by Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory (VIDRL), Melbourne, or the Special Pathogens 
Laboratory, CDC, Atlanta or Special Pathogens Laboratory, National Institute of 
Virology (NIV), Johannesburg; OR 
x Detection of specific virus by nucleic acid testing, antigen detection 
assay, or electron microscopy pending confirmation by VIDRL, 
Melbourne, or CDC, Atlanta or NIV, Johannesburg; OR 
x IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a 
fourfold or greater rise in titre to specific virus pending confirmation by 
VIDRL, Melbourne, or CDC, Atlanta or NIV, Johannesburg; OR 
x Detection of IgM to a specific virus pending confirmation by VIDRL, 
Melbourne, or CDC, Atlanta or NIV, Johannesburg. 
Laboratory definitive evidence requires confirmation of EVD infection by 
VIDRL, Melbourne, or CDC, Atlanta, or NIV, Johannesburg 
x Isolation of a specific virus; OR 
x Detection of specific virus by nucleic acid testing or antigen detection 
assay; OR 
IgG seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or 
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greater rise in titre to specific virus. 
 
 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Suspected case - requires clinical evidence and epidemiological evidence. 
܆ Probable case - requires clinical evidence and epidemiological evidence, 
AND, laboratory suggestive evidence of EVD 
܆ Confirmed case - requires laboratory definitive evidence only 
܆ Contact - Do not use this form, please use form for contacts 
܆ Confirmed negative (not a case of EVD) 
For more information on definitions please click on the information button 
 
2. == Case information == 
2.1. Date of birth   
 
2.2. Gender (Mark only one box) 
܆ Male  ܆ Female
 
܆ Other
  
܆ Unknown  
 
 
2.3. State in which case resides or is 
primarily staying while in Australia 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Australian Capital Territory 
܆New South Wales 
܆Northern Territory 
܆Queensland 
܆South Australia 
܆Tasmania 
܆Victoria 
܆Western Australia 
܆Unknown 
 
2.4. Residency status (Mark only one box) 
܆Australian resident 
܆Migrant 
܆Short term visitor 
܆Long term visitor 
܆Unknown 
 
2.5. Is the case alive or dead? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Alive  ܆ Deceased  
 
If you selected Alive, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
2.6. Date of death   
 
3. == Clinical Symptoms == 
3.1. Did/does the case have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
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If Yes write the maximum recorded 
temperature below 
 
3.2. Maximum temperature recorded in 
degrees C to one decimal place 
  
Degrees C 
 
3.3. Did/does the case have abdominal 
pain? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.4. Did/does the case have diarrhoea? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.5. Did/does the case have fatigue? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.6. Did/does the case have joint and 
muscle pain? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.7. Did/does the case have severe 
headache? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.8. Was/is the case vomiting? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.9. Did/does the case have unexplained 
bleeding or bruising? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
3.10. Did/does the case have other 
symptoms or complications? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If yes please specify below 
 
3.11. Other symptoms such as neurologic, 
multi-organ failure, oedema, 
hypotension/shock (please specify) 
  
 
4. == Exposure period == 
4.1. Symptom dates 
4.1.1. Date of onset of symptoms   
 
4.1.2. Start of exposure period (21 days 
prior to onset of symptoms) 
  
 
4.2. Travel exposure 
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4.2.1. Did the case travel to an area in West 
Africa with active Ebola 
disease/outbreak during the 
exposure period? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Yes 
܆No 
܆Unknown 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
If yes, specify area/s below. 
 
4.2.2. Name of first region visited City 
Country 
 
4.2.3. Date arrived in first region   
 
4.2.4. Date departed first region   
 
4.2.5. Name of second region visited City 
Country 
 
4.2.6. Date arrived in second region   
 
4.2.7. Date departed second region   
 
4.2.8. Name of third region visited City 
Country 
 
4.2.9. Date arrived in third region   
 
4.2.10 Date departed third region   
 
4.2.11 Provide information on additional 
regions visited. 
  
 
4.3. EVD case exposures 
4.3.1. During the exposure period, did the 
case have contact with any known 
EVD case/s in Australia or overseas? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Yes - Overseas 
܆Yes - Australia 
܆No 
܆Unknown 
If you did not select Yes - Overseas or 
Yes - Australia, skip the remaining 
parts of this question. 
 
4.3.2. At the time of contact, were any of 
the cases deceased? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
4.3.3. In what setting/s did contact occur? ܆Household 
܆Health care 
܆School 
܆Aeroplane 
܆Unknown 
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܆Burial/body disposal 
܆Other - please specify 
Select all that apply 
 
4.3.4. Specify other exposure setting   
 
4.3.5. What type of contact was it? ܆Visit sick patient 
܆Care for sick patient - specify type of care 
below 
܆Bury deceased patient 
܆Exposed to blood, saliva, urine, vomit or 
faeces of sick patient 
܆Exposed to blood, saliva, urine, vomit or 
faeces of deceased patient 
܆Live with sick patient 
܆Other - please specify 
܆Unknown 
Select all that apply 
 
4.3.6. Specify other information about type 
of contact 
  
 
5. == **Exposure risk assessment** == 
5.1. HIGHER RISK A person is "higher risk" if any of the following are present: 
5.1.1. Did the case receive a needle stick 
injury from a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.2. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and blood or fluid splash to mucous 
membrane from a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.3. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and their skin touched blood, vomit, 
diarrhoea, urine, saliva, semen from 
a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.4. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and processed blood or body fluids 
from a confirmed case in laboratory? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.5. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and direct contact with dead body or 
fluid from a dead body with confirmed 
EVD, or suspected to have EVD, 
outcome not known or cause of death 
unknown in an EVD affected area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.6. Did the case have direct contact with 
sick or dead wild animals in an EVD 
endemic region? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
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5.2. LOWER RISK A person is considered "lower risk" if no higher risks are 
present and they answer yes to any of the following: 
5.2.1. Is the case a household member of a 
confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.2. Did the case work in a medical or 
nursing capacity caring directly for 
confirmed EVD cases in an EVD 
affected area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.3. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and touched skin or body of alive 
confirmed EVD case with no visible 
body fluid? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.4. Was there potential droplet exposure 
to a confirmed EVD case, meaning 
no PPE and in same room with 
confirmed EVD case actively 
vomiting / diarrhoea / cough / aerosol 
generating procedure (downgrade to 
casual if large room and very distant, 
such as in a hall at other end, or 
briefly at the other end of train 
carriage)? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.5. Did the case have direct contact with 
an ill person or body fluids from a 
person of unknown health status in a 
EVD affected area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.6. Did the case work in a mine / cave 
inhabited by bat colonies in an EVD 
endemic region? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3. CASUAL CONTACT A person is considered a "casual contact" if no high 
or low risks are present and they have any of the following: (Note to 
interviewer: brief interactions such as walking by a person or moving 
through a hospital do not constitute close/casual contact) 
5.3.1. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and had been within 1 metre or within 
the room or care area of an EVD 
case for a prolonged period of time? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.2. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and had direct contact (e.g. shaking 
hands) with an EVD case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.3. Did the case have inadequate PPE 
and potentially touched a non-visibly 
stained surface in a room occupied 
by a confirmed case of EVD (e.g. 
was in waiting room with a case, was 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
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on a ward round of a case and did 
not touch case)? 
5.3.4. Did the case work in a medical or 
nursing capacity in Australia and 
cared directly for a confirmed EVD 
case using adequate PPE? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.5. Was the case a cleaner on a ward 
with a confirmed case and wore 
adequate PPE when cleaning room? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.4. NO RISK A person is considered to have no risk if there is an absence of 
high, low or casual risk exposures. 
6. == Assessed Risk Categorisation == 
6.1. Based on the risk assessment 
criteria, please select the appropriate 
risk category 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Higher Risk 
܆Lower Risk 
܆Casual Risk 
܆No Risk 
If there are multiple exposures in different 
categories, consider the higher risk 
exposure as the case’s risk category. 
 
7. == Hospital presentation == 
7.1. Did the case present at a hospital? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
7.2. Date of hospital presentation   
 
7.3. Name, address and phone number of 
hospital 
  
 
7.4. Was the case admitted to hospital? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
7.5. Date of admission   
 
7.6. Date of discharge or death   
 
7.7. Name, address and phone number of 
hospital, if different from above 
  
 
7.8. Isolated in single room (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
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7.9. Admitted to ICU/HDU (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
7.10. Date admitted to ICU/HDU   
 
7.11. Date discharged from ICU/HDU   
 
7.12. Were antivirals administered? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
7.13. If yes, specify antiviral   
 
7.14. Date hospital information collected   
 
7.15. Name and contact details for treating 
doctor or team 
  
 
7.16. Was the infection thought to be 
hospital acquired? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
7.17. Was an infection control consultant 
notified if infection thought to be 
hospital acquired? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
7.18. Name and contact details of infection 
control consultant, if yes 
  
 
8. == Laboratory evidence == 
8.1. Has a specimen been collected? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
8.2. Were any of the samples positive for 
EVD? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  ܆ Pending
  
 
 
8.3. Blood or serum collected (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
8.4. If yes, date blood or serum collected   
 
8.5. Result of EVD testing on blood/serum 
sample 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Positive  ܆ Negative
  
܆ Pending
  
 
8.6. Throat swab collected (Mark only one box) 
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܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
8.7. If yes, date throat swab collected   
 
8.8. Result of EVD testing on throat swab (Mark only one box) 
܆ Positive  ܆ Negative
  
܆ Pending
  
 
 
8.9. Urine collected (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
8.10. If yes, date urine collected   
8.11. Result of EVD testing on urine 
sample 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Positive  ܆ Negative
  
 
 
8.12. Other specimen collected (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  ܆ Pending
  
 
 
8.13. If yes, specify type of specimen 
collected 
  
 
8.14. Date other specimen collected   
 
8.15. Result of EVD testing on other 
sample 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Positive  ܆ Negative
  
܆ Pending
  
 
 
8.16. Name and address of laboratory 
specimens sent to 
  
 
8.17. Were any samples sent for 
confirmatory testing at VIDRL? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
8.18. Were any of the samples sent to 
VIDRL positive for EVD? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  ܆ Pending
  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
8.19. What specimens were confirmed 
positive for EVD at VIDRL? 
܆Blood/serum 
܆Throat swab 
܆Urine 
܆Other specimen 
 
8.20. Specify other tests Specify other tests 
 
9. == Log of case movements during infectious period == Note: EVD cases 
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are deemed infectious from the day of symptoms onset for three weeks 
9.1. Infectious period 
9.1.1. Start of infectious period. Use the 
same date as recorded in "symptom 
onset" (question 4.1.1) 
  
 
9.1.2. End of infectious period. Calculate as 
21 days after symptom onset 
  
 
9.2. Travel 
9.2.1. Did the case travel away from home 
(including return from overseas) 
during the infectious period? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
9.2.2. Where did the case travel? ܆ Within state  ܆ Interstate
  
܆ Oversea
s  
 
 
9.2.3. Provide details of travel, including 
location, arrival and departure dates, 
mode of travel, flight/train/bus 
number and accommodation details 
  
 
9.3. Occupation 
9.3.1. Did the case work in any of these 
occupations during the infectious 
period? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Health care facility 
܆Residential care facility 
܆Assisted living 
܆Military base 
܆Correctional facility 
܆Educational facility 
܆Other - please specify 
܆Unknown 
܆None of the above 
 
9.3.2. Specify other occupation   
 
9.3.3. Details of work location, including 
address and phone number 
  
 
9.4. Childcare 
9.4.1. Did the case attend a childcare 
centre? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
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9.4.2. Details of childcare centre attended, 
including address and phone number 
  
 
9.5. Preschool/school 
9.5.1. Did the case attend a Preschool or 
school? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
9.5.2. Details of preschool or school 
attended, including address and 
phone number 
  
 
9.6. Educational/residential facility 
9.6.1. Did the case attend another 
educational or residential facility? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
9.6.2. Details of other educational or 
residential facility attended, including 
address and phone number 
  
 
9.7. Health service or facility 
9.7.1. Did the case attend a health service 
or facility? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If you did not select Yes, skip the 
remaining parts of this question. 
 
9.7.2. Details of first health facility, including 
name, address and contact number, 
date attended, time stayed and 
section visited/stayed. 
  
 
9.7.3. Details of second health facility, 
including name, address and contact 
number, date attended, time stayed 
and section visited/stayed. 
  
 
9.7.4. Details of third health facility, 
including name, address and contact 
number, date attended, time stayed 
and section visited/stayed. 
  
 
9.8. Household contacts 
9.8.1. What type of accommodation does 
the case live in? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Private residence 
܆Correctional facility 
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܆Hospital 
܆Hostel/boarding/hotel 
܆Aged care 
܆Psych facility 
܆Other - please specify 
܆Unknown 
 
9.8.2. Specify other accommodation type   
 
9.8.3. Number of household contacts   
 
9.8.4. Contact information for the other 
contacts in the household 
  
 
9.9. Other locations 
9.9.1. Provide information on places such 
as cinemas, cafes, restaurants, etc 
not covered above. Go through each 
day sequentially to assist memory 
List other locations, dates and contacts (if 
known) 
 
9.10. Pets 
9.10.1
. 
Has the case been in close contact 
with any animal, for example pets? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes
  
܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If yes, specify pet type below 
 
9.10.2 Specify types of pets/animals   
 
10. == Contacts identified == 
10.1.  Have any contacts been identified for this 
case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Yes - If yes, please use Ebola Contacts 
form for these contacts if this person 
becomes a case 
܆No 
܆Unknown 
 
11. == Data entry == 
11.1. Contact details for person who 
entered data 
Paste in email signature block 
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Contact report form 
Ebola – dummy data Demographics/Identification 
1 This is an environment for collection of dummy data to assist with evaluation of 
NetEpi EVD surveillance cases of EVD. 
2 Surname   
 
3 Given names   
 
4 Notifying State (Mark only one box) 
܆Unknown 
܆Australian Capital Territory 
܆New South Wales 
܆Northern Territory 
܆Queensland 
܆South Australia 
܆Tasmania 
܆Victoria 
܆Western Australia 
 
= Ebolavirus Disease (EVD) Contacts Form = 
(Version 44) 
1. == This form is used to evaluate and monitor all people who have had 
contact with a case (suspected, confirmed or probable) of EVD, including 
returning health care workers == 
1.1. What type of contact has the 
person had with a case of 
EVD? 
܆Health care worker in a region of current EVD 
activity 
܆Health care of EVD case in Australia 
܆Contact of EVD case in a region of current 
EVD activity 
܆Contact of EVD case in Australia 
܆Travel or lived in a region of current EVD 
activity 
܆Other - please specify 
Check all that apply 
 
1.2. Specify type of "other" contact   
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1.3. Has the person been tested 
for EVD 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
If yes is selected, please use EVD case 
form instead. As per the Ebolavirus SoNG, if a 
risk assessment determines that a person should 
be tested for Ebola virus, the person should be 
managed as a suspected case. If the test is 
negative for EVD, the person should return to 
monitoring as a contact for the remainder of the 
incubation period (21 days after last exposure to 
an EVD case or leaving region of current EVD 
activity) 
 
2. == General information == 
2.1. Date of birth   
 
2.2. Gender (Mark only one box) 
܆  Male  ܆  Female  ܆  Other  ܆  Unknown  
 
 
2.3. State in which person resides 
or is primarily staying while in 
Australia 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Australian Capital Territory 
܆New South Wales 
܆Northern Territory 
܆Queensland 
܆South Australia 
܆Tasmania 
܆Victoria 
܆Western Australia 
܆Unknown 
 
2.4. Residency status (Mark only one box) 
܆Australian resident 
܆Migrant 
܆Short term visitor 
܆Long term visitor 
܆Unknown 
 
3. == Exposure information == 
3.1. Date of first exposure   
 
3.2. Date of last exposure   
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3.3. Exposure setting (Mark only one box) 
܆Travel/work in region of EVD 
activity 
܆Health care overseas 
܆Health care in Australia 
܆Household 
܆School 
܆Aeroplane 
܆Other - please specify 
܆Unknown 
 
3.4. Specify "other" exposure setting   
 
3.5. In which country did exposure occur? Use 
Standard Australian Classification of Countries 
(SACC). http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@
.nsf/mf/1269.0 
  
 
4. == Travel exposure == 
4.1. Did the person travel to an area of West Africa 
with active Ebola disease/outbreak during the 
exposure period? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
4.2. Name of the first region visited   
 
4.3. Date arrived in the first region   
 
4.4. Date departed first region   
 
4.5. Name of the second region visited   
 
4.6. Date arrived in the second region   
 
4.7. Date departed second region   
 
4.8. Name of the third region visited   
 
4.9. Date arrived in the third region   
 
4.10. Date departed third region   
 
5. == *Exposure risk assessment* == 
5.1. HIGHER RISK A person is "higher risk" if any of the following are present: 
5.1.1. Did the person receive a needle stick injury 
from a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.2. Did the person have inadequate PPE and 
blood or fluid splash to mucous membrane 
from a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
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5.1.3. Did the person have inadequate PPE and their 
skin touched blood, vomit, diarrhoea, urine, 
saliva, semen from a confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.4. Did the person have inadequate PPE and 
processed blood or body fluids from a 
confirmed case in laboratory? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.5. Did the person have inadequate PPE and 
direct contact with dead body or fluid from a 
dead body with confirmed EVD, or suspected 
to have EVD, outcome not known or cause of 
death unknown in an EVD affected area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.1.6. Did the person have direct contact with sick or 
dead wild animals in an EVD endemic region? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2. LOWER RISK A person is considered "lower risk" if no high risks are 
present and they answer yes to any of the following: 
5.2.1. Is the person a household member of a 
confirmed case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.2. Did the person work in a medical or nursing 
capacity caring directly for confirmed EVD 
cases in an EVD affected area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.3. Did the person have inadequate PPE and 
touched skin or body of alive confirmed EVD 
case with no visible body fluid? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.4. Was there potential droplet exposure to a 
confirmed EVD case, meaning no PPE and in 
same room with confirmed EVD case actively 
vomiting / diarrhoea / cough / aerosol 
generating procedure (downgrade to casual if 
large room and very distant, such as in a hall 
at other end, or briefly the other end of train 
carriage)? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.5. Did the person have direct contact with an ill 
person or body fluids from a person of 
unknown health status in a EVD affected 
area? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.2.6. Did the person work in a mine/cave inhabited 
by bat colonies in an EVD endemic region? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3. CASUAL CONTACT A person is considered a "casual contact" if no high 
or low risks are present and they have any of the following: Note to 
interviewer: brief interactions such as walking by a person or moving 
through a hospital do not constitute close/casual contact 
 182 
 
5.3.1. Did the person have inadequate PPE and had 
been within 1 metre or within the room or care 
area of an EVD case for a prolonged period of 
time? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.2. Did the person have inadequate PPE and had 
direct contact (e.g. shaking hands) with an 
EVD case? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.3. Did the person have inadequate PPE and 
potentially touched a non-visibly stained 
surface in a room occupied by a confirmed 
case of EVD (e.g. was in waiting room with a 
case, was on a ward round of a case and did 
not touch case)? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.4. Did the person work in a medical or nursing 
capacity in Australia and cared directly for a 
confirmed EVD case using adequate PPE? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.3.5. Was the person a cleaner on a ward with a 
confirmed case and wore adequate PPE when 
cleaning room? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
5.4. NO RISK A person is considered to have no risk if there is an absence of 
higher, lower or casual risk exposures 
6. == Assessed Risk Categorisation == 
6.1. Based on the risk assessment criteria, please 
select the appropriate risk category 
(Mark only one box) 
܆Higher Risk 
܆Lower Risk 
܆Casual Risk 
܆No Risk 
If there are multiple exposures in 
different categories, consider the 
higher risk exposure as the 
contact’s risk category. 
 
7. == Clinical Symptoms == If the person answers yes to any of these 
symptoms in combination with a lower or higher risk of exposure, a case 
report form should be completed instead and the local Public Health Unit 
should be notified. 
7.1. Did/does the person have a fever or history of 
fever in the past 24 hours, abdominal pain, 
diarrhoea, fatigue, joint or muscle pain, severe 
headache, vomiting or unexplained bleeding? 
(Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
 
8. == Temperature logging == If the person records a fever (>37.5C), notify 
the local Public Health Unit 
8.1. Day 0 Record as the same date as "date last exposed" 
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8.1.1. Day 0 date and AM time   
 
8.1.2. Day 0 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.1.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.1.4. Day 0 date and PM time   
 
8.1.5. Day 0 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
Record temperature below 
 
8.1.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.2. Day 1 
8.2.1. Day 1 date and AM time   
 
8.2.2. Day 1 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.2.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.2.4. Day 1 date and PM time   
 
8.2.5. Day 1 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.2.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.3. Day 2 
8.3.1. Day 2 date and AM time   
 
8.3.2. Day 2 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.3.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.3.4. Day 2 date and PM time   
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8.3.5. Day 2 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.3.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.4. Day 3 
8.4.1. Day 3 date and AM time   
 
8.4.2. Day 3 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.4.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.4.4. Day 3 date and PM time   
 
8.4.5. Day 3 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.4.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.5. Day 4 
8.5.1. Day 4 date and AM time   
 
8.5.2. Day 4 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.5.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.5.4. Day 4 date and PM time   
 
8.5.5. Day 4 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.5.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.6. Day 5 
8.6.1. Day 5 date and AM time   
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8.6.2. Day 5 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.6.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.6.4. Day 5 date and PM time   
 
8.6.5. Day 5 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.6.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.7. Day 6 
8.7.1. Day 6 date and AM time   
 
8.7.2. Day 6 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.7.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.7.4. Day 6 date and PM time   
 
8.7.5. Day 6 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.7.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.8. Day 7 
8.8.1. Day 7 date and AM time   
 
8.8.2. Day 7 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.8.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.8.4. Day 7 date and PM time   
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8.8.5. Day 7 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.8.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.9. Day 8 
8.9.1. Day 8 date and AM time   
 
8.9.2. Day 8 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.9.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.9.4. Day 8 date and PM time   
 
8.9.5. Day 8 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.9.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.10. Day 9 
8.10.1. Day 9 date and AM time   
 
8.10.2. Day 9 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.10.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.10.4. Day 9 date and PM time   
 
8.10.5. Day 9 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.10.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.11. Day 10 
8.11.1. Day 10 date and AM time   
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8.11.2. Day 10 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.11.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.11.4. Day 10 date and PM time   
 
8.11.5. Day 10 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.11.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.12. Day 11 
8.12.1. Day 11 date and AM time   
 
8.12.2. Day 11 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.12.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.12.4. Day 11 date and PM time   
 
8.12.5. Day 11 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.12.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.13. Day 12 
8.13.1. Day 12 date and AM time   
 
8.13.2. Day 12 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.13.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.13.4. Day 12 date and PM time   
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8.13.5. Day 12 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.13.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.14. Day 13 
8.14.1. Day 13 date and AM time   
 
8.14.2. Day 13 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.14.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.14.4. Day 13 date and PM time   
 
8.14.5. Day 13 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.14.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.15. Day 14 
8.15.1. Day 14 date and AM time   
 
8.15.2. Day 14 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.15.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.15.4. Day 14 date and PM time   
 
8.15.5. Day 14 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.15.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.16. Day 15 
8.16.1. Day 15 date and AM time   
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8.16.2. Day 15 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.16.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.16.4. Day 15 date and PM time   
 
8.16.5. Day 15 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.16.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.17. Day 16 
8.17.1. Day 16 date and AM time   
 
8.17.2. Day 16 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.17.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.17.4. Day 16 date and PM time   
 
8.17.5. Day 16 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.17.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.18. Day 17 
8.18.1. Day 17 date and AM time   
 
8.18.2. Day 17 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.18.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.18.4. Day 17 date and PM time   
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8.18.5. Day 17 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.18.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.19. Day 18 
8.19.1. Day 18 date and AM time   
 
8.19.2. Day 18 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.19.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.19.4. Day 18 date and PM time   
 
8.19.5. Day 18 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.19.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.20. Day 19 
8.20.1. Day 19 date and AM time   
 
8.20.2. Day 19 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.20.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.20.4. Day 19 date and PM time   
 
8.20.5. Day 19 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.20.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.21. Day 20 
8.21.1. Day 20 date and AM time   
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8.21.2. Day 20 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.21.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.21.4. Day 20 date and PM time   
 
8.21.5. Day 20 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.21.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
8.22. Day 21 
8.22.1. Day 21 date and AM time   
 
8.22.2. Day 21 AM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.22.3. Record temperature   
AM Degrees C 
 
8.22.4. Day 21 date and PM time   
 
8.22.5. Day 21 PM Did the person have a fever? (Mark only one box) 
܆ Yes  ܆ No  ܆ Unknown  
 
Record temperature below 
 
8.22.6. Record temperature   
PM Degrees C 
 
9. == **Data Entry** == 
9.1. Contact details for person who entered 
data 
Paste in email signature block 
 
 
 19
2 
 
C
O
N
T
A
C
T 
FO
R
M
 D
A
T
A
 D
IC
TI
O
N
A
R
Y
 
S
ec
tio
n
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
na
m
e 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
nu
m
be
r 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
ty
pe
 
P
os
si
bl
e 
re
sp
on
se
s 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
R
eq
ui
re
d 
fie
ld
 
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s 
ca
se
_i
d 
D
1 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
U
ni
qu
e 
ID
 a
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
 g
en
er
at
ed
 b
y 
N
et
E
pi
 
X
 
lo
ca
l_
ca
se
_i
d 
D
2 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
U
ni
qu
e 
ID
 u
se
d 
by
 re
po
rti
ng
 s
ta
te
 
X
 
su
rn
am
e 
D
3 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
S
ur
na
m
e 
of
 c
as
e 
X
 
gi
ve
n_
na
m
es
 
D
4 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
G
iv
en
 n
am
es
 o
f c
as
e 
X
 
st
at
e 
D
5 
st
rin
g 
A
C
T 
= 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
C
ap
ita
l 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 
N
S
W
 =
 N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
 
N
T 
= 
N
or
th
er
n 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 
Q
LD
 =
 Q
ue
en
sl
an
d 
S
A
 =
 S
ou
th
 A
us
tra
lia
 
TA
S
 =
 T
as
m
an
ia
 
V
IC
 =
 V
ic
to
ria
 
W
A
 =
 W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tra
lia
 
. =
 U
nk
no
w
n 
N
ot
ify
in
g 
st
at
e 
X
 
 19
3 
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f s
ta
tu
s 
co
nt
ac
t_
ty
pe
 
1.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
w
or
ke
r i
n 
a 
re
gi
on
 o
f c
ur
re
nt
 E
V
D
 
ac
tiv
ity
 
2 
= 
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
of
 E
V
D
 
ca
se
 in
 A
us
tra
lia
 
3 
= 
C
on
ta
ct
 o
f E
V
D
 c
as
e 
in
 a
 re
gi
on
 o
f c
ur
re
nt
 
E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
ity
 
4 
= 
C
on
ta
ct
 o
f E
V
D
 c
as
e 
in
 A
us
tra
lia
 
5 
= 
Tr
av
el
 o
r l
iv
ed
 in
 
re
gi
on
 o
f c
ur
re
nt
 E
V
D
 
ac
tiv
ity
 
6 
= 
O
th
er
 - 
pl
ea
se
 s
pe
ci
fy
 
W
ha
t t
yp
e 
of
 c
on
ta
ct
 h
as
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
ad
 w
ith
 a
 
ca
se
 o
f E
V
D
?  
X
 
co
nt
ac
t_
ty
pe
_s
pe
c 
1.
2 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
S
pe
ci
fy
 "
ot
he
r"
 ty
pe
 o
f c
on
ta
ct
 
X
 
te
st
ed
 
1.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
H
as
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 b
ee
n 
te
st
ed
 fo
r E
V
D
? 
If 
ye
s 
is
 
se
le
ct
ed
, p
le
as
e 
us
e 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
fo
rm
 in
st
ea
d.
 A
s 
pe
r t
he
 E
bo
la
vi
ru
s 
S
oN
G
, i
f a
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
de
te
rm
in
es
 th
at
 a
 p
er
so
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
te
st
ed
 fo
r 
E
bo
la
 v
iru
s,
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
an
ag
ed
 a
s 
a 
su
sp
ec
te
d 
ca
se
. I
f t
he
 te
st
 is
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
fo
r E
V
D
, 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
tu
rn
 to
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
as
 a
 c
on
ta
ct
 
fo
r t
he
 re
m
ai
nd
er
 o
f t
he
 in
cu
ba
tio
n 
pe
rio
d 
(2
1 
da
ys
 
af
te
r l
as
t e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 a
n 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
or
 le
av
in
g 
re
gi
on
 o
f c
ur
re
nt
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
ity
) 
X
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
do
b 
2.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
of
 b
irt
h 
of
 c
as
e 
X
 
ge
nd
er
 
2.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
M
al
e 
0 
= 
Fe
m
al
e 
3 
= 
O
th
er
 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
G
en
de
r o
f c
as
e 
X
 
 19
4 
 
st
at
e_
re
si
de
 
2.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
C
ap
ita
l 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 
2 
= 
N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
 
3 
= 
N
or
th
er
n 
Te
rr
ito
ry
 
4 
= 
Q
ue
en
sl
an
d 
5 
= 
S
ou
th
 A
us
tra
lia
 
6 
= 
Ta
sm
an
ia
 
7 
= 
V
ic
to
ria
 
8 
= 
W
es
te
rn
 A
us
tra
lia
 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n  
S
ta
te
 in
 w
hi
ch
 p
er
so
n 
re
si
de
s 
or
 is
 p
rim
ar
ily
 
st
ay
in
g 
X
 
re
si
de
nc
y 
2.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
re
si
de
nt
 
2 
= 
M
ig
ra
nt
 
3 
= 
S
ho
rt 
te
rm
 v
is
ito
r 
4 
= 
Lo
ng
 te
rm
 v
is
ito
r 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
R
es
id
en
cy
 s
ta
tu
s 
X
 
E
xp
os
ur
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
da
te
_1
st
_e
xp
 
3.
1 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
of
 fi
rs
t k
no
w
n 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 a
n 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
X
 
la
st
_e
xp
 
3.
2 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
of
 la
st
 k
no
w
n 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 a
n 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
X
 
ex
p_
se
tti
ng
 
3.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Tr
av
el
/w
or
k 
in
 re
gi
on
 
of
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
ity
 
2 
= 
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
ov
er
se
as
 
3 
= 
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
in
 
A
us
tra
lia
 
4 
= 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
5 
= 
S
ch
oo
l 
6 
= 
A
er
op
la
ne
 
7 
= 
O
th
er
 - 
pl
ea
se
 s
pe
ci
fy
 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n  
T
yp
e 
of
 s
et
tin
g 
in
 w
hi
ch
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 a
n 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 
X
 
ot
he
r_
ex
p 
3.
4 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
S
pe
ci
fy
 "
ot
he
r"
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
se
tti
ng
 
X
 
 19
5 
 
ex
p_
co
un
try
 
3.
5 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 (4
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
s)
 
In
 w
hi
ch
 c
ou
nt
ry
 d
id
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
oc
cu
r?
 U
se
 
S
ta
nd
ar
d 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
nt
rie
s 
(S
A
C
C
). 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.a
bs
.g
ov
.a
u/
au
ss
ta
ts
/a
bs
@
.n
sf
/m
f/1
26
9.
0 
X
 
Tr
av
el
 e
xp
os
ur
es
 
w
af
r_
tra
ve
l 
4.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
ca
se
 tr
av
el
 to
 a
n 
ar
ea
 in
 W
es
t A
fri
ca
 w
ith
 
an
 a
ct
iv
e 
E
V
D
 o
ut
br
ea
k  
X
 
re
gi
on
1_
na
m
e 
4.
2 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
N
am
e 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 re
gi
on
 tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
ac
tiv
e 
E
V
D
 z
on
e 
in
 W
es
t A
fri
ca
 
  
re
gi
on
1_
ar
riv
al
 
4.
3 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
ar
riv
ed
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
re
gi
on
1_
de
pa
rt 
4.
4 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
de
pa
rte
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
fir
st
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
re
gi
on
2_
na
m
e 
4.
5 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
N
am
e 
of
 o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
re
gi
on
 tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
ac
tiv
e 
E
V
D
 z
on
e 
in
 W
es
t A
fri
ca
 
  
re
gi
on
2_
ar
riv
al
 
4.
6 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
ar
riv
ed
 in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
re
gi
on
2_
de
pa
rt 
4.
7 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
de
pa
rte
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
re
gi
on
3_
na
m
e 
4.
8 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
N
am
e 
of
 o
f t
he
 th
ird
 re
gi
on
 tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
ac
tiv
e 
E
V
D
 z
on
e 
in
 W
es
t A
fri
ca
 
  
re
gi
on
3_
ar
riv
al
 
4.
9 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
ar
riv
ed
 in
 th
e 
th
ird
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
re
gi
on
3_
de
pa
rt 
4.
10
 
st
rin
g 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) 
D
at
e 
de
pa
rte
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
th
ird
 E
V
D
 a
ct
iv
e 
re
gi
on
 
  
ex
tra
_r
eg
io
ns
 
4.
11
 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
P
ro
vi
de
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 re
gi
on
s 
vi
si
te
d.
 
  
E
xp
os
ur
e 
ris
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
H
ig
he
r 
ris
k 
hi
gh
_n
ee
dl
e 
5.
1.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 re
ce
iv
e 
a 
ne
ed
le
 s
tic
k 
in
ju
ry
 fr
om
 a
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 c
as
e  
X
 
hi
gh
_f
lu
id
 
5.
1.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 b
lo
od
 o
r 
flu
id
 s
pl
as
h 
to
 m
uc
ou
s 
m
em
br
an
e 
fro
m
 a
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 c
as
e?
 
X
 
 19
6 
 
hi
gh
_s
ki
n 
5.
1.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
sk
in
 to
uc
he
d 
bl
oo
d,
 v
om
it,
 d
ia
rr
ho
ea
, u
rin
e,
 s
al
iv
a,
 
se
m
en
 fr
om
 a
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 c
as
e?
 
X
 
hi
gh
_p
ro
ce
ss
ed
 
5.
1.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
se
d 
bl
oo
d 
or
 b
od
y 
flu
id
s 
fro
m
 a
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 
ca
se
 in
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
?  
X
 
hi
gh
_d
ea
d 
5.
1.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 d
ire
ct
 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 d
ea
d 
bo
dy
 o
r f
lu
id
 fr
om
 a
 d
ea
d 
bo
dy
 
w
ith
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 E
V
D
, o
r s
us
pe
ct
ed
 to
 h
av
e 
E
V
D
, 
ou
tc
om
e 
no
t k
no
w
n 
or
 c
au
se
 o
f d
ea
th
 u
nk
no
w
n 
in
 
an
 E
V
D
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 a
re
a?
 
X
 
hi
gh
_a
ni
m
al
s 
5.
2.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
di
re
ct
 c
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 s
ic
k 
or
 
de
ad
 w
ild
 a
ni
m
al
s 
in
 a
n 
E
V
D
 e
nd
em
ic
 re
gi
on
? 
X
 
Lo
w
er
 
ris
k 
lo
w
_h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
5.
2.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
Is
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 a
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 m
em
be
r o
f a
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 
ca
se
?  
X
 
lo
w
_h
cw
 
5.
2.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 w
or
k 
in
 a
 m
ed
ic
al
 o
r n
ur
si
ng
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 c
ar
in
g 
di
re
ct
ly
 fo
r c
on
fir
m
ed
 E
V
D
 c
as
es
 in
 
an
 E
V
D
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 a
re
a?
 
X
 
lo
w
_s
ki
n_
flu
id
 
5.
2.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 to
uc
he
d 
sk
in
 o
r b
od
y 
of
 a
liv
e 
co
nf
irm
ed
 E
V
D
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 n
o 
vi
si
bl
e 
bo
dy
 fl
ui
d?
 
X
 
 19
7 
 
lo
w
_d
ro
pl
et
 
5.
2.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
W
as
 th
er
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l d
ro
pl
et
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 a
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 E
V
D
 c
as
e,
 m
ea
ni
ng
 n
o 
P
P
E
 a
nd
 in
 
sa
m
e 
ro
om
 w
ith
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 E
V
D
 c
as
e 
ac
tiv
el
y 
vo
m
iti
ng
 / 
di
ar
rh
oe
a 
/ c
ou
gh
 / 
A
G
P
 (d
ow
ng
ra
de
 to
 
ca
su
al
 if
 la
rg
e 
ro
om
 a
nd
 v
er
y 
di
st
an
t, 
su
ch
 a
s 
in
 a
 
ha
ll 
at
 o
th
er
 e
nd
, o
r b
rie
fly
 th
e 
ot
he
r e
nd
 o
f t
ra
in
 
ca
rr
ia
ge
)?
 
X
 
lo
w
_i
llc
on
ta
ct
 
5.
2.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
di
re
ct
 c
on
ta
ct
 w
ith
 a
n 
ill
 
pe
rs
on
 o
r b
od
y 
flu
id
s 
fro
m
 a
 p
er
so
n 
of
 u
nk
no
w
n 
he
al
th
 s
ta
tu
s 
in
 a
 E
V
D
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 a
re
a?
 
X
 
lo
w
_m
in
e 
5.
2.
7 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 w
or
k 
in
 a
 m
in
e 
/ c
av
e 
in
ha
bi
te
d 
by
 
ba
t c
ol
on
ie
s 
in
 a
n 
E
V
D
 e
nd
em
ic
 re
gi
on
?  
X
 
C
as
ua
l 
ca
su
al
_3
fe
et
 
5.
3.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 h
ad
 
be
en
 w
ith
in
 1
 m
et
re
 o
r w
ith
in
 th
e 
ro
om
 o
r c
ar
e 
ar
ea
 
of
 a
n 
E
V
D
 c
as
e 
fo
r a
 p
ro
lo
ng
ed
 p
er
io
d 
of
 ti
m
e?
 
X
 
ca
su
al
_d
ire
ct
co
nt
ac
t 
5.
3.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 h
ad
 
di
re
ct
 c
on
ta
ct
 (e
.g
. s
ha
ki
ng
 h
an
ds
) w
ith
 a
n 
E
V
D
 
ca
se
?  
X
 
ca
su
al
_t
ou
ch
 
5.
3.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 a
nd
 
po
te
nt
ia
lly
 to
uc
he
d 
a 
no
n -
vi
si
bl
y 
st
ai
ne
d 
su
rfa
ce
 in
 
a 
ro
om
 o
cc
up
ie
d 
by
 a
 c
on
fir
m
ed
 c
as
e 
of
 E
V
D
 (e
.g
. 
w
as
 in
 w
ai
tin
g 
ro
om
 w
ith
 a
 c
as
e,
 w
as
 o
n 
a 
w
ar
d 
ro
un
d 
of
 a
 c
as
e 
an
d 
di
d 
no
t t
ou
ch
 c
as
e)
? 
X
 
ca
su
al
_h
cw
 
5.
3.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 w
or
k 
in
 a
 m
ed
ic
al
 o
r n
ur
si
ng
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 in
 A
us
tra
lia
 a
nd
 c
ar
ed
 d
ire
ct
ly
 fo
r a
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 E
V
D
 c
as
e 
us
in
g 
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
? 
X
 
 19
8 
 
ca
su
al
_c
le
an
er
 
5.
3.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
W
as
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 a
 c
le
an
er
 o
n 
a 
w
ar
d 
w
ith
 a
 
co
nf
irm
ed
 c
as
e 
an
d 
w
or
e 
ad
eq
ua
te
 P
P
E
 w
he
n 
cl
ea
ni
ng
 ro
om
? 
X
 
N
o 
ris
k 
N
A
 
5.
4 
N
A
 
N
A
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
na
l s
ec
tio
n 
ab
ou
t "
N
o 
R
is
k"
 c
at
eg
or
y 
  
A
ss
es
se
d 
R
is
k 
C
at
eg
or
is
at
io
n 
ris
k_
ca
t 
6.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
H
ig
he
r r
is
k 
2 
= 
Lo
w
er
 ri
sk
 
3 
= 
C
as
ua
l r
is
k 
4 
= 
N
o 
ris
k 
B
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ris
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
t c
rit
er
ia
, p
le
as
e 
se
le
ct
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 ri
sk
 c
at
eg
or
y.
 If
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
ul
tip
le
 e
xp
os
ur
es
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t c
at
eg
or
ie
s,
 c
on
si
de
r 
th
e 
hi
gh
er
 ri
sk
 e
xp
os
ur
e 
as
 th
e 
ca
se
’s
 ri
sk
 
ca
te
go
ry
. 
X
 
C
lin
ic
al
 S
ym
pt
om
s 
sy
m
pt
om
s 
7.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
/d
oe
s 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r o
r h
is
to
ry
 o
f 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
pa
st
 2
4 
ho
ur
s,
 a
bd
om
in
al
 p
ai
n,
 
di
ar
rh
oe
a,
 fa
tig
ue
, j
oi
nt
 o
r m
us
cl
e 
pa
in
, s
ev
er
e 
he
ad
ac
he
, v
om
iti
ng
 o
r u
ne
xp
la
in
ed
 b
le
ed
in
g?
 
X
 
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
lo
gg
in
g 
D
ay
 0
 
da
y0
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
1.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 o
f l
as
t e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y0
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
1.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
0?
 
  
da
y0
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
1.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 0
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n  
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t. 
  
da
y0
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
1.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 o
f l
as
t e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y0
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
1.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
0?
 
  
 19
9 
 
da
y0
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
1.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 0
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 1
 
da
y1
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
2.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
2.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
1?
 
  
da
y1
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
2.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
2.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
2.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
1?
 
  
da
y1
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
2.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 2
 
da
y2
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
3.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y2
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
3.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
2?
 
  
da
y2
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
3.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 2
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
 20
0 
 
da
y2
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
3.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y2
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
3.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
2?
 
  
da
y2
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
3.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 2
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 3
 
da
y3
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
4.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 3
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y3
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
4.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
3?
 
  
da
y3
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
4.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 3
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y3
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
4.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 3
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y3
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
4.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
3?
 
  
da
y3
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
4.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 3
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 4
 
da
y4
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
5.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 4
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
 20
1 
 
da
y4
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
5.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
4?
 
  
da
y4
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
5.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 4
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t. 
  
da
y4
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
5.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 4
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y4
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
5.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
4?
 
  
da
y4
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
5.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 4
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 5
 
da
y5
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
6.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 5
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y5
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
6.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
5?
 
  
da
y5
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
6.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 5
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y5
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
6.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 5
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y5
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
6.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
5?
 
  
 20
2 
 
da
y5
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
6.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 5
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 6
 
da
y6
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
7.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 6
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y6
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
7.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
6?
 
  
da
y6
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
7.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 6
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y6
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
7.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 6
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y6
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
7.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
6?
 
  
da
y6
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
7.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 6
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 7
 
da
y7
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
8.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 7
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y7
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
8.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
7?
 
  
da
y7
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
8.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 7
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
 20
3 
 
da
y7
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
8.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 7
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y7
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
8.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
7?
 
  
da
y7
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
8.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 7
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 8
 
da
y8
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
9.
1 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 8
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y8
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
9.
2 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
8?
 
  
da
y8
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
9.
3 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 8
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t. 
  
da
y8
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
9.
4 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 8
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y8
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
9.
5 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
8?
 
  
da
y8
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
9.
6 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 8
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 9
 
da
y9
_a
m
da
te
 
8.
10
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 9
 p
os
t-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
 20
4 
 
da
y9
_a
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
10
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
9?
 
  
da
y9
_a
m
te
m
p 
8.
10
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 9
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y9
_p
m
da
te
 
8.
10
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 9
 p
os
t-
ex
po
su
re
 a
t 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y9
_p
m
fe
ve
r 
8.
10
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
9?
 
  
da
y9
_p
m
te
m
p 
8.
10
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 9
? 
R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
0 
da
y1
0_
am
da
te
 
8.
11
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
0 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
0_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
11
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
10
? 
  
da
y1
0_
am
te
m
p 
8.
11
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
0?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
0_
pm
da
te
 
8.
11
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
0 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
0_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
11
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
10
?  
  
 20
5 
 
da
y1
0_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
11
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
0?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 1
1 
da
y1
1_
am
da
te
 
8.
12
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
1 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
1_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
12
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
11
?  
  
da
y1
1_
am
te
m
p 
8.
12
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
1?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
1_
pm
da
te
 
8.
12
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
1 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
1_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
12
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
11
? 
  
da
y1
1_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
12
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
1?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 1
2 
da
y1
2_
am
da
te
 
8.
13
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
2 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
2_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
13
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
12
?  
  
da
y1
2_
am
te
m
p 
8.
13
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
2?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
 20
6 
 
da
y1
2_
pm
da
te
 
8.
13
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
2 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
2_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
13
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
12
?  
  
da
y1
2_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
13
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
2?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
3 
da
y1
3_
am
da
te
 
8.
14
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
3 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
3_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
14
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
13
?  
  
da
y1
3_
am
te
m
p 
8.
14
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
3?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
3_
pm
da
te
 
8.
14
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
3 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
3_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
14
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
13
?  
  
da
y1
3_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
14
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
3?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
4 
da
y1
4_
am
da
te
 
8.
15
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
4 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
 20
7 
 
da
y1
4_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
15
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
14
? 
  
da
y1
4_
am
te
m
p 
8.
15
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
4?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
4_
pm
da
te
 
8.
15
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
4 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
4_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
15
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
14
?  
  
da
y1
4_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
15
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
4?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
5 
da
y1
5_
am
da
te
 
8.
16
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
5 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
5_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
16
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
15
? 
  
da
y1
5_
am
te
m
p 
8.
16
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
5?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
5_
pm
da
te
 
8.
16
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
5 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
5_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
16
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
15
?  
  
 20
8 
 
da
y1
5_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
16
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
5?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 1
6 
da
y1
6_
am
da
te
 
8.
17
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
6 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
6_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
17
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
16
?  
  
da
y1
6_
am
te
m
p 
8.
17
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
6?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
6_
pm
da
te
 
8.
17
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
6 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
6_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
17
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
16
? 
  
da
y1
6_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
17
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
6?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 1
7 
da
y1
7_
am
da
te
 
8.
18
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
7 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
7_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
18
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
17
?  
  
da
y1
7_
am
te
m
p 
8.
18
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
7?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
 20
9 
 
da
y1
7_
pm
da
te
 
8.
18
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
7 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
7_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
18
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
17
?  
  
da
y1
7_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
18
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
7?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
8 
da
y1
8_
am
da
te
 
8.
19
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
8 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
8_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
19
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
18
?  
  
da
y1
8_
am
te
m
p 
8.
19
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
8?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
8_
pm
da
te
 
8.
19
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
8 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y1
8_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
19
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
18
?  
  
da
y1
8_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
19
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
8?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 1
9 
da
y1
9_
am
da
te
 
8.
20
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
9 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
 21
0 
 
da
y1
9_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
20
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
19
? 
  
da
y1
9_
am
te
m
p 
8.
20
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 1
9?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y1
9_
pm
da
te
 
8.
20
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 1
9 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y1
9_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
20
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
19
?  
  
da
y1
9_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
20
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 1
9?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
.  
  
D
ay
 2
0 
da
y2
0_
am
da
te
 
8.
21
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
0 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y2
0_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
21
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
20
? 
  
da
y2
0_
am
te
m
p 
8.
21
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 2
0?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y2
0_
pm
da
te
 
8.
21
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e 
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
0 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
  
da
y2
0_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
21
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
20
?  
  
 21
1 
 
da
y2
0_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
21
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 2
0?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
ay
 2
1 
da
y2
1_
am
da
te
 
8.
22
.1
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
m
or
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
1 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 
w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y2
1_
am
fe
ve
r 
8.
22
.2
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 o
n 
da
y 
21
?  
  
da
y2
1_
am
te
m
p 
8.
22
.3
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
or
ni
ng
 
on
 d
ay
 2
1?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r 
pr
es
en
t.  
  
da
y2
1_
pm
da
te
 
8.
22
.4
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
da
te
 (D
D
/M
M
/Y
Y
Y
Y
) a
nd
 
tim
e  
D
at
e 
an
d 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
tim
e 
on
 d
ay
 2
1 
po
st
-e
xp
os
ur
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 w
as
 ta
ke
n  
  
da
y2
1_
pm
fe
ve
r 
8.
22
.5
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
1 
= 
Y
es
 
0 
= 
N
o 
9 
= 
U
nk
no
w
n 
D
id
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 h
av
e 
a 
fe
ve
r i
n 
th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 
da
y 
21
? 
  
da
y2
1_
pm
te
m
p 
8.
22
.6
 
nu
m
er
ic
 
nu
m
be
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
 a
nd
 
50
 
W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 d
ay
 2
1?
 R
ec
or
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 e
ve
n 
if 
no
 fe
ve
r p
re
se
nt
. 
  
D
at
a 
en
try
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
er
_d
et
ai
ls
 
9.
1 
st
rin
g 
te
xt
 
P
as
te
 in
 e
m
ai
l s
ig
na
tu
re
 b
lo
ck
 o
f i
nt
er
vi
ew
er
 
X
 
 212 
 
Appendix 4: List of questions for Stakeholders 
Questions for Ebola Response Taskforce – face to face 
discussion 
1. Do you consider the EVD surveillance system to be simple to use and 
understand? 
2. How could it be simplified or streamlined? 
3. How well do you feel our surveillance measures achieved the objectives of 
prevention and control? 
4. Were the reports (border surveillance/testing and monitoring) useful? 
5. Did the information contained in the reports provide the information the EVD 
taskforce required? 
6. What other information would have been useful? 
7. Was there any information gathered that was unnecessary? 
8. Was the information shared in a timely manner? 
9. How could this have been improved? 
10. Do you have any other comments? 
Questions for CDNA members – Out of session item and 
SurveyMonkey survey 
1. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is poor and 5 is excellent, how would you rate the 
overall usefulness of the following and why? 
a. Reporting to jurisdictions of people identified at the border as having 
been in an EVD epidemic area  
b. Weekly reporting of border surveillance summary 
c. Weekly reporting of testing and monitoring summary 
d. NetEpi EVD instance for case reporting (for those who are using it) 
2. What specific information provided by each of the enhanced active surveillance 
measures was the most useful from the jurisdictional perspective, and why? 
a. Reporting to jurisdictions of people identified at the border as having 
been in an EVD epidemic area 
b. Weekly reporting of border surveillance 
c. Weekly reporting of testing and monitoring (national) 
3. How did you use the data from each of the additional components? For 
example for planning, briefings, assignment of rosters for on call work. 
a. Reporting to jurisdictions of people identified at the border as having 
been in an EVD epidemic area  
b. Weekly reporting of border surveillance 
c. Weekly reporting of testing and monitoring (national) 
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d. NetEpi EVD instance for case reporting (for those who are using it) 
4. How could each component be improved (if at all)? 
a. Reporting to jurisdictions of people identified at the border as having 
been in an EVD epidemic area  
b. Weekly reporting of border surveillance 
c. Weekly reporting of testing and monitoring (national) 
d. NetEpi EVD instance for case reporting (for those who are using it) 
5. Is weekly reporting of border and testing/monitoring data the best frequency of 
reporting? If not, why not and what would you suggest?  
6. Who would be best for me to talk to in your jurisdiction about day to day use of 
the system? For example, would contacting the person who sends the testing 
and monitoring email be best? 
Questions for Jurisdictional users – telephone conversation 
Case data management - NetEpi – SA and NT 
1. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is hard and 5 is simple, how easy is it to enter data 
into NetEpi? – SA and NT only 
2. Why did you provide that rating? How could it be improved? 
3. Was having the control form in NetEpi useful to you? Scale of 1 to 5 
4. What was or wasn’t useful about it – how could it be improved? 
5. Was using NetEpi acceptable? 
6. How could it be made more acceptable? 
7. Do you initially collect the information on paper, and how long between 
collecting the information and entering it into NetEpi? 
NetEpi – all other states 
1. Why did you decide not to use NetEpi for contact management? 
Laboratory testing and temperature monitoring 
1. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is hard and 5 is simple, how easy is it to extract the 
data you are required to email to me weekly? 
2. Why? And how could it be improved? 
3. Are the fields easy to interpret? 
4. Is the method of sharing testing and monitoring data easy? i.e. email 
5. What would make it easier or simpler? 
6. Is weekly reporting of testing and monitoring enough? Too much? 
7. Do you receive the weekly summary? 
8. Do you use the information in the summary? 
a. Is it useful? 
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9. What was the time between onset of symptoms compatible with EVD and 
testing and/or isolation? 
Border surveillance 
1. Is the information provided through border screening useful to you? 
2. Why or why not? 
3. What information that is provided is most useful? 
4. Is there any information that is not provided that would be useful? 
5. How do you use the provided data? E.g planning, briefings, assignment of 
rosters etc 
6. Do you receive the weekly border summary? 
a. Is it useful? 
Overall 
1. Is this system the best way to manage the national side of the outbreak and 
surveillance? 
2. Do you have any suggestions that would improve it? 
3. Do you have any other comments? 
Questions for Department of Agriculture 
1.     How easy is it (on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is hard and 5 is easy) to enter data into 
the Ag run database? 
2.     Why did you give this rating and do you have any suggestions on how it could be 
improved? 
3.     Is the method of downloading and sharing this data to Health simple? Use the 1 to 
5 scale again. 
4.     Why did you give this rating and do you have any suggestions on how it could be 
improved? 
5.     Is this system the best way to manage the response to the outbreak? If not, what 
would have been better? 
6.     What is the time lag between screening a passenger and entering the data into the 
database? 
7.     Do you have any other comments? 
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reporting of enteric bacterial pathogens in 
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
Over the last few years, public health laboratories across Australia have been 
introducing culture independent diagnostic techniques for testing of clinical samples for 
the presence of pathogens causing disease. In Queensland (QLD), both private 
pathology laboratories (Queensland Medical Laboratory (QML) and Sullivan Nicolaides 
Pathology (SNP)) introduced culture independent diagnostic testing (CIDT) for bacterial 
enteric pathogens in late 2013, while the public pathology laboratory, Pathology QLD 
introduced CIDT in late 2015. As with any change in diagnostic methods, it is important 
to understand the effect of the change from culture-based tests to culture independent 
tests on the diagnosis and surveillance of enteric diseases. 
My role 
I designed and conducted this study, including preparing the proposal, applying for 
ethics approval, liaising with stakeholders, coordinating data collation and analysing the 
data.  
Lessons learned 
This project required coordination of stakeholders from several different locations, most 
of which were in a different part of the country from me. I hadn’t met many of them 
before, so it was useful to organise a meeting with everyone when I was in Brisbane for 
a conference. Meeting people face to face helps with communication down the track, 
especially when you have to ask people for something. 
Although I had applied for animal ethics approval before, this was my first time applying 
for human ethics approval. Obtaining human ethics approval is more complicated than 
applying for animal ethics approval. While the experience was useful, in the end it 
turned out that I probably didn’t need to obtain ethics approval for this study since it 
used only de-identified data. It is a good idea to talk to the staff at the ethics office 
before you apply – these people know best what types of studies require ethics 
approval. 
The data for this project was provided by several different laboratories, and as a result 
was in different formats, requiring a lot of cleaning before the data could be combined. 
String functions in Stata were a lifesaver, in particular the function ‘strpos’ – which finds 
a particular part of a string within a variable. From there you can generate new 
variables or replace values using the information, or list, table or count only those with 
the string. 
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Public health implications of this work 
Laboratory notifications of enteric pathogens such as Salmonella increased in 2014 
and 2015. This increase coincided with the introduction of CIDT at QML and SNP. As a 
result, it was unclear if the increase in laboratory notifications of enteric pathogens was 
a real increase in disease incidence or was an artefact of the change in testing 
practices due to more sensitive tests detecting cases that were previously undetected. 
Time and effort in public health surveillance units may be needlessly expended on 
investigating what was thought to be an increase in disease incidence only to find it 
was an artefact of changed sensitivity of laboratory testing practices. This study 
determined that the increase in notifications of Salmonella in QLD during 2014 was a 
true increase in the incidence of the disease. However, the increase in notifications of 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia was likely to be a combination of increased 
incidence and the increased sensitivity of the testing methods used (CIDT). This 
information can be used to plan public health surveillance and policy. In addition, this 
study documented for the first time the laboratory testing procedures for Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia in use at all pathology laboratories in QLD to 
enable coordinated planning of testing practices in QLD and incorporate advances in 
diagnostic technologies without losing the information required for public health 
surveillance.  
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to all those involved in every step of this project. Ben Polkinghorne from the 
Australian Government Department of Health (OzFoodNet), Emily Fearnley and Martyn 
Kirk from the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Russell Stafford 
and Heidi Carroll from QLD Health, John Bates from QLD Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services, Renu Vohra from QML, Jenny Robson from SNP and Graeme 
Nimmo from Pathology QLD. 
Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity 
requirement 
Design and conduct an epidemiological study. 
Abstract 
Culture-independent diagnostic testing (CIDT) for testing of samples for the presence 
of enteric pathogens has been introduced to all three primary pathology laboratories in 
Queensland, as of November 2015. Changes in testing methods for pathogens should 
be assessed to determine their impact on public health surveillance through changed 
sensitivity of testing. Changes in testing sensitivity can affect the apparent incidence of 
the disease by diagnosing cases that would otherwise have remained undiagnosed 
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using the previously used test if the new test is more sensitive than the old test, or may 
miss cases that would have been diagnosed if the new test is less sensitive. This study 
aimed to assess the impact of the introduction of CIDT on testing for four enteric 
pathogens in Queensland and to document the current testing protocol in each primary 
laboratory and the Queensland reference laboratory. 
Laboratory process data was obtained from the laboratories by questionnaire. Primary 
testing and demographic data was obtained from Queensland Medical Laboratory 
(QML), Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology (SNP) and Pathology Queensland (the primary 
laboratories) and subtyping data was obtained from Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services (the reference laboratory). Tests that were positive for Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia between 2010 and 2014, inclusive, were 
analysed by type of test performed. The percent of tests positive was calculated using 
the total number of tests for gastroenteritis performed by each laboratory as the 
denominator. The incidence of positive tests after the introduction of CIDT was 
compared with positive tests before the introduction of CIDT. Information about 
outbreaks of Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia between 2010 and 
2014, inclusive, were extracted from the Queensland OzFoodNet Outbreak Register, 
and assessed for whether they would have been identified without subtyping 
information on isolates from the cases and source. 
Only QML and SNP introduced CIDT during the study period (August 2013 and 
November 2013 respectively) and both laboratories continue to culture samples, either 
concurrently with CIDT or reflexively for samples positive by CIDT. The number of tests 
positive for all four pathogens increased in 2014, after introduction of CIDT at QML and 
SNP. The increase in the number of tests positive for Salmonella was likely to be due 
to a real increase in the incidence of the pathogen, but the reason for the increase in 
the number of tests positive for Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia was less clear 
and was likely to be a combination of a true increase in incidence and the increased 
sensitivity of CIDT. After testing, 38% of samples positive for these four pathogens 
were positive by CIDT only. Ten outbreaks of Salmonella between 2010 and 2014 did 
not have a single point source and were identified based on subtyping information.  
The introduction of CIDT in QLD has had an impact on the apparent incidence of the 
enteric pathogens in this study due to increased sensitivity of the CIDT test, in 
particular for Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia. This increased sensitivity of case 
detection must be considered when assessing disease trends and the burden of 
disease. Continued culture of samples will ensure the availability of isolates for 
outbreak detection and public health surveillance. 
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Introduction 
Recent advances in laboratory technologies have made techniques that were once 
only in the realm of research cheap and simple enough for routine use in diagnostic 
pathology laboratories (1). Until late 2013, growth of organisms by culture and 
characterisation of the cultured isolates was the predominant form of identification for 
enteric bacterial pathogens in Queensland (QLD), but culture-independent diagnostic 
testing (CIDT) has become widely used across the state since late 2013. Any change 
in testing procedures may impact on public health surveillance and detection of 
common source outbreaks. This project aims to investigate how changes in testing 
methods, specifically the move from culture-based methods to CIDT, have affected 
public health surveillance of enteric pathogens in QLD. 
In addition to information about the identity of the causative agent, the information from 
pathology testing data that is required for public health action is different from that 
required for clinical treatment. At the level of the individual, the identity of the pathogen 
and antibiotic sensitivity for some pathogens is often all that is required to inform 
clinical treatment and prevention of transmission. In some cases, such as for most 
enteric pathogens, even identity is not needed for clinical management as in most 
cases, treatment involves rehydration and management of the symptoms (2). However, 
for public health surveillance purposes, including examining trends in disease and 
detection of outbreaks, additional information about the pathogen strain or serotype is 
essential. Traditional methods of culture and further characterisation of the isolates 
provides information for both these purposes. However, this relies on the ability to 
culture the infectious agent. Unless information is available implicating a specific 
pathogen, stool samples are plated on multiple selective (allows the growth of only 
certain types of bacteria) or differential (incorporates chemicals that change colour 
depending on the metabolites produced by certain types of bacteria) agar plates in 
order to grow the pathogen present in the sample while minimising the growth of the 
normal flora present in the sample. Some agents, such as Campylobacter (3) and 
Shigella (4) are fastidious and difficult to culture, meaning that they may be 
underdiagnosed as a cause of diarrhoeal illness using traditional culture diagnostic 
methods. Introduction of CIDT for difficult to culture pathogens may result in an 
increase in the number of cases identified. 
Culture-independent technologies include any test that does not require the agent to be 
cultured prior to identification. CIDT currently used by pathology laboratories worldwide 
include tests that amplify and/or detect nucleic acid (most commonly polymerase chain 
reaction [PCR]) and tests that detect antigens (such as enzyme immunoassays) (1). 
These tests are fast, easy, sensitive and reliable, but are unable to identify antibiotic 
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sensitivity (required to inform treatment for some diseases) or serotypes (required to 
link cases in an outbreak) (5-7). The improvement in sensitivity will provide a more 
accurate estimate of the burden of disease, and the ability of multiplex PCR to detect 
polymicrobial infections will provide new insight into diseases and disease interactions 
(1). However, the change in sensitivity will need to be considered when interpreting 
disease trends over time (1). The currently recommended method to avoid this loss of 
information is to concurrently culture all samples that undergo CIDT, or reflexively 
culture all CIDT positive samples (6). This doubling up of testing methods is time and 
resource intensive, thus hoped to be temporary. Newer technologies, such as 
metagenomics, are currently gaining popularity in the research setting, and will provide 
molecular characterisation that will replace the need for culture and culture dependent 
characterisation. The introduction of CIDT will have immediate impacts on the 
laboratories themselves, both primary pathology laboratories and public health 
reference laboratories, including on-cost, storage and human resources (including 
training). CIDT will also have an impact on the public health surveillance system, 
especially if the greater sensitivity of CIDT results in an increase in the numbers of 
cases of disease identified, leading to additional workload for public health staff. 
Current CIDT techniques also result in a loss of serotyping and molecular 
characterisation, which may lead to a decrease in the number of outbreaks identified.  
A study conducted on data collected between 2012 and 2014 by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance 
Network (FoodNet) assessed the impact of CIDT on public health surveillance of 
enteric pathogens in the United States (US). FoodNet reported that 46% of CIDT 
positive samples were not confirmed by culture, where 22% were culture negative, and 
culture was not attempted for 24% (8). It is difficult to know whether the culture 
negative samples were falsely positive by CIDT, or were true positives that would have 
remained undiagnosed had they been tested by culture alone. Not all laboratories 
surveyed were using CIDT, and CIDT methods were most commonly used to identify 
Campylobacter (8). 
Clinical pathology in QLD is dominated by two private primary pathology laboratories 
(Queensland Medical Laboratory [QML] and Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology [SNP]) and 
one public primary laboratory (Pathology QLD), and one reference laboratory 
(Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services [QHFSS]). Approximately 8000 
cases of foodborne illness are reported annually in QLD. Salmonella (other than 
Typhoid or Paratyphoid) and Campylobacter together contribute more than 90% of the 
foodborne illnesses notified to Queensland Health every year. Shigella and Yersinia 
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have the next two highest numbers of yearly notifications (~1% of notifications each) 
(9). Therefore, these four pathogens were selected to be included in this study. 
Aim of study 
The aim of this study was to document the move from traditional culture based 
methods to culture independent methods for identification of bacterial enteric 
pathogens in QLD by comparing testing practices at the three primary diagnostic 
laboratories and one reference laboratory, and identifying changes in numbers of 
positive tests for Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia.  
Methods 
Ethics approval 
Human research ethics approval for the study was obtained through both the Australian 
National University Research Ethics Committee (reference number 2015/429) and the 
Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital Human Research Ethics Committee (reference 
number HREC/15/QRBW/404). 
Laboratory processes 
In order to establish the routine procedure for testing clinical samples for enteric 
bacteria for each QLD pathology laboratory, process data for samples tested for 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia were collected from all four 
laboratories (QML, SNP, Pathology QLD and QHFSS) through a questionnaire sent to 
co-investigators on 8 September 2015 (Appendix 1). Data collected included 
information about when the laboratory introduced CIDT, whether they routinely test for 
each pathogen, what they do when CIDT and culture results are discordant and 
whether they refer the pathogen to the reference laboratory for further subtyping. The 
questionnaire was designed as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with set response 
options where possible to limit the answers available. This qualitative data was collated 
and summarised using Microsoft Excel. 
Data collection 
The data provided by the laboratories included all testing results for stool samples that 
were positive for Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella or Yersinia performed between 
2010 and 2014, inclusive. Each laboratory provided the data as a line list, with the 
minimum fields of laboratory identification number, date the sample was received by 
the laboratory, the age or date of birth of the patient, the postcode of the patient, the 
organisms identified by culture, and the results of PCR testing where applicable. In 
addition, QML provided the date the pathogen was identified, allowing a calculation of 
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time from receipt of the sample to identification of the pathogen. QML also provided 
information about what type of test was requested. QHFSS provided data on subtyping 
and biotyping of the pathogens isolated. QHFSS also provided laboratory reference 
numbers allowing linkage of samples with the primary referring laboratory. 
Data analysis 
Testing for enteric bacteria at primary pathology laboratories 
All data was cleaned and analysed using StataSE 13 (Stata Corp, College Station, TX, 
USA). The data provided by each laboratory was cleaned and prepared separately to 
obtain common variable names and formats. If a date of birth was provided, the age at 
the time of sample collection or receipt of the sample by the laboratory was calculated. 
The data from QML, SNP and Pathology QLD were combined into a single data set 
using the STATA append command. As Pathology QLD had not introduced PCR during 
the period of this study, it is used as a baseline comparison of the change in incidence 
during 2014 in a laboratory without PCR.  
All samples that did not identify at least one of Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella or 
Yersinia by culture or PCR at the primary laboratory or after referral to QHFSS were 
excluded from the analysis, even if a different pathogen was identified. Thus a negative 
value for a variable such as Salmonella PCR means only that the sample was negative 
by that test method for that pathogen, and was not negative for all pathogens included 
in this study. Samples positive only for Salmonella Typhi or Salmonella Paratyphi were 
excluded as the public health response for these two pathogens is different from the 
public health response for other Salmonella serovars.  
The median number of tests positive and the percent of tests positive (percent 
positivity) were calculated for each pathogen by month of sample receipt. The 
denominator data used to calculate the percent positivity was obtained from the 
laboratories, and was the total number of tests for bacterial enteric pathogens 
conducted during each month. Graphs of the median number of tests positive and 
percent positivity were produced using Microsoft Excel.  
Median counts and percent positivity before the introduction of CIDT (data from 2010 to 
2012) and after the introduction of CIDT (data from 2014) were compared for all 
laboratories whether they had introduced CIDT or not. Data from 2013 was not 
included in the comparison as QML and SNP introduced CIDT in different months 
during 2013 (August and November respectively). Significance was assessed using the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The difference in medians was considered significant if the p-
value was less than 0.05. 
 224 
 
The time from sample receipt to identification of the pathogen was calculated for 
samples tested by QML. The median time to identification before the introduction of 
CIDT (data from 2010 to 2012) was compared with the median time to identification 
after the introduction of CIDT (data from 2014). The significance of the difference in 
medians was assessed using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. A p-value less than 0.05 
was considered significant. 
A data set categorising postcodes into Australian Bureau of Statistics Remoteness 
Areas was obtained from the Australian Government Department of Health Office of 
Health Protection Data Managers. For the purposes of this study, the “Inner Regional 
Australia” and “Outer Regional Australia” categories were combined into a single 
category of “Regional Australia”. Similarly, “Remote Australia” and “Very Remote 
Australia” were combined into a category of “Remote Australia”. The Remoteness Area 
data set was merged with the laboratory testing data set using the postcode of the 
patient. 
QML offers three different options for testing of samples for enteric pathogens: CIDT 
(PCR), culture alone, or culture and microscopy. Two types of tests (e.g. CIDT and 
culture) can be requested on the same sample. The categories of “culture” and “culture 
and microscopy” were combined for analysis, resulting in three testing options: CIDT 
only, CIDT and culture and culture only. The type of test requested was compared by 
Remoteness Area and age group of the patient using the chi-squared test. 
Referral of enteric bacteria to QHFSS 
Data cleaning and analysis was performed using StataSE 13. The median number of 
tests performed per month was compared using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The 
difference in medians was considered significant if the p-value was less than 0.05. 
The data provided by QHFSS was merged into the primary laboratory data set using 
the laboratory numbers provided by the primary laboratory. Samples that were referred 
from a laboratory other than QML, SNP or Pathology QLD were removed from the 
subsequent analysis. Where names of towns were entered in the postcode field, they 
were converted to postcodes using the Australia Post postcode finder 
(http://auspost.com.au/apps/postcode.html). Duplicate entries were removed if all fields 
were the same or combined if different results were entered for the same patient. 
Samples that were identified as Salmonella at the primary laboratory but identified as 
Salmonella Typhi or Salmonella Paratyphi at QHFSS were excluded from the analysis 
of referral data if no other species of Salmonella was identified and if the sample was 
negative for Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia. 
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Median counts and percent positivity were calculated and compared as for primary 
laboratories. As QHFSS is the reference laboratory, the data form a subset of the tests 
performed at the primary laboratories. The denominator number for QHFSS data was 
the number of tests that were referred to QHFSS by the primary laboratories and were 
positive for at least one of Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia at the 
primary laboratory, QHFSS or both. 
Community outbreaks of enteric bacteria 
Data for outbreaks caused by Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia in 
QLD that were reported between 2010 and 2014 were extracted from the Microsoft 
Access OzFoodNet Outbreak Register. Community based outbreaks (i.e. those that did 
not have an obvious point source, such as a single restaurant or event) were 
determined by analysing the setting in which the implicated food was prepared and 
eaten, the case definition and other information about case finding that was entered in 
the free-text remarks field of the Register. Information on subtyping of isolates that was 
used to link cases and the source of the outbreak (food or water) was analysed. 
Results 
Laboratory process 
The routine procedure for all four laboratories in QLD is similar, with only minor 
differences (Table 1).  
QML culture stool samples for the bacterial pathogens of Salmonella, Campylobacter, 
Shigella. Stools are only cultured for and Yersinia when requested. They introduced 
PCR in August 2013 and use a Roche brand multiplex PCR test for all four bacteria. 
They only perform CIDT if the test is requested, and when requested, they concurrently 
perform culture on the sample. In the event of a discordant result, where the sample 
was PCR positive but culture negative, the result is reported as positive for Salmonella, 
Campylobacter and Shigella without additional testing, but reflex culture is attempted 
for samples that were PCR positive for Yersinia. They refer cultured isolates of 
Salmonella, Shigella and Yersinia but not Campylobacter to QHFSS for further 
characterisation. Stool samples positive for Salmonella and Shigella only by PCR are 
referred to QHFSS for further culture. 
SNP routinely culture stool samples for the bacterial pathogens of Salmonella, 
Campylobacter and Shigella, but only culture stool samples for the bacterial pathogen 
of Yersinia on request. They introduced PCR in November 2013 and use the same 
Roche brand multiplex PCR test used by QML. They test the samples for the presence 
of Salmonella, Campylobacter and Shigella concurrently with PCR. As the PCR also 
includes primers for Yersinia, they attempt to culture Yersinia if the PCR test is positive 
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for Yersinia (reflex testing). They refer isolates of Salmonella, Shigella and Yersinia but 
not Campylobacter to QHFSS for further characterisation. They discard PCR 
positive/culture negative samples after seven days without referral to QHFSS. These 
samples are reported as positive for the pathogen detected. 
Pathology QLD introduced an in-house designed multiplex PCR test for enteric 
pathogens in September 2015 and reflexively culture only those samples that are 
positive by PCR. However, during the period of data collection for this study (2010 to 
2014) Pathology QLD had not yet introduced CIDT. They refer isolates of Salmonella, 
Shigella and Yersinia to QHFSS for further typing. 
QHFSS are the reference laboratory for QLD. They have not introduced any CIDT 
methods to date (as of 1 November 2015). 
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Table 1: Routine procedures for Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia as reported 
by Queensland laboratories in September and October 2015 
Salmonella Campylobacter Shigella Yersinia 
Routinely 
test 
QML Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SNP Yes Yes Yes If requested 
Pathology 
QLD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
QHFSS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use 
culture 
QML If requested If requested If requested If requested 
SNP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pathology 
QLD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
QHFSS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Use CIDT 
QML If requested If requested If requested If requested 
SNP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pathology 
QLD Yes No Yes Yes 
QHFSS No No No No 
Type and 
brand  of 
CIDT 
QML Roche PCR Roche PCR Roche PCR Roche PCR 
SNP Roche PCR Roche PCR Roche PCR Roche PCR 
Pathology 
QLD 
In house 
PCR Not done 
In house 
PCR 
In house 
PCR 
QHFSS Not done Not done Not done Not done 
Timing of 
culture 
with CIDT 
QML Concurrent Concurrent 
Concurrent 
(reflexive if 
unsuccessful) 
Concurrent 
SNP Concurrent Concurrent Concurrent Reflexive 
Pathology 
QLD Reflexive Not done Reflexive Reflexive 
QHFSS Not done Not done Not done Not done 
Referral of 
isolates to 
QHFSS 
QML Yes No Yes No 
SNP Yes No Yes Yes 
Pathology 
QLD Yes No Yes Yes 
QHFSS Not done Not done Not done Not done 
Referral of 
CIDT 
positive 
stool to 
QHFSS 
QML Yes No Yes No 
SNP No No No No 
Pathology 
QLD No Not done No No 
QHFSS Not done Not done Not done Not done 
Date CIDT 
introduce
d 
QML August 2013 
SNP November 2013 
Pathology 
QLD September 2015* 
QHFSS Not introduced (as of November 2015) 
* CIDT was introduced at Pathology QLD after the period of data collection for this study. During 
the period of data collection for this study (2010 to 2014), Pathology QLD used on culture for all 
four pathogens and referred all but Campylobacter to QHFSS. QML – Queensland Medical 
Laboratory; SNP – Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology; QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and 
Scientific Services; QLD - Queensland 
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Testing for enteric bacteria at primary pathology laboratories 
In Figure 1 (Salmonella), Figure 2 (Campylobacter), Figure 3 (Shigella) and Figure 4 
(Yersinia), the type of test that resulted in the positive identification of the pathogen is 
shown by year and month of test. Prior to the introduction of CIDT at QML in August 
2013, all pathogens were identified by culture alone. With the introduction of CIDT, first 
at QML in August 2013, and then at SNP in November 2013, the number of tests 
positive by CIDT and culture or CIDT alone increased. After the introduction of CIDT, 
most samples positive for Shigella (Figure 3) and Yersinia (Figure 4) were positive by 
CIDT alone.
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The number of tests for enteric pathogens that were performed by each primary 
laboratory (denominator) increased over time (Figure 5). The increase in the number of 
tests performed at QML exceeded the increase at SNP, and the increase at both 
exceeded the increase at Pathology QLD. The number of tests positive per month at 
each laboratory is shown in Figure 6 (Salmonella), Figure 7 (Campylobacter), Figure 8 
(Shigella) and Figure 9 (Yersinia) by each pathogen of interest. 
Salmonella shows seasonality and an increase in the number of tests positive and 
percent positivity at all laboratories during the summer of 2013-2014, whether they had 
introduced CIDT or not (Figure 6). Pathology QLD has a higher rate of detection of 
Salmonella than QML and SNP, but lower overall numbers. 
The number of tests positive and the percent positivity for Campylobacter at all 
laboratories decreased in early 2012 and has remained stable at Pathology QLD since 
this time (Figure 7). In contrast, both the number of tests positive and the percent 
positivity for Campylobacter at QML increased from September 2013. Testing for 
Campylobacter at SNP also decreased in early 2012, but decreased again in mid-2013 
to levels lower than QML and Pathology QLD. The median number of tests positive and 
percent positivity at SNP increased back to 2012 levels beginning December 2013.   
The number of tests positive and the percent positivity for Shigella increased 
dramatically for both QML and SNP after introduction of CIDT. In contrast, the number 
of tests positive and percent positivity at Pathology QLD remained constant between 
2010 and 2014 (Figure 8).  
Similarly, the number of tests positive and the percent positivity for Yersinia also 
increased dramatically at QML and SNP after introduction of CIDT (Figure 9). In 
contrast, the number of tests positive and the percent positivity remained constant at 
Pathology QLD in 2014. 
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Table 2 shows the median number of samples that tested positive per month and the 
percent positivity per month for each pathogen, by laboratory. The denominator data 
(total number of tests performed for enteric pathogens) is also shown. The median 
number of tests for enteric pathogens performed per month at each laboratory 
increased significantly in 2014 (p-value <0.05). 
The median number of tests positive for each of the four pathogens per month was 
larger after the introduction of CIDT than before at the two laboratories that have 
introduced CIDT (QML and SNP, p-value <0.05; Table 2). The number of tests positive 
for Salmonella and Campylobacter doubled, while the number of tests positive for 
Shigella and Yersinia increased between ten and twenty fold. In contrast, although the 
median number of tests for Salmonella, Shigella and Yersinia has increased over time 
at Pathology QLD (which had not introduced CIDT at the time this data was collected), 
this difference was not significant with the exception of tests positive for Yersinia. The 
number of tests positive for Campylobacter at Pathology QLD decreased in 2014, 
although this decrease was not significant.  
The difference in percent positivity before and after introduction of CIDT was significant 
for all bacterial pathogens under study at both QML and SNP, with the exception of 
Salmonella at QML. All changes in percent positivity at QML and SNP were an 
increase with the exception of percent positivity for Campylobacter at SNP which 
decreased in 2014 (p <0.05). The change in percent positivity for Campylobacter at 
Pathology QLD, a decrease, was significant while the change in the percent positivity 
for the other three pathogens (an increase) was not significant for tests at Pathology 
QLD.  
The increase in testing at the primary laboratories was reflected in an increase in 
referrals and testing at the reference laboratory, QHFSS, for Salmonella, Shigella and 
Yersinia. No laboratories routinely refer samples positive for Campylobacter to QHFSS. 
The increase in percent positivity was significant (p < 0.05) for Shigella and Yersinia. 
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Table 3 shows the number and percentage of results that were concordant and 
discordant for CIDT and culture and were performed during 2014 at the two 
laboratories that had introduced CIDT (QML and SNP). During 2014, the type of test 
positive for more than half of samples that were positive for Salmonella and 
Campylobacter included culture of the pathogen (81% and 56% respectively). 
However, only 17% of samples positive for Shigella and 22% of samples positive for 
Yersinia yielded an isolate.  
Table 3: Percent and number of positive samples at laboratories that had introduced CIDT* by 
concordance or discordance and test result (culture independent diagnostic tests (CIDT) and 
culture-based tests), 2014 
 CIDT Culture 
Salmonella 
n = 3881 
Campylobacter 
n = 6057 
Shigella 
n = 477 
Yersinia 
n = 588 
Concordant 
results % (n) + + 43 (1651) 37 (2239) 10 (48) 21 (123) 
Discordant 
results % (n) 
+ - 12 (483) 36 (2176) 74 (352) 65 (379) 
- + 5 (193) 0 (12) 0 (0) 0 (1) 
+ ND** 6 (239) 8 (476) 9 (42) 14 (80) 
ND** + 34 (1315) 19 (1154) 7 (35) 1 (5) 
Total culture positive % (n) 81 (3159) 56 (3405) 17 (83) 22 (129) 
* Queensland Medical Laboratory and Sullivan Nicolaides Laboratory 
** ND – Not done 
The median time to identification for all four pathogens at QML was three days during 
the pre-CIDT period (2010 to 2012). The time to identification reduced to one day in 
2014 after the introduction of CIDT. The difference between the time to identification 
before introduction of CIDT and after introduction of CIDT was significant (p-value 
<0.001). 
Table 4 shows how test requests at QML differed by remoteness in the post CIDT 
period (2014). During 2014 in all Remoteness Area categories, CIDT and culture was 
the most frequently ordered test type, although the number of clinicians requesting 
culture only (no CIDT) was higher in remote and regional areas of Australia than in 
major cities (p-values <0.05). Conversely, clinicians in major cities were more likely to 
order both CIDT and culture than those in regional or remote areas (p-values <0.05). 
Table 4: Type of test requested compared by Remoteness Area, QML, 2014 
 
Major Cities of 
Australia 
% (n) 
Regional 
Australia 
% (n) 
Remote 
Australia 
% (n) 
p-value 
CIDT only 12 (522) 14 (292) 15 (13) 0.14 
CIDT and 
culture 76 (3268) 69 (1471) 65 (57) <0.001 
Culture only 12 (526) 17 (359) 20 (18) <0.001 
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Table 5 shows how the type of test requested differs by the age group of the patient. In 
2014 at QML, CIDT and culture was the most frequently requested test for all age 
groups. The type of test requested differed significantly by age group (p-value for trend 
<0.05 for all test types; Table 5). CIDT alone was less likely to be ordered for children 
(0 to 17 years) than for adults (pairwise p-values <0.05), while CIDT and culture was 
less likely to be ordered for patients aged over 55 than for any other group (pairwise p-
values <0.05). Similarly, culture alone was less likely to be ordered for people aged 18 
to 54 years than for any other age group (pairwise p-values <0.05). 
Table 5: Type of test requested compared by age group, QML, 2014 
 
0 to 4 years 
% (n) 
5 to 17 years 
% (n) 
18 to 54 years 
% (n) 
≥55 years 
(% n) 
p-value 
for trend 
CIDT only 11 (132) 10 (70) 13 (394) 14 (233) 0.005 
CIDT and culture 74 (918) 74 (505) 75 (2242) 70 (1138) <0.001 
Culture only 16 (196) 16 (107) 11 (336) 16 (264) <0.001 
Referral of enteric bacteria to QHFSS 
The total number of tests performed per month at QHFSS during the period of data 
collection for the study (2010 to 2014), regardless of outcome (positive or negative for 
all pathogens) or referring laboratory is shown in Figure 10. The median number of 
tests performed at QHFSS before CIDT was introduced at two of the referring primary 
laboratories (QML and SNP, 2010 to 2012) was 297 tests per month. The median 
number of tests performed at QHFSS after CIDT was introduced at QML and SNP 
(2014) was 488. This increase was significant (p-value = 0.003).
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Only QML routinely refers stool samples to QHFSS that were CIDT positive for 
Salmonella and Shigella but were negative by culture, or culture was not done (Table 
1). However, the data set included 440 stool samples (412 from QML and 28 from 
SNP) that were CIDT positive (all four pathogens) and culture negative or not cultured 
that were referred to QHFSS. After referral of these 440 stool samples to QHFSS for 
reflex culture, 383 (87%) of stool samples yielded an isolate of Salmonella, Shigella or 
Yersinia (Table 6). This increased the total number of samples with an isolate available 
for subtyping for these three pathogens to 88%, 26% and 37% respectively. No 
additional isolates of Campylobacter were cultured after referral to QHFSS despite 
referral of 39 stool samples to QHFSS for further testing. All samples and isolates that 
were referred to QHFSS and yielded an isolate were further typed to species, subtype 
or biotype. 
Table 6: Outcome of referral to QHFSS of samples positive by CIDT but with no isolate 
obtained compared with the total number of samples culture positive at a primary laboratory 
before referral, 2014. The final percent and total count of samples with an isolate obtained after 
referral is shaded  
 
Salmonella 
% (n) 
Campylobacter 
% (n) 
Shigella 
% (n) 
Yersinia 
% (n) 
Total culture positive at 
primary laboratory 81 (3159) 56 (3405) 17 (83) 22 (129) 
CIDT positive, no isolate at 
primary laboratory 19 (720) 44 (2652) 83 (394) 78 (459) 
CIDT positive (no isolate) sent 
to reference laboratory 7 (254) 1 (39) 11 (52) 16 (95) 
Isolate obtained from CIDT 
positive sample at QHFSS 7 (253) 0 9 (42) 15 (88) 
Total culture positive (primary 
and QHFSS) 88 (3412) 56 (3405) 26 (125) 37 (217) 
The outcome (positive or negative) for each sample that tested positive by any method 
at the initial primary laboratory (QML, SNP and Pathology QLD) or after referral testing 
at the reference laboratory (QHFSS) is shown in Table 7 (Salmonella), Table 8 
(Campylobacter), Table 9 (Shigella) and Table 10 (Yersinia) by year. Four different 
outcomes were observed:  
1. The sample was positive for the pathogen at the primary laboratory but was not 
sent to QHFSS for further subtyping. 
2. The sample was positive for the pathogen at both the primary laboratory and 
QHFSS. 
3. The sample was positive for the pathogen at the primary laboratory but was 
negative at QHFSS. 
4. The sample was negative for the pathogen at the primary laboratory (the 
sample may have been positive for a different pathogen, or may have been 
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negative for all pathogens), but was sent to QHFSS, and was positive for the 
pathogen at QHFSS. 
Most samples positive for Salmonella (84%) were positive at both the primary 
laboratory and QHFSS (Table 7). Prior to the introduction of CIDT, samples that were 
negative were not sent to QHFSS for further attempts at obtaining an isolate 
suggesting that most samples in Table 7 that were negative at the primary laboratory 
for Salmonella were positive at the primary laboratory for a different pathogen. The 
number of samples positive for Salmonella at the primary laboratory that were not sent 
to QHFSS for subtyping increased in 2014. 
Table 7: Samples positive for Salmonella by outcome at primary laboratory (Queensland 
Medical Laboratory, Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology and Pathology Queensland) and reference 
laboratory (Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services), by year 
 Salmonella results at laboratory % (n) 
Primary laboratory + - + + 
QHFSS* + + - Not done 
Year 
2010 92.0 (2822) 0.2 (5) 0.2 (6) 7.7 (235) 
2011 88.4 (2668) 0.1 (3) 0.2 (5) 11.3 (342) 
2012 85.6 (2536) 0.1 (4) 0.3 (9) 14.0 (414) 
2013 83.5 (2746) 0.1 (2) 0.2 (7) 16.3 (535) 
2014 75.2 (3832) 0.0 (2) 0.2 (10) 24.6 (1253) 
* QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services 
In contrast, most samples positive for Campylobacter at the primary laboratory were 
not sent to QHFSS for additional testing (96%; Table 8). During 2011 and 2012, the 
number of samples referred to QHFSS increased dramatically before returning to low 
levels in late 2012. This increase in isolates referred to QHFSS may have affected the 
median counts and percent positivity for Campylobacter at QHFSS in Table 2. 
Table 8: Samples positive for Campylobacter by outcome at primary laboratory (Queensland 
Medical Laboratory, Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology and Pathology Queensland) and reference 
laboratory (Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services), by year 
 Campylobacter results at laboratory % (n) 
Primary laboratory + - + + 
QHFSS* + + - Not done 
Year  
2010 0.3 (16) 0.0 (0) 0.7 (38) 98.9 (5054) 
2011 6.6 (381) 0.0 (0) 1.0 (59) 92.4 (5333) 
2012 11.0 (516) 0.0 (0) 1.3 (61) 87.7 (4125) 
2013 0.5 (19) 0.0 (0) 0.6 (22) 99.0 (3947) 
2014 0.2 (11) 0.0 (0) 0.9 (67) 98.9 (7066) 
* QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services 
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Although the total number of samples that tested positive for Shigella increased in 
2014, most of these samples were not referred to QHFSS for further testing (53%; 
Table 9). Similarly, although the number of Yersinia positive samples referred to 
QHFSS increased in 2014 (Table 10), there was also an increase in samples positive 
for Yersinia that were not referred to QHFSS. 
Table 9: Samples positive for Shigella by outcome at primary laboratory (Queensland Medical 
Laboratory, Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology and Pathology Queensland) and reference laboratory 
(Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services), by year 
 Shigella results at laboratory % (n) 
Primary laboratory + - + + 
QHFSS* + + - Not done 
Year  
2010 93.1 (94) 0.0 (0) 1.0 (1) 5.9 (6) 
2011 89.3 (50) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 10.7 (6) 
2012 82.1 (64) 0.0 (0) 1.3 (1) 16.7 (13) 
2013 33.7 (63) 0.5 (1) 1.6 (3) 64.2 (120) 
2014 29.6 (157) 0.6 (3) 1.9 (10) 68.0 (361) 
* QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services 
Table 10: Samples positive for Yersinia by outcome at primary laboratory (Queensland Medical 
Laboratory, Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology and Pathology Queensland) and reference laboratory 
(Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services), by year 
 Yersinia results at laboratory % (n) 
Primary laboratory + - + + 
QHFSS* + + - Not done 
Year  
2010 88.4 (114) 2.3 (3) 2.3 (3) 7.0 (9) 
2011 86.3 (44) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 13.7 (7) 
2012 80.3 (57) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 19.7 (14) 
2013 48.0 (96) 0.0 (0) 2.5 (5) 49.5 (99) 
2014 38.6 (242) 0.0 (0) 1.1 (7) 60.3 (378) 
* QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services 
Community outbreaks of enteric bacteria 
During the period 2010 to 2014, 56 outbreaks caused by Salmonella, 11 outbreaks 
caused by Campylobacter and one outbreak caused by Shigella were reported. Of 
these outbreaks, ten (all caused by Salmonella) were assessed as unlikely, based on 
the setting of the outbreak, to have been identified as outbreaks without subtyping 
information. None of these outbreaks had an obvious point source, such as a 
restaurant. Four outbreaks were associated with bakery chains, with cases purchasing 
products from different locations. One outbreak was associated with a “meals on 
wheels” provider, with clients in different locations becoming ill. One outbreak was 
associated with a single catering company, but many different events were catered by 
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the company on the day in question. One outbreak was associated with bore water and 
the other three outbreaks did not have a clearly defined source. The cases in all of 
these outbreaks were identified as connected due to multiple locus variable number 
tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) of the Salmonella isolates from the cases, and in some 
outbreaks the source. Three of these outbreaks occurred in 2014, after CIDT had been 
introduced at QML and SNP. However, during this time, concurrent culture had 
continued for Salmonella, making an isolate available for subtyping. All three outbreaks 
in 2014 were associated with bakery franchises. 
Discussion 
The introduction of CIDT into the primary laboratories in QLD has increased the 
apparent incidence of the enteric pathogens in this study, in particular Shigella and 
Yersinia. During the period of data collection for this study (2010 to 2014), only QML 
and SNP had introduced CIDT for enteric pathogens, both in 2013 (August and 
November respectively). Prior to the introduction of CIDT, identification of enteric 
bacterial pathogens occurred through the use of culture to obtain an isolate. After CIDT 
was introduced, identification of enteric bacterial pathogens occured one of three ways: 
culture (as for before introduction of CIDT), CIDT, or culture and CIDT together. All 
laboratories attempt to obtain an isolate through concurrent or reflexive culture. 
However, even with continued culture of samples, during 2014, 38% of all samples 
positive for one of the four pathogens did not yield an isolate. Of samples positive by 
CIDT (either alone or with a positive culture), 50% of samples did not yield an isolate. 
This included 29% of samples positive for Salmonella, 54% of samples positive for 
Campylobacter, 87% of samples positive for Shigella and 76% of samples positive for 
Yersinia. This is similar to a FoodNet study in the US which examined testing for 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia, in addition to Shiga-toxin producing 
E. coli and Vibrio, found that 46% of positive samples did not have an associated 
isolate (8). With the CIDT methods currently in use, these samples were unable to be 
further characterised to subtype, biotype and in some cases even species. Without this 
information, defining epidemiologically linked samples is difficult, with negative 
implications for public health surveillance.  
There was a significant increase in the median number of tests requested per month 
for enteric pathogens at all laboratories when 2014 (post CIDT) was compared with the 
pre-CIDT period, 2010 to 2012. This may have been due to a change in clinician 
behaviour, where clinicians may be more likely to request testing for bacterial causes of 
gastroenteritis in 2014 due to a perceived decrease in time to receipt of test results (1). 
However, the number of tests performed increased regardless of whether the 
laboratory had introduced CIDT during the study period, suggesting a true increase in 
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the incidence of gastroenteritis in QLD. Similarly, the median number of tests per 
month positive for each of the pathogens in this study (Salmonella, Campylobacter, 
Shigella and Yersinia) increased over the same time period. 
The increase in the detection of Salmonella is likely to be due to a true increase in the 
incidence of disease as the median number of tests positive for Salmonella increased 
for all laboratories, regardless of the introduction of CIDT. Indeed, while the percent 
positivity increased slightly, the total number of samples that tested positive for 
Salmonella increased dramatically from the summer of 2013/2014. This is consistent 
with the increase in cases of Salmonella in other Australian jurisdictions in 2014, 
including New South Wales (10) and South Australia (11). Indeed, the incidence of 
Salmonella in Australia has been increasing since 2000 (12). The higher percent 
positivity reported by Pathology QLD, when compared with the private pathology 
laboratories, is likely to be due to the role of Pathology QLD in testing samples taken 
from people admitted to hospital. These people have a more serious illness than those 
in the community, and are therefore more likely to have a serious gastroenteritis illness 
such as Salmonella rather than a milder illness like those caused by a bacterial toxin. 
The incidence of Campylobacter in Australia decreased nationwide during 2012. This 
decrease has been attributed by OzFoodNet epidemiologists to the introduction of the 
Primary Production and Processing Standard for Poultry Meat (Standard 4.2.2) in 2012 
(13). However, both the median number of tests positive per month and the percent 
positivity for Campylobacter increased significantly at both QML and SNP after the 
introduction of CIDT. In contrast, the median number of tests positive per month and 
the percent positivity for Campylobacter decreased at Pathology QLD suggesting that 
the apparent increase in cases of Campylobacter is due to the increased sensitivity of 
detection of Campylobacter infection by PCR. Campylobacter is difficult to culture as it 
requires specific environmental conditions (microaerophilic) and fresh stool samples in 
order to grow (3). As a result, many cases of Campylobacter remain undiagnosed 
when only culture is used for testing. This difficulty obtaining a culture is reflected in 
testing at the reference laboratory, where no samples that were CIDT positive for 
Campylobacter and were referred to QHFSS for further testing yielded an isolate at 
QHFSS.  
The median number of tests positive per month and the percent positivity for Shigella 
increased dramatically after the introduction of CIDT at QML and SNP. In contrast, the 
median number of tests positive and the percent positivity remained constant at 
Pathology QLD during 2014. Current PCR methods for testing for the presence of 
Shigella are unable to distinguish between Shigella and enteroinvasive Escherichia coli 
(EIEC) as Shigella and EIEC are genetically closely related species within the same 
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genus (E. coli) (14, 15). However, EIEC causes a milder illness than Shigella (16) and 
is not notifiable in Australia. Some of this increase in the median number of tests 
positive for Shigella may be due to cases of EIEC being detected by the Shigella PCR, 
although since Shigella can be difficult to culture (4), the possibility that the CIDT 
positive samples are true cases of Shigella can’t be discounted. The case definition for 
Shigella in QLD requires isolation of the pathogen, so only those samples with an 
associated isolate are notified to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
(17). Nevertheless, although these possibly false positive samples will become de-
notified when an isolate is unable to be obtained, they have already resulted in an 
increase in workload at both primary and reference laboratories. 
SNP only tests for Yersinia if requested. However, as Yersinia is included in the 
multiplex PCR test used at SNP, Yersinia is detected by this method even when it is 
not specifically requested. This may explain some of the increase in the median 
number of tests positive for Yersinia after introduction of CIDT. In contrast, although 
QML and Pathology QLD routinely culture for Yersinia, the number of tests positive for 
Yersinia at QML and Pathology QLD has also increased despite Pathology QLD not 
introducing CIDT during the study period. The increase in the number of tests positive 
for Yersinia at Pathology QLD was small (from a median of two positive samples per 
month to three positive samples per month). It is likely that the increase in tests positive 
for Yersinia during 2014 is a combination of a real but small increase in cases and an 
artefact of the change in the sensitivity of the laboratory testing method. 
Clinicians in remote and regional areas of QLD were less likely to request both CIDT 
and culture than their major city counterparts during 2014. The QML information for 
clinicians recommends requesting both PCR and culture (18), suggesting that outside 
of the major cities this recommendation is not followed as well as in the cities. The 
postcode used for analysis in this study was that of the patient not the clinician. 
However, people are unlikely to travel far for an ailment such as gastroenteritis (19), so 
using patient postcodes should be an appropriate substitute for clinician locations. 
Clinicians for patients in all age groups ordered both CIDT and culture more frequently 
than CIDT or culture alone. However, clinicians were less likely to order CIDT and 
culture for patients over 55 years of age, so focusing awareness on clinicians who treat 
this age group should improve this.   
Obtaining an isolate to enable subtyping of the pathogen is important for public health 
surveillance (5-7). Due to the increased sensitivity of PCR testing (1), it is inevitable 
that some samples will be positive by CIDT only, especially for those pathogens that 
are difficult to culture, like Campylobacter and Shigella. By sending these samples to 
the reference laboratory (QHFSS), the probability of obtaining an isolate for subtyping 
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is improved. With the exception of CIDT positive samples referred to QHFSS for culture 
of Campylobacter, referral of stool samples to QHFSS that were culture negative at the 
primary laboratory increased the number of samples with an isolate available for 
subtyping. Despite the resulting increase in workload at QHFSS, this practice should 
continue until culture independent subtyping is available so that outbreak detection and 
public health surveillance can continue. 
Outbreak detection and case finding for diseases with a high level of baseline activity 
occurs through epidemiological linking of cases (e.g. the cases attended the same 
event or restaurant). When an epidemiological link isn’t obvious, cases can be linked if 
the isolates have the same subtype. Not having subtyping information will impact 
outbreak detection (5, 6). Ten outbreaks during the study period, three of which were in 
2014, after CIDT was introduced at QML and SNP, may not have been identified as 
outbreaks without the subtyping information that demonstrated a link between the 
cases, showing the importance of continued culture and subtyping of samples from 
cases of bacterial gastroenteritis.   
A limitation of this study is that only one year of data was available after the 
introduction of CIDT at QML and SNP. Comparison of multiple years of data would 
ensure the incidence of the pathogens in 2014 was not an anomaly. In addition, only 
QLD data was compared, and only for four enteric pathogens. This study should be 
extended in the future to other jurisdictions across Australia, and for other pathogens. 
However, the results of this study can be used by laboratories and public health units in 
QLD to inform the way forward for diagnosis, referral and subtyping of enteric 
pathogens. 
This study provided an overview of the current testing procedures for Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia at all QLD laboratories and examined the 
incidence of the four pathogens. While the number of tests positive for all four 
pathogens has increased over the period of the study, only Salmonella has increased 
in incidence. The increase in the number of tests positive for Campylobacter, Shigella 
and Yersinia is likely to be predominantly due to the change in testing resulting in an 
increase in the sensitivity of the tests and subsequently the ability to detect these three 
pathogens. However, the possibility of an increase in incidence cannot be discounted 
for these pathogens. The increase in the sensitivity of case detection by CIDT must be 
accounted for when assessing trends and the burden of disease, especially for 
Campylobacter, Shigella and Yersinia. Continuing attempts to obtain an isolate, either 
through concurrent culture or reflexive culture of samples positive by CIDT, is 
recommended in order to obtain the isolates required for typing as typing information is 
necessary for outbreak detection and public health surveillance. 
 251 
 
References 
1. Langley G, Besser J, Iwamoto M, Lessa FC, Cronquist A, Skoff TH, et al. Effect 
of Culture-Independent Diagnostic Tests on Future Emerging Infections Program 
Surveillance. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2015;21(9):1582. 
2. Queensland Health. Gastroenteritis. 2014 [updated 2014; cited 13 November 
2015]; Available from: 
http://conditions.health.qld.gov.au/HealthCondition/condition/14/33/60/Gastroenteritis. 
3. Bessede E, Delcamp A, Sifre E, Buissonniere A, Megraud F. New methods for 
detection of campylobacters in stool samples in comparison to culture. Journal of 
clinical microbiology. 2011 Mar;49(3):941-4. 
4. Dutta S, Chatterjee A, Dutta P, Rajendran K, Roy S, Pramanik KC, et al. 
Sensitivity and performance characteristics of a direct PCR with stool samples in 
comparison to conventional techniques for diagnosis of Shigella and enteroinvasive 
Escherichia coli infection in children with acute diarrhoea in Calcutta, India. Journal of 
Medical Microbiology. 2001 Aug;50(8):667-74. 
5. Atkinson R, Maguire H, Gerner-Smidt P. A challenge and an opportunity to 
improve patient management and public health surveillance for food-borne infections 
through culture-independent diagnostics. Journal of Clinical Microbiology. 2013 
Aug;51(8):2479-82. 
6. Cronquist AB, Mody RK, Atkinson R, Besser J, Tobin D'Angelo M, Hurd S, et al. 
Impacts of culture-independent diagnostic practices on public health surveillance for 
bacterial enteric pathogens. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 2012 Jun;54 Suppl 5:S432-9. 
7. Jones TF, Gerner-Smidt P. Nonculture diagnostic tests for enteric diseases. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2012 Mar;18(3):513-4. 
8. Iwamoto M, Huang JY, Cronquist AB, Medus C, Hurd S, Zansky S, et al. 
Bacterial Enteric Infections Detected by Culture-Independent Diagnostic Tests - 
FoodNet, United States, 2012-2014. MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 
2015 Mar 13;64(9):252-7. 
9. OzFoodNet Queensland. OzFoodNet - Enhancing Foodborne Disease 
Surveillance Across Australia, Annual Report 2010, Queensland. 2010. 
10. Ward K, Franklin N, Furlong C, Hope K, Flint J. OzFoodNet New South Wales 
annual report 2014. In: Communicable Diseases Branch HPN, editor.; 2014. 
11. Miller M, Halliday J, Denehy E, Koehler A. OzFoodNet South Australia Annual 
Report 2014. In: Communicable Disease Control Branch SH, editor.; 2014. 
12. Kirk M, Ford L, Glass K, Hall G. Foodborne illness, Australia, circa 2000 and 
circa 2010. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2014 Nov;20(11):1857-64. 
13. Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Poultry Standards.  [cited 17 
November 2015]; Available from: 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/code/primaryproduction/poultry/pages/default.aspx  
14. Sahl JW, Morris CR, Emberger J, Fraser CM, Ochieng JB, Juma J, et al. 
Defining the phylogenomics of Shigella species: a pathway to diagnostics. Journal of 
Clinical Microbiology. 2015 Mar;53(3):951-60. 
15. Lan R, Reeves PR. Escherichia coli in disguise: molecular origins of Shigella. 
Microbes Infect. 2002 Sep;4(11):1125-32. 
16. Food and Drug Administration. Enteroinvasive Escherichia coli (EIEC).  Bad 
Bug Book, Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins; 2012. p. 80-1. 
17. Queensland Health. Shigella infection (Shigellosis) - Queensland Health 
Guidelines for Public Health Units. 2010. 
 252 
 
18. Queensland Medical Laboratory. Faecal Multiplex PCR testing. 2013 [updated 
2013; cited 17 November 2015]; Available from: 
http://www.qml.com.au/Portals/0/PDF/FaecalMultiplexPCR_1177.pdf. 
19. Ward B, Humphreys J, McGrail M, Wakerman J, Chisholm M. Which 
dimensions of access are most important when rural residents decide to visit a general 
practitioner for non-emergency care? Aust Health Rev. 2015 Apr;39(2):121-6. 
 
 25
3 
 Ap
pe
nd
ix
 1
: L
ab
or
at
or
y 
pr
oc
es
s 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
 
 
Sa
lm
on
el
la
 
C
am
py
lo
ba
ct
er
 
Sh
ig
el
la
 
Ye
rs
in
ia
 
1 
a 
D
o 
yo
u 
te
st
 s
to
ol
/b
lo
od
 s
pe
ci
m
en
s 
fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
es
e 
pa
th
og
en
s 
in
 y
ou
r l
ab
or
at
or
y?
 Y
es
/N
o 
 
 
 
 
b 
If 
no
, d
o 
yo
u 
se
nd
 th
e 
sp
ec
im
en
 fo
r t
es
tin
g 
fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 
th
es
e 
pa
th
og
en
s 
to
 a
no
th
er
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
? 
Y
es
/N
o 
 
 
 
 
c 
If 
ye
s 
to
 1
b,
 w
hi
ch
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
 d
o 
yo
u 
se
nd
 th
e 
sp
ec
im
en
s 
to
? 
(s
ki
p 
to
 q
ue
st
io
n 
6a
)  
 
 
 
 
2 
D
o 
yo
u 
ro
ut
in
el
y 
us
e 
cu
ltu
re
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
se
 
pa
th
og
en
s?
 Y
es
/N
o/
on
ly
 if
 re
qu
es
te
d  
 
 
 
 
3 
a 
D
o 
yo
u 
ro
ut
in
el
y 
us
e 
a 
cu
ltu
re
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t t
es
t (
C
ID
T)
 to
 
id
en
tif
y 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
se
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
? 
Y
es
/N
o/
on
ly
 if
 
re
qu
es
te
d 
 
 
 
 
b 
If 
ye
s 
to
 3
a,
 w
ha
t t
yp
e 
of
 C
ID
T 
do
 y
ou
 u
se
? 
e.
g.
 P
C
R
, 
ra
pi
d 
di
ag
no
st
ic
 te
st
 
 
 
 
 
c 
If 
ye
s 
to
 3
a,
 w
ha
t b
ra
nd
 o
f C
ID
T 
do
 y
ou
 u
se
? 
 
 
 
 
4 
a 
D
o 
yo
u 
us
e 
bo
th
 c
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 C
ID
T 
fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
es
e 
pa
th
og
en
s?
 
 
 
 
 
b 
If 
ye
s 
to
 4
a,
 d
o 
yo
u 
do
 b
ot
h 
co
nc
ur
re
nt
ly
 b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
kn
ow
 
th
e 
re
su
lt 
("
co
nc
ur
re
nt
")
 o
r d
o 
yo
u 
on
ly
 c
ul
tu
re
 s
am
pl
es
 
th
at
 w
er
e 
po
si
tiv
e 
by
 C
ID
T 
("
re
fle
xi
ve
")
 o
r d
o 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 ro
ut
in
e 
("
ot
he
r"
)?
 
 
 
 
 
c 
P
le
as
e 
de
sc
rib
e 
yo
ur
 "
ot
he
r"
 ro
ut
in
e 
 
 
 
 
5 
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
do
 w
ith
 s
pe
ci
m
en
s 
th
at
 a
re
 p
os
iti
ve
 b
y 
C
ID
T 
bu
t n
eg
at
iv
e 
by
 c
ul
tu
re
?  
 
 
 
 
 25
4 
 6 
a 
D
o 
yo
u 
re
fe
r c
ul
tu
re
 p
os
iti
ve
 is
ol
at
es
 to
 a
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
la
bo
ra
to
ry
 fo
r f
ur
th
er
 ty
pi
ng
? 
 
 
 
 
b 
If 
cu
ltu
re
 w
as
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
or
 y
ou
 u
se
 C
ID
T 
on
ly
, d
o 
yo
u 
re
fe
r 
st
oo
l/b
lo
od
 s
pe
ci
m
en
s 
th
at
 a
re
 C
ID
T 
po
si
tiv
e 
to
 a
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
la
bo
ra
to
ry
 fo
r f
ur
th
er
 ty
pi
ng
? 
 
 
 
 
7 
If 
yo
u 
us
e 
C
ID
T,
 w
he
n 
di
d 
yo
ur
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
 in
tro
du
ce
 th
es
e 
m
et
ho
ds
 fo
r e
ac
h 
pa
th
og
en
?  
 
 
 
 
8 
a 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 y
ou
r p
at
ho
lo
gy
 la
bo
ra
to
ry
? 
 
 
 
 
b 
W
ha
t s
ta
te
 a
re
 y
ou
 lo
ca
te
d 
in
? 
 
 
 
 
 255 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Data dictionary for analysis* 
Field Stata variable name Description Example input 
Specimen ID labnumber Unique ID Text 
Laboratory lab Name of the 
laboratory doing 
the testing 
QML, SNP, Pathology 
QLD, QHFSS 
Age group age_grp Age group of 
patient 
0-4 years 
5-17 years 
18-54 years 
≥55 years 
Sex† gender Gender of patient 1 = Female 
0 = Male 
3 = Other 
9 = Unknown 
Postcode postcode Residential 
postcode of 
patient 
Queensland 
postcodes only 
Remoteness 
area 
ra What was the 
remoteness area 
classification of 
the patient? 
Text 
Year year Year of testing dd/mm/yyyy 
Month month Month and year of 
test request 
YYYYmmm 
Date of receipt receipt_date Date the request 
was received 
Date 
Test/s 
requested† 
test_request What tests were 
requested? 
Culture, PCR or both 
Date of 
identification 
result† 
id_date Date the result 
was disseminated 
Date 
Pathogen 
identified - 
Salmonella 
salmonella Was Salmonella 
identified in the 
sample? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified - 
Campylobacter 
campylobacter Was 
Campylobacter 
identified in the 
sample? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified - 
Shigella 
shigella Was Shigella 
identified in the 
sample? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified - 
Yersinia 
yersinia Was Yersinia 
identified in the 
sample? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Culture culture Was the culture 
positive? 
Negative? Not 
done? If not done, 
skip the pathogen 
specific culture 
questions 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
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Salmonella 
culture 
salmonella_culture Was Salmonella 
detected by 
culture? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Campylobacter 
culture 
campylobacter_culture Was 
Campylobacter 
detected by 
culture? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Shigella culture shigella_culture Was Shigella 
detected by 
culture? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Yersinia culture yersinia_culture Was Yersinia 
detected by 
culture? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
PCR pcr Was PCR 
positive? 
Negative? Not 
done? If not done, 
skip the pathogen 
specific PCR 
questions 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Salmonella PCR salmonella_pcr Was Salmonella 
detected by PCR 
(positive), not 
detected 
(negative) or was 
PCR not done 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Campylobacter 
PCR 
campylobacter_pcr Was 
Campylobacter 
detected by PCR 
(positive), not 
detected 
(negative) or was 
PCR not done 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Shigella PCR shigella_pcr Was Shigella 
detected by PCR 
(positive), not 
detected 
(negative) or was 
PCR not done 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Yersinia PCR yersinia_pcr Was Yersinia 
detected by PCR 
(positive), not 
detected 
(negative) or was 
PCR not done 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Time to ID† time_to_id Time between 
receipt of the 
sample and 
identification of 
pathogen 
Number of days 
Sent to 
QHFSS?† 
qhfss Was the sample 
sent to QHFSS 
for further 
investigation, as 
indicated by the 
primary lab? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
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QHFSS request 
date 
qhfss_request Date the request 
received by 
QHFSS 
dd/mm/yyyy 
QHFSS receipt 
date 
qhfss_receipt Date the sample 
was received by 
QHFSS 
dd/mm/yyyy 
Pathogen 
identified by 
QHFSS - 
Salmonella 
qhfss_salmonella Was Salmonella 
identified in the 
sample provided 
to QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified by 
QHFSS - 
Campylobacter 
qhfss_campylobacter Was 
Campylobacter 
identified in the 
sample provided 
to QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified by 
QHFSS - 
Shigella 
qhfss_shigella Was Shigella 
identified in the 
sample provided 
to QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Pathogen 
identified by 
QHFSS - 
Yersinia 
qhfss_yersinia Was Yersinia 
identified in the 
sample provided 
to QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Culture - 
QHFSS 
qhfss_culture Was the culture 
positive when 
tested by 
QHFSS? 
Negative? Not 
done? If not done, 
skip the pathogen 
specific culture 
questions 
Positive = 1 
Negative = 0 
Test not performed = . 
Salmonella 
culture - QHFSS 
qhfss_salmonella_culture Was Salmonella 
detected by 
culture at 
QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Campylobacter 
culture - QHFSS 
qhfss_campylobacter_culture Was 
Campylobacter 
detected by 
culture at 
QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Shigella culture - 
QHFSS 
qhfss_shigella_culture Was Shigella 
detected by 
culture at 
QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Yersinia culture - 
QHFSS 
qhfss_yersinia_culture Was Yersinia 
detected by 
culture at 
QHFSS? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Subtyping done? subtyping Was subtyping 
done on the 
sample 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
MLVA done? mlva Was MLVA done? Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
MLVA result mlva_result What was MLVA 
of the sample? 
An MLVA number 
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Biotyping done? biotype Was biotyping 
done? 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Other subtyping subtype Was another 
subtyping method 
done 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Unknown = . 
Salmonella 
species 
salmonella_species What species of 
Salmonella was 
identified? 
Text 
Second 
Salmonella 
species 
salmonella_species2 What was the 
second 
Salmonella 
species identified, 
if applicable? 
Text 
Salmonella 
subtype 
salmonella_subtype What subtype of 
Salmonella was 
identified? 
Text 
Campylobacter 
species 
campylobacter_species What species of 
Campylobacter 
was identified? 
Text 
Shigella species shigella_species What species of 
Shigella was 
identified? 
Text 
Shigella subtype shigella_subtype What subtype of 
Shigella was 
identified? 
Text 
Shigella biotype shigella_biotype What biotype of 
Shigella was 
identified? 
Text 
Yersinia species yersinia_species What species of 
Yersinia was 
identified? 
Text 
Yersinia subtype yersinia_subtype What subtype of 
Yersinia was 
identified? 
Text 
Yersinia biotype yersinia_biotype What biotype of 
Yersinia was 
identified? 
Text 
* Unshaded fields were provided by QML, SNP and Pathology QLD. Shaded fields were 
provided by QHFSS. ID – identification; QML – Queensland Medical Laboratory; SNP – Sullivan 
Nicolaides Pathology; QLD – Queensland; QHFSS – Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific 
Services; PCR – polymerase chain reaction; CIDT – culture independent diagnostic testing; 
MLVA – multiple locus variable number tandem repeat analysis 
† not all laboratories provided this information 
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Chapter 5 
Cluster of cases with Ralstonia species 
bacteraemia potentially associated with 
propofol administration 
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
On 1 May 2014, South Australia (SA) Health notified the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA) of the isolation of Ralstonia species from blood cultures of 
three bacteraemic patients in two different hospitals in Adelaide. Ralstonia is not a 
common isolate in blood samples in pathology laboratories in SA, raising suspicion 
of a possible outbreak of Ralstonia in South Australia. A preliminary investigation 
by SA Health reported that the only exposure common to all three patients was 
administration of a single brand of propofol, a widely used short acting anaesthetic 
agent, regulated by TGA. The TGA quarantined the implicated batches of propofol 
across Australia, and initiated an investigation into the source of infection. The 
investigation was necessary to determine whether the quarantined propofol should 
be recalled and disposed of, or released back into use. 
My role 
Associate Professor Mahomed Patel provided supervision, and along with Anna-Lena 
Arnold and I, we formed the “MAE Team” for investigation of this unusual cluster of 
cases. We relocated to an office in the TGA for the initial part of the investigation, 
assisting them directly with the epidemiological investigations. Later in the 
investigation, we returned to our field placements, and assisted the Communicable 
Diseases Network Australia working group (CDNA-WG) convened in response to this 
cluster of cases. We also acted as facilitators of the Delphi process in the later stages 
of the investigation.  
As part of the MAE investigation team, I was involved in all discussions and planning of 
the investigation, providing intellectual input at all stages of the investigation. I assisted 
with collating case information into line lists and performing descriptive analyses. I also 
conducted the simulations of analytical studies, and contributed to the assessment of 
the Bradford-Hill framework along with the MAE team. My background in microbial 
phylogenetics provided me with a comprehensive understanding of the genetic analysis 
of the isolates, which allowed me to explain this aspect of the investigation to members 
of the investigation team who had no previous experience with genetic analysis. I also, 
along with Mahomed and Anna-Lena, drafted and critically reviewed documents 
including multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation reports, documents for the Delphi 
rounds, literature reviews, as well as preparing the final reports to the CDNA and the 
Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC). 
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Lessons learned 
As this was my first ever outbreak investigation, I learned a lot of new things, even 
though it didn’t end up being a “traditional” outbreak; this was more an investigation of 
a cluster of cases of an uncommon disease that might have a common source. The 
main thing I learned was the difficulty in engaging and encouraging cooperation when 
many people with different agendas were involved. In hindsight, this investigation 
should have been managed in a similar way to multijurisdictional outbreaks run by 
OzFoodNet. OzFoodNet multijurisdictional outbreaks are run according to a standard 
protocol, resulting in everyone knowing their role in the investigation. A similar 
document for non-foodborne outbreaks would be useful for future outbreaks of this 
type. Good communication and knowing roles is an important component of a 
successful outbreak investigation. 
The most valuable things I learned were all related to how to think like an 
epidemiologist, rather than a microbiologist, although I think keeping the microbiology 
in mind is also very important. Learning how to think like an epidemiologist from 
Mahomed was an invaluable experience. We learned about the Bradford-Hill 
framework in class, but applying the criteria in a practical situation was completely 
different! 
Interestingly, both this outbreak investigation, and the investigation of hepatitis A in the 
next chapter reinforced to me the importance of not going into an outbreak 
investigation with a preconceived idea of what the exposure was. In this investigation, 
propofol was mentioned from the outset, and this may have led those involved in the 
investigation to ignore evidence that might have implicated a different exposure. In 
addition, the ignoring of non-bacteraemic cases of Ralstonia in Queensland (QLD), 
despite these cases also being unexpected, caused the critical link between these 
cases and some of the bacteraemic Ralstonia cases in QLD to be missed by the 
CDNA-WG. 
I really enjoyed learning how to simulate analytical studies in the absence of real data, 
and getting to play with some basic commands in Stata and EpiInfo. But the most 
interesting new method learned in this cluster investigation was the Delphi Method. 
Using expert opinions rather than hard facts is very different to my experience during 
life as a laboratory scientist. However, this technique is not without its pitfalls. If you 
don’t ask a precise question, you won’t get a precise answer. On the other hand, no 
matter how direct the question, there will always be someone who goes their own way 
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– in this case, we asked people to respond to scenarios with defined responses. One 
person made up their own response, making it very difficult to combine responses. I 
like a quote from the original paper discussing the Delphi Method,  
“vague questions inviting general critical comment … produce literary 
outpourings of little value for the analysis” (1). 
Public health implications of this work 
This investigation showed the importance of looking for and sharing observations about 
bacteraemia of uncommon causes, such as Ralstonia, in vulnerable populations such 
as immunocompromised patients in hospitals. This investigation was unable to resolve 
the source of the cases of Ralstonia in this cluster. However, during the course of the 
investigation, we found that there was a perception among health care workers that the 
outer surface of rubber stoppers of single use vials are sterile, protected from 
contamination by the plastic lid. This investigation showed that the outer surface of 
rubber stoppers are not sterile, and should always be swabbed with a suitable 
disinfectant and allowed to dry before inserting the needle to withdraw the vial contents 
for injection. 
During the course of the investigation, a separate investigation of the cases in QLD 
found an alternative source of infection. This investigation found that many of the cases 
in QLD, including some additional non-bacteraemic cases, were associated with bottled 
water used in a hospital. Although we were not directly involved in this investigation, 
the QLD representatives on the CDNA-WG shared some aspects of the investigation 
with the group. A memorandum was supplied to the Chief Executives of Health and 
Hospital Services to remind clinicians that bottled water should not be considered 
sterile, and as such is not suitable for severely immunocompromised patients. 
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Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity 
requirement 
Investigate an acute public health problem or threat (typically a disease outbreak). 
Literature review that demonstrates skills in conducting a targeted literature search and 
synthesis (Appendix 1).  
Abstract 
South Australia notified the TGA of an unusual cluster of three Ralstonia bacteraemia 
cases potentially associated with propofol on 1 May 2014. Subsequently, QLD (four 
cases) and Victoria (VIC, one case) also notified cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia and a 
CDNA working group was convened to assist with the investigation. 
Batches of the implicated propofol product were tested for microbial contamination of 
both the vial contents and the outer surfaces of the vial closures (plastic flip off lid and 
rubber stoppers) by the TGA, SA Pathology, the product manufacturer and two 
independent laboratories. Isolates of Ralstonia from bacteraemia cases and an isolate 
from a pooled sample of five vial lids and rubber stoppers from a single batch of 
propofol were genotyped by DiversiLabTM rep-PCR and whole genome sequencing. 
The epidemiological investigation included a case series, describing the cluster by 
time, person, place and risk factors. The level of exposure to propofol required for a 
significant measure of association was calculated through simulated case control and 
case cohort studies. As it was deemed that an analytical study was unlikely to achieve 
significance of association, causation was assessed using a combination of Bradford-
Hill criteria and consultation with an expert panel using the Delphi Method.  
Eight cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia were identified nationally with onsets between 1 
April 2014 and 4 May 2014. All cases were administered the same brand of propofol 
prior to onset of bacteraemia suggesting that the measure of association would be 
infinitely high. Application of the Bradford-Hill criteria and expert discussion via the 
Delphi Method was unable confirm a single common source for all cases. Identification 
of microbial contamination on the outer surface of the rubber stoppers of vials, in 
combination with findings from the literature showed biological plausibility for 
contamination of the outer surface of the rubber stoppers. The participants in the 
Delphi panel agreed that, if the propofol was contaminated with Ralstonia, it was 
contaminated on the outside of the vial rather than in the solution. Independent 
investigations by QLD Health found cases of non-bacteraemic Ralstonia infection at the 
same hospital in QLD, QLD3, where two cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia were 
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reported. An epidemiological investigation by QLD Health found an association 
between all cases at this hospital and bottled drinking water, excluding these cases 
from the propofol associated investigation.  
At least two distinct sources of infection, bottled water and a second source that may 
have been propofol, were identified during this investigation. However, it is unclear how 
many cases were simply background cases. In the absence of a clear epidemiological 
or microbiological link between illness and infection, using the Delphi method and a 
group of experts can help to clarify some of the issues, but consensus may be difficult 
to attain if the information provided to the group is not sufficiently comprehensive. 
Introduction 
A staff member of South Australia (SA) Health identified three cases of bacteraemia 
caused by Ralstonia species, within a single week in late April 2014, in patients at two 
different hospitals in SA, and initiated further investigation. Initial investigations 
reported that the only common exposure between all three cases was administration of 
the same brand of the anaesthetic, propofol. SA Health notified the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA) on 1 May 2014, prompting nationwide case finding and 
investigation. These investigations aimed to determine if there were additional cases 
elsewhere in Australia (as would be expected given the national distribution of the 
propofol product), if the propofol product was the common source, and how it became 
contaminated. 
Outbreak investigations can make use of many different techniques in order to find an 
answer and resolve the outbreak. In addition to classical analytical study methods, the 
Delphi Method can be employed to assist with obtaining an answer to outbreak or 
cluster investigations that can’t be resolved using traditional methods. The Delphi 
Method was first designed and used to obtain expert opinion to inform strategies to 
optimise the United States industrial target system and to estimate required numbers of 
Atomic-bombs during the Cold War (1). The method makes use of a series of 
questionnaires in an effort to achieve a consensus of opinion. During the question 
rounds, additional information is supplied to participants as needed or requested, 
allowing participants to change or enhance their responses. This method allows 
participants to answer anonymously, removing the tendency for “group-think” and the 
domination of opinions by stronger personalities inevitable in any group situation (1, 2). 
Ralstonia pickettii is the type species of a genus of Gram negative bacteria first 
proposed as a new species in 1995. Prior to this, species of Ralstonia were 
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taxonomically grouped in a number of genera, including Burkholderia, and 
Pseudomonas (3). Three species, R. pickettii, R. mannitolilytica and R. insidiosa have 
been implicated in human disease (4-30). R. mannitolilytica was first proposed as a 
species distinct from R. pickettii in 2001 (31), and R. insidiosa was first identified in 
2003 (25).  
Ralstonia species are commonly found in the environment, especially associated with 
water, including ultrapure water (32, 33) and in the water system of the Space Shuttle 
Discovery (34). Ralstonia species are also able to survive in disinfectants (35-37). In 
the clinical setting, Ralstonia species are not considered virulent but are commonly 
found colonising cystic fibrosis patients and on occasion can cause pneumonia in these 
patients (38-41). They have also been implicated in a large number of nosocomial 
outbreaks worldwide due to contaminated medical devices (4, 10, 13, 26, 28), solutions 
contaminated during manufacture (6, 9, 14, 18, 22) or through cross-contamination of 
solutions in hospitals (7, 11, 15, 16, 19).  
Propofol is a short acting anaesthetic agent, commonly used in hospitals and clinical 
settings. It is a lipid and soybean based emulsion, and is a rich environment for the 
growth of microorganisms (42-46). Since release in 1987, several outbreaks worldwide 
have been attributed to contamination of propofol, although all have been as a result of 
contamination through use, rather than contamination during manufacture (47-60). 
There have been two outbreaks that the investigators considered may have been due 
to a failure to disinfect the rubber stoppers (48, 53). None have been previously 
reported in Australia.  
The implicated brand of propofol is provided in a glass vial with a rubber stopper, metal 
crimp and plastic flip off lid. The vial contents are sterilised after the vials are filled and 
sealed. The flip off lid is not intended to protect the outer surface of the rubber stopper 
from contamination. Experimental evidence shows that intentional contamination of the 
outer surface of vials similar to propofol vials can result in contamination of the internal 
surface of the plastic lid, and the upper surface of the rubber stopper (61, 62). 
Contamination of the rubber stopper without disinfection before use can result in 
contaminated needles or solutions (63, 64). Disinfection of the rubber stopper with an 
alcohol swab or spray (considered standard infection control practice (65)) can reduce 
onward transfer of contamination from the stopper to patients (62, 63). 
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Objectives 
The objective of this investigation was to determine if the cases of Ralstonia 
bacteraemia reported in April and May 2014 were associated with a common exposure, 
and if this common exposure was propofol. Case-finding for unidentified cases of 
Ralstonia bacteraemia was also undertaken. 
Methods 
Epidemiological investigations 
Case definition 
A meeting of the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) on 9 May 
2014 selected the case definition for the study: “all cases of bacteraemia with blood 
cultures positive for Ralstonia spp. and date of detection of infection since 1 January 
2014”. 
Case series 
Information about cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia from all jurisdictions were reported 
via CDNA representatives to the TGA and CDNA-WG. The MAE team adapted a 
questionnaire originally designed by QLD Health to collect additional information on 
reported cases from hospital or public health staff, and included questions on 
demographics, hospital and clinical details, laboratory testing details, medications 
administered (including detailed information about propofol use) and clinical 
procedures performed. The form used is included in Appendix 2. This information was 
collated into a line list using Microsoft Excel. 
As cases of Ralstonia are not notifiable to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System (NNDSS), background rates of isolation of Ralstonia species from laboratories 
nation-wide were obtained through consultation with the Public Health Laboratory 
Network (PHLN) of Australia. Members of the PHLN were asked to check records for 
previous years and report how many Ralstonia isolates were made from blood cultures. 
The laboratories that provided data to PHLN are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Laboratories that provided information about isolates of Ralstonia 
State Laboratory 
ACT The Canberra Hospital 
Calvary Health Care 
National Capital Private Hospital 
NSW South West Area Pathology Service 
Hunter Area Pathology Service 
Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research 
South Eastern Area Laboratory Service 
SydPath 
Pacific Laboratory Medicine Services 
NT Royal Darwin Hospital 
QLD Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services 
SA SA Pathology 
TAS Royal Hobart Hospital 
VIC Victorian Nosocomial Infectious Surveillance System 
WA PathWest 
 
In consultation with the TGA, we posted a message on ProMED (Appendix 3) asking if 
other countries had an increase in propofol-associated Ralstonia bacteraemia.   
Microbiology 
Bacterial cultures from confirmed cases were initially identified as Ralstonia species by 
the pathology laboratories using either matrix assisted laser desorption/ionization-time 
of flight (MALDI-TOF) or sequencing of the 16S rRNA gene. All isolates were 
subsequently sent to the UQCCR to be compared using the DiversiLabTM platform 
(bioMérieux) for rep-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) DNA fingerprinting (66). This 
method utilises specially designed primers that produce different sized PCR products in 
different species of highly similar bacteria. It can be used to differentiate bacteria to the 
species level, and in some cases genotypes within a species (67). Additional Ralstonia 
isolates held in the QLD culture collection were included in the DiversiLabTM analysis 
for comparison with the isolates from cases in the cluster. In addition, Ralstonia 
isolates from clinical samples (e.g. throat aspirates) from non-bacteraemic patients at 
the same hospital as two of the bacteraemic cases were included. These non-
bacteraemic samples were not included in the cluster investigation as they did not meet 
the case definition. DiversiLabTM results were shared with the Ralstonia CDNA-WG on 
23 May 2014. 
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Isolates underwent Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) at the Microbial Genomics 
group in the SCMB at UQ. Sequencing was performed at the Australian Genome 
Research Facility (AGRF) using the Illumina HiSeq2500. The Microbial Genomics 
group in-house analysis pipeline was used for sequence assembly and phylogenetic 
analysis. WGS results were made available to CDNA on 24 April 2015. 
Simulated case-control and case-cohort studies 
To inform decisions about analytical epidemiological studies, we simulated hypothetical 
case-control and case-cohort studies. We based our assumptions on what was already 
known about the reported cases. For both the case-control and case-cohort 
simulations, we calculated Odds Ratios (ORs) assuming a total of eight cases (the 
number of cases that had been reported as of 29 May 2014) that had received propofol 
prior to developing Ralstonia bacteraemia, and we tested four different scenarios of 
cases who did not receive propofol before developing Ralstonia bacteraemia: zero (the 
real situation at the time of the simulation), one, two and three. We assumed that each 
case would be in a ward with ten other patients who did not have Ralstonia 
bacteraemia, and for the case control, we simulated three controls per case. For each 
scenario, the OR, 95% confidence intervals (CI) and p-values were calculated for four 
different rates of propofol usage among controls: 90%, 50%, 25% and a value that 
gave a significant 95% CI (lower bound just above 1) and p-value (<0.05). Due to 
values of less than five in at least one cell in all simulations, Fisher’s exact test was 
used to calculate 95% CI for scenarios with a value greater than zero in all cells and for 
all p-values. For scenarios in which there were zero cases in one cell (i.e. zero cases 
with no propofol exposure), Cornfield’s Approximation was used to calculate 95% CIs. 
All calculations were conducted using StataSE 13. 
Bradford-Hill Framework  
The Bradford-Hill framework for causation (68) was used to assess the causal 
relationship between Ralstonia bacteraemia and propofol in this cluster of cases. 
Causal association was assessed using the following criteria: 
x Strength of association between exposure and outcome 
o This typically refers to measures of association obtained during analytical 
studies. In this investigation we used a case series along with simulated 
case-control and case-cohort measures of association. 
o We also examined the association between illness and specific brands and 
batches of propofol. 
x Consistency of findings across different populations 
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o Comparison of results from different study designs 
o Review of past outbreaks published in the literature. 
x Specificity in the relationship between exposure and outcome 
o Assessed by comparing specificity of 
 Genotypes of isolates of the bacteria from different locations  
 Batch numbers of propofol used 
 Type of disease (i.e. bacteraemia) 
x Temporality, i.e. the outcome occurred after (and not before) exposure 
o Incubation time between administration of propofol and onset of 
bacteraemia. 
x Biological gradient, i.e. dose-effect relationship between exposure and outcome 
o Dose response related to bolus (single dose) versus infusions. 
x Biological plausibility of the association between exposure and disease 
o How could the propofol or the outer surface of the vial rubber stopper have 
become contaminated with bacteria? 
o Is polyclonal contamination of propofol and/or the vial stopper plausible? 
x Coherence, i.e. cause-effect relationship does not conflict with what is known of the 
natural history and biology of the disease 
o Review of polyclonal outbreaks published in the literature. 
x Experimental evidence, i.e. removing exposure or laboratory-based experiments 
o Effect of quarantining propofol 
o Release of propofol from quarantine  
x Analogy 
o Review of microbial contamination of medical products (drug solutions, 
vials/rubber stoppers) published in the literature. 
Distribution chain of propofol 
The distribution chain of propofol from manufacture in India through to use in a clinic or 
hospital in Australia was determined through discussion with staff of the TGA.  
Environmental investigation 
Details of any microbiological testing performed within the clinic or hospital were 
requested as part of the questionnaire completed by hospital or public health staff, as is 
shown in Appendix 2.  
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Testing of propofol 
Propofol vials were tested for the presence of Ralstonia species using the methods 
described below. The TGA, SA Pathology, the manufacturer and two independent 
laboratories tested a total of 2738 vials of propofol from 31 different batches (six 
batches were not supplied to Australia), including the two batches originally implicated 
by SA (A030906 and A030907). The vials were tested for contamination by four 
different methods 
1. Test for sterility (TGA, manufacturer, independent laboratories).  
2. Test for bacterial endotoxins (TGA, manufacturer, independent laboratories).  
3. Microbial contamination test of vial contents (TGA, SA Pathology and one 
independent laboratory). 
4. Microbial contamination test of flip-off lids and the external surface of the rubber 
stopper (TGA, SA Pathology and one independent laboratory). 
Both the test for sterility and the test for bacterial endotoxins are standard tests used 
prior to release of injectable medicines. A “pass” result for the test for sterility means 
that no bacterial or fungal contamination was detected in the portion of sample tested, 
while a “pass” for the test for bacterial endotoxins means that no bacterial endotoxins 
were detected in the portion of sample tested. If an injectable medicine gets a “pass” 
for both tests, and if all other manufacturing and batch release criteria are met, then the 
batch can be released (69). 
The test for microbial contamination of vial contents is not a standard test for injectable 
medicines but was included as an additional test in this investigation. Similarly, the test 
for microbial contamination of flip off lids and rubber stoppers was adapted for the 
purposes of this investigation. The method for the latter differed slightly between the 
TGA and SA Pathology. Whereas the TGA laboratory is accredited for this type of 
environmental test, and was able to ensure maintenance of aseptic technique 
throughout the procedure, SA Pathology holds accreditation only for testing of human 
diagnostic samples and medical devices, and they have limited accreditation for 
environmental testing. The TGA was able to test the lid and stopper of one vial at a 
time, whereas SA Pathology pooled the tests for groups of five vials (from a single 
box), and placed the disinfected whole flip-off lid of each vial into the culture medium, 
along with the swabs of the outer surfaces of the rubber stoppers. In addition, SA 
Pathology did not use positive or negative controls during their procedure. Any isolates 
obtained from environmental studies were sent to UQCCR for genotyping by 
DiversiLabTM and to UQ SCMB for WGS. 
 273 
 
 
 
Delphi Method 
Members for the expert panel volunteered to participate during the CDNA-WG 
teleconference or were suggested by other members. The members included three 
infectious disease physicians (two professors, one associate professor), a clinical 
microbiologist and three medical epidemiologists. The Delphi coordination and 
synthesis team consisted of Mahomed Patel, Anna-Lena Arnold and I. The Delphi 
consisted of three rounds where responses were requested from participants and a 
final concluding document.  
In Round 1, we proposed a series of questions and asked for comment and 
suggestions to revise and refine the questions. Suggestions for additional questions 
were also sought. We used this input from the panel members to refine the questions 
for Round 2. In Round 2, we asked the members to respond to the refined questions. 
We collated and synthesised these responses and for Round 3, we de-identified the 
responses and asked the members to comment on their own and other’s responses 
and our synthesis. We also added additional questions to further explore the themes of 
the responses in Round 2 and conducted a literature review to answer some questions 
raised. Round 4 collated, synthesised and summarised the discussion of the previous 
three rounds.  
Results 
Timeline of investigation 
Figure 1 shows a timeline of significant events during this investigation and the date of 
detection of bacteraemia for all cases of Ralstonia reported during 2014. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of cases (by date of detection of Ralstonia) and events during the 
investigation. Cases included in the investigation are shown in red, excluded cases are in brown
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Case series 
Table 2 shows the number of isolations of Ralstonia by PHLN member laboratories 
nationwide. Due to availability of data, different years were reported by different state 
representatives. Based on the information provided, a mean of four cases of Ralstonia 
bacteraemia were reported annually across Australia, compared with eight cases in the 
5 week-period from 1 April to 4 May 2014.  
Table 2: Frequency of isolation of Ralstonia species by state and year 
State/ 
Territory 
Number of Ralstonia isolates from blood cultures 
Year Before April 2014 
Between 1 April and 4 
May 2014 
QLD 
2011 
2012 
2013 
Jan-Mar 2014 
1 
2 
3 
0 
4 
SA 
2013 
Jan-Mar 2014 
0 
0 
3 
VIC 
2004-2013 
Jan-Mar 2014 
5 
0 
1 
NT 
2013 
Jan-Mar 2014 
0 
0 
0 
ACT 
2012 
2013 
Jan-Mar 2014 
1 
0 
0 
0 
TAS 2012 - 2013 0 0 
WA 2012 – 2013 1 0 
NSW 
1998 
2001 
2003 
2009 
2010-Mar 2014 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
0 
Australia 2011-2013 4 per year 8 
 
The eight cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia were reported with a date of detection of 
clinical infection (used as a proxy for onset of illness, as onset of bacteraemia is difficult 
to determine in hospitalised patients) between 1 January 2014 and 4 May 2014 (the 
date range included in the case definition). The epidemic curve is shown in Figure 2, 
and the simplified line list is shown in Table 3. Three additional cases of Ralstonia 
bacteraemia were reported during or after the investigation and Delphi Method were 
completed. These three cases are not shown in the epidemic curve as they were not 
included in the CDNA-WG investigation due to onset dates after completion of the 
investigation. However, they have been included in the timeline in Figure 1. The three 
cases include a child at SA3 and an adult at VIC2, both with a history of use of the 
same brand of propofol after propofol had been released from quarantine and a case 
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from QLD3 that had no association with propofol. Although these cases were not 
included in the CDNA-WG investigation, they will be included in the analysis and 
discussion contained within this chapter. No other countries responded to our ProMED 
post reporting Ralstonia bacteraemia associated with administration of propofol. 
Cases were reported from six different hospitals and three different states. In QLD, one 
case was reported from QLD hospital 1 in Brisbane (QLD1), one from QLD hospital 2 
(QLD2, also in Brisbane) and two cases were reported from QLD hospital 3 (QLD3) at 
the Gold Coast. In SA, two cases were reported by SA hospital 1 (SA1) and one from 
an endoscopy unit at SA hospital 2 (SA2). Both hospitals are located in Adelaide. The 
single case in VIC was reported by a rural hospital, also from a patient in an endoscopy 
unit (VIC1). 
All eight cases identified during the CDNA-WG investigation received propofol before 
Ralstonia was isolated from their blood sample, although the exact batch numbers of 
propofol used for each case were not certain as hospitals don’t routinely record batch 
numbers when medications are used. The batch numbers shown in Table 4 were the 
most likely batch numbers based on the hospital propofol inventory at the time of 
reporting. Two of the cases received a single bolus dose of propofol (both before 
endoscopy), while the remaining six cases received an infusion involving multiple vials 
of propofol (shown as coloured bars in Figure 2). The time between the first injection of 
propofol (the earliest possible time of infection if the propofol is contaminated) and 
onset of bacteraemia ranged between 2 hours and 23 days. 
All cases were adults (median 54 years, range 28-64), and 62.5% (n=5) were male 
(Table 3). With the exception of the two cases who attended endoscopy clinics, all 
other cases were in hospital for a period of time, and had multiple medical 
interventions.
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A summary of the genotype analysis based on DiversilabTM is shown in Figure 3, and 
follows the same colour coding as in Figure 2. The isolates from the eight cases of 
Ralstonia bacteraemia fall into five different genotypes. No single genotype was found 
in more than one state. The isolates from QLD1 and QLD3 were strains of R. 
mannitolilytica (Cluster 2). The remaining isolate from QLD (QLD2), was a strain of R. 
insidiosa (Singleton 6). Two of the isolates from SA, one from SA1 and one from the 
SA2, were strains of R. mannitolilytica (Cluster 3), while the other isolate from SA1 is a 
strain of R. pickettii (Singleton 2). The isolate from VIC1 is a strain of R. mannitolilytica, 
Singleton 3. The figure includes samples from QLD that were not included in our 
investigation. These samples are greyed out in Part A of the figure. 
The phylogenetic relationship of the isolates in this cluster, based on WGS, is shown in 
Figure 4. Part A of the figure shows the relationship of all isolates, clustering according 
to the species previously identified. The resolution of this tree was too low to resolve 
the relationships of the isolates of R. mannitolilytica, so part B shows a cladogram 
(where branch lengths are not related to genetic distance) of the R. mannitolilytica 
isolates. The QLD isolates form a clade of closely related isolates (Clade 3a) which is 
distinct from the clade of clinical isolates that includes two SA isolates, the VIC1 isolate 
as well as the isolate from the lid of the propofol vial (Clade 3b). These data were not 
available during the Delphi process so assessments were made using only the 
DiversiLabTM data. A comparison of the DiversiLabTM and WGS results is shown in 
Table 5. Although the names given to genetically related groups identified by each 
method are different, most groups contain the same isolates in each method, with the 
exception of the VIC1 isolate, which shows a distinct genotype in the DiversiLabTM 
analysis, but is genetically indistinguishable from the SA R. mannitolilytica isolates in 
WGS. 
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Figure 3: Summary of DiversiLabTM analysis of Ralstonia isolates, adapted from figures 
provided by Hanna Sidjabat, UQCCR. Dendrogram showing relatedness of isolates, as 
determined by DiversiLabTM. Coloured boxes show multiple isolates from a single patient. All 
other samples are one isolate per patient. QLD = Queensland, SA = South Australia, VIC = 
Victoria, TA = tracheal aspirate, NA = not applicable (not samples from patients during 2014), * 
= reference isolates. Samples shown in grey are not a part of the cluster of cases of 
bacteraemia
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Table 5: Comparison of DiversiLabTM and whole genome sequencing (WGS) results for clinical 
isolates and the propofol lid isolate 
TGA ID Hospital Species DiversiLabTM WGS 
340165 QLD2 R. insidiosa Singleton 6 Clade 1 
339549 SA1 R. pickettii Singleton 2 Clade 2 
340180 QLD1 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 2 Clade 3a 
340180 QLD1 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 2 Clade 3a 
340753 QLD3 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 2 Clade 3a 
339761 QLD3 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 2 Clade 3a 
339547 SA1 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 3 Clade 3b 
339552 SA2 R. mannitolilytica Cluster 3 Clade 3b 
339687 VIC R. mannitolilytica Singleton 3 Clade 3b 
NA Propofol R. mannitolilytica Cluster 3 Clade 3b 
Environmental testing 
Limited environmental testing was done within the facilities reporting the cases. Only 
SA1 reported the results of testing, stating that multiple swabs in the ICU were 
negative. As a result, environmental testing focused on the suspected common 
exposure of propofol vials. 
Testing of propofol 
Vials of propofol from the two main implicated batches, in addition to vials from 23 
other batches from the same manufacturer that were distributed in Australia were 
tested for contamination of the propofol solution. Vials from 15 of these batches were 
also tested for external contamination on the flip off lids and outer surface of the rubber 
stoppers. A full list of batch numbers, tests, laboratories and results are shown in 
Appendix 4. All tests for microbial or endotoxin contamination of the propofol solution 
were negative. 
In contrast, both the TGA and SA Pathology isolated a variety of species of bacteria 
from the flip-off lids and/or outer surface of the rubber stoppers of the vials from the 
implicated batches (A030906 and A030907) (Table 6). The TGA also isolated similar 
species of bacteria from other batches tested (Appendix 4). All of the bacterial species 
identified were common environmental or skin contaminants.  SA Pathology also 
isolated R. mannitolilytica from one pool of flip-off lids and swabs of rubber stopper 
outer surfaces taken from five vials of batch A030907. Vials from the same box of 
propofol were retested in an attempt to confirm the isolation of R. mannitolilytica but 
this was not successful. The caveats provided by SA Pathology state that  
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“aseptic techniques were used; however, removal of vial lids was difficult 
and adventitious contamination may have been introduced during the 
sampling and testing processes….isolation of Bacillus species from some 
pools might reflect lack of sporicidal activity of 70% alcohol used for 
disinfection of external surfaces of vial lids”  
In addition, SA Pathology had not been able to use appropriate positive and negative 
controls. The single isolate was sent to UQCCR and SCMB for comparison with the 
patient isolates, and is shown in Figure 3, labelled as “propofol”. This isolate was 
similar to the two R. mannitolilytica isolates from SA in Cluster 3. 
Table 6: Testing results for microbial contamination of flip-off lids and outer surfaces of rubber 
stoppers of vials of propofol from the main implicated batches 
Batch Lab 
Single 
or 
pool 
Number 
positive 
(number 
tested) 
Percent 
positive 
Bacterial species 
identified 
A030906 
TGA Single 12 (80 vials) 15% 
Bacillus, Gram positive 
cocci 
SA 
Pathology 
Pool 
10 (14 pools, 70 
vials) 
71% 
Bacillus (10 pools), 
coagulase-negative 
staphylococci (3 pools) 
A030907 
TGA Single 7 (80 vials) 9% 
Bacillus, Gram positive 
cocci 
SA 
Pathology 
Pool 
15 (18 pools, 90 
vials) 
83% 
Bacillus (10 pools), 
coagulase-negative 
staphylococci (5 pools), 
Ralstonia mannitolilytica (1 
pool) 
Simulated epidemiological studies 
This cluster had only eight cases, all had received propofol produced at the same 
manufacturing site from six different health care providers. Due to these factors, 
discussions in meetings of the CDNA-WG were unable to decide if an analytical study 
would be able to obtain a significant measure of association for administration of 
propofol. In order to assess this, we calculated the ORs for simulations that mimic the 
likely scenario of an analytical study. For both simulated scenarios (case control in 
Table 7 and case cohort in Table 8), significance was attained between 30% propofol 
use among controls (in a case control study where three cases of Ralstonia 
bacteraemia did not receive propofol) and 65% propofol use among controls (in a case 
cohort study where zero cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia did not receive propofol). This 
level of propofol use is not realistic in a clinical setting, as propofol is a commonly used 
anaesthetic. Therefore, a formal case control or case cohort study was not undertaken.
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Distribution chain of propofol 
The propofol brands implicated in this cluster are produced in India. The distribution 
chain is shown in Figure 5. Contamination of the product at the different points marked 
in Figure 5, sections A, B and C, would be expected to result in different patterns of 
contamination. If contamination occurred at any point in section A, the contamination 
could be expected anywhere the product is sent to from the Sponsor’s (the company 
that imports a product into Australia) warehouse (potentially the whole country). 
Contamination in section B would be restricted to only the locations served by the 
central pharmacy or wholesaler in which the contamination occurred, within a single 
state. Contamination in section C would be localised to only the hospital in which the 
contamination occurred.   
 
Figure 5: Distribution of propofol in Australia. Different patterns of contamination are 
represented by A, B and C. If contamination occurred during the part represented by “A”, it 
would be spread across Australia, and the same genotype or genotypes could be expected to 
be found across the country. If contamination occurred in part “B”, it would be restricted to the 
state where it occurred. In part C, contamination would be localised to specific hospitals or 
wards or patients 
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Assessment of causation using Bradford-Hill framework 
In the absence of an analytical study, and in order to make the most of the limited data 
collected in this small cluster, we applied the Bradford-Hill framework to assess 
causation and determine if there was a clear link between use of propofol and 
Ralstonia bacteraemia. A full discussion of aspects of the cluster in relation to each 
criterion is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Assessment of Bradford-Hill framework for causation using evidence for and against 
the implication of propofol as the source of Ralstonia infection. This table is modified and 
updated from a table prepared as a collaborative effort by Mahomed Patel, Anna-Lena Arnold 
and I for reporting to CDNA-WG 
Standard of 
evidence 
suggested by 
Bradford Hill 
Evidence for and against each standard  
(we have stated ‘Uncertain’ where data are lacking or we lack 
appropriate technical knowledge) 
Strength of 
association 
between 
exposure and 
outcome 
For 
x All cases with Ralstonia bacteraemia received propofol. This means 
that there was zero risk if propofol was not administered and the 
RR/OR for association of propofol with Ralstonia bacteraemia is very 
high. 
x Six of the eight cases received a single brand of propofol, one received 
the same brand in addition to a second brand, and one received only 
the second product. The two implicated products are produced at the 
same manufacturing plant. 
Against 
x Any analytical study would have 
o Low power (only eight cases) 
o Multiple confounders (i.e. other opportunities to acquire the 
infection)  
o Multiple potential selection and measurement biases inherent 
in a retrospective study, including undiagnosed Ralstonia 
bacteraemia in people designated as non-cases and recall 
bias about treatments 
x The strength of association with vials from specific propofol batch 
numbers is unknown. The exact batches administered were confirmed 
only for the patient at QLD2 (A031110 and A030504), while batch 
details for the other cases were not certain. In total, at least three and 
up to seven different batches may be implicated (as detailed in Table 
4) 
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Standard of 
evidence 
suggested by 
Bradford Hill 
Evidence for and against each standard  
(we have stated ‘Uncertain’ where data are lacking or we lack 
appropriate technical knowledge) 
x Propofol is frequently used in hospitals. An average of 4800 vials of 
propofol produced by the implicated manufacturer is used every day 
across Australia (personal communication, Vladimir Illievski, AFT 
Pharmaceuticals).  
Consistency of 
our findings 
across different 
populations 
For 
x Multistate nosocomial outbreaks of Ralstonia have been reported from 
contamination of medical products in multiple different studies and 
publications. This shows consistency across studies using different 
methodologies (10, 11, 15, 16, 19). 
x Multistate nosocomial outbreaks as a result of intrinsic contamination 
of propofol have been reported in multiple different studies and 
publications (13, 28, 70). 
x Multistate nosocomial outbreaks caused by polyclonal (≥2 isolates) 
contamination of a medical product have been reported in the literature 
(18, 22, 28).  
Specificity in the 
relationship 
between 
exposure and 
outcome 
For 
x An isolate of Ralstonia from the lid of a vial of propofol (A030907) is 
genetically indistinguishable from clinical isolates from two patients 
managed at the two hospitals in SA (based on DiversiLabTM results).  
x WGS results suggest that the VIC1 isolate is also genetically 
indistinguishable from the isolate from the lid and the clinical isolates in 
the two SA patients. Two of the propofol batch numbers that were 
possibly used in VIC1 correspond to the possible batch numbers used 
in SA. 
Against 
x This isolation of Ralstonia from the lid of propofol vials could not be 
replicated when the rubber stoppers from the same vials were retested 
at a later date at the same laboratory (the flip-off lids were not able to 
be retested).  
x The strains of Ralstonia isolated from eight cases belonged to three 
different species of Ralstonia in four genetically distinct groups, i.e. 
Clade 1 (R. insidiosa), Clade 2 (R. pickettii) and Clades 3a and 3b 
(distinct groups of R. mannitolilytica) as shown in Figure 4.  
o Two clades in SA – Clade 2 and Clade 3b (one isolate of R. 
pickettii and 2 isolates of R. mannitolilytica respectively)   
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Standard of 
evidence 
suggested by 
Bradford Hill 
Evidence for and against each standard  
(we have stated ‘Uncertain’ where data are lacking or we lack 
appropriate technical knowledge) 
o Two clades in QLD – Clade 1 and Clade 3a (R. insidiosa and 
R. mannitolilytica respectively)  
o One clade in VIC – Clade 3b (R. mannitolilytica)  
x The specificity of association by propofol batch number is uncertain. 
There are at least three and up to seven different batches implicated, 
and it is not known which specific batches were used in six cases 
(Table 4). 
x Specificity of type of disease is true if only cases identified according to 
the case definition are considered. 
o The cluster of cases with Clade 3a R. mannitolilytica in QLD 
includes isolates from non-bacteramic patients and isolates 
from patients who did not receive propofol. 
o A later blood isolate from a case of Ralstonia bacteraemia who 
did not receive propofol, also from QLD and also in the same 
genetic cluster strengthens the case against specificity 
o A separate investigation by QLD Health found convincing 
evidence that the cases from QLD1 and QLD3 (including non-
bacteraemic cases) were associated with bottled water either 
consumed or used for cleaning medical equipment. 
Temporality, i.e. 
the outcome 
occurred after 
(and not before) 
exposure 
For 
x All cases received propofol between two hours and 23 days before 
developing clinical infection. 
Uncertain 
x The expected incubation period for Ralstonia bacteraemia is unknown. 
Members of the CDNA-WG (including clinicians) have expressed 
uncertainty about the interval acceptable to be defined as the 
incubation period. In two cases the incubation period was two and five 
hours respectively (both of whom were given propofol immediately 
before an endoscopy) and in two other cases, the incubation periods 
were 23 days each.  
Biological 
gradient, i.e. 
dose-effect 
relationship 
between 
For 
x The very short incubation periods of two and five hours have been 
interpreted as a dose-response relationship because patients being 
prepared for an endoscopy are given large bolus dose/s of propofol.  
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Standard of 
evidence 
suggested by 
Bradford Hill 
Evidence for and against each standard  
(we have stated ‘Uncertain’ where data are lacking or we lack 
appropriate technical knowledge) 
exposure and 
outcome 
Uncertain 
x Is a dose response relationship plausible if only the vial or the cap of 
the vial was contaminated but not the propofol solution? 
Biological 
plausibility of 
the association 
between 
exposure and 
disease 
For 
x Injecting a solution when the needle is contaminated with Ralstonia is 
known to cause bacteraemia. 
x The propofol solution and/or outer surface of the vial stopper could 
have been contaminated if sterilisation procedures at the 
manufacturing facility were inadequate. 
x The propofol packages and vials could have been contaminated during 
transport, distribution and storage of supplies, and in the process of 
drawing up and injecting the propofol solution. 
x The propofol packages and vials could have been contaminated with 
multiple strains of Ralstonia. 
Uncertain 
x The combination of polyclonal contamination of propofol with four 
genetically different strains of Ralstonia, and cases in different states 
having different unique genotypes requires explanation. One 
explanation for this scenario is separate contamination events at state 
level (see Figure 5 for an explanation).  
Coherence i.e. 
cause-effect 
relationship 
does not 
conflict with 
what is known 
of the natural 
history and 
biology of the 
disease 
For 
x Polyclonal Ralstonia contamination of medical solutions as well as of 
medical devices has been reported (18, 22, 28) 
Uncertain 
x There are no reports in the literature of contamination of a medical 
product with four different strains of the same bacteria, and where 
genotypes differ across localities. 
Experimental 
evidence i.e. 
removing 
exposure or lab-
based 
For 
x No new propofol associated cases were reported during the period of 
quarantine. 
x Two additional cases (one from SA and one from VIC) were reported 
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Standard of 
evidence 
suggested by 
Bradford Hill 
Evidence for and against each standard  
(we have stated ‘Uncertain’ where data are lacking or we lack 
appropriate technical knowledge) 
experiments in August 2014, after the propofol had been released from quarantine. 
Against 
x No new cases were reported among those who received propofol 
between 27 April 2014 and the date of quarantine on 2 May 2014 (5 
days).  
x A new case with no reported association with propofol was reported on 
26 June 2014 at QLD3. 
Analogy For 
x Multiple strains (polyclonal) of other bacteria contaminating medical 
solutions and devices have been reported. 
 
Given the limited information available in this investigation, assessing this information 
using the Bradford-Hill framework was unable to provide a definitive answer as to 
whether the propofol was the source of the Ralstonia infections. A consensus opinion 
via expert panel was sought using the Delphi Method. 
Delphi Method 
The Delphi Method is a collaborative process used to build consensus about a topic by 
using opinion and advice from an “Expert Panel”. After simulations showed the difficulty 
of attaining statistical significance in analytical studies, assessment of causality with the 
Bradford-Hill criteria resulted in more questions than answers, and discussions during 
the teleconferences of the Ralstonia working group were unable to achieve any 
conclusions, we decided to adapt the design of the Delphi Method to attempt to 
achieve consensus about the major questions associated with this cluster. Specifically, 
we wanted to discuss: 
1. Were all the cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia reported during April and early May 
2014 associated with the same exposure? 
2. Was that exposure propofol? 
3. Was the propofol liquid or the outer surface of the vial stopper contaminated with 
Ralstonia? 
4. How/where did the propofol vial become contaminated with Ralstonia? 
Figure 6 shows the design of our Delphi and how many participants responded in each 
round. The number of participants responding to the Delphi decreased over the course 
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of the process, from all seven Panel Members providing feedback in Round 1, six 
Panel Members responding in Round 2, and five Panel Members responding in Round 
3. 
 
Figure 6: Summary of Delphi rounds used in this investigation 
A synthesis of the Panel Member’s answers to the questions in Round 2 is provided in 
Table 10, and a summary of the responses provided to scenarios posed in Round 3 is 
provided in Table 11. Little consensus was achieved by Round 3, and discussion with 
the participants suggested that further rounds would not help to resolve the 
disagreements. This was a reflection of the uncertainty evident throughout this 
investigation. Supported by the laboratory testing, the only question on which 
consensus was achieved was whether contamination of propofol occurred in the 
solution or the outside of the vial (specifically the outer surface of the rubber stopper or 
plastic flip off lid). All members of the panel agreed that the propofol solution was 
unlikely to be contaminated, but that the outer surface of the rubber stopper should not 
be considered sterile, and that if the propofol was the source of some or all of the 
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cases, contamination of the outer surface of the rubber stopper may have been the 
route of infection. Answers for the remaining questions varied widely, with some 
participants considering some scenarios “almost certain”, while others considered the 
same scenario “almost certainly not”.  
Table 10: Synthesis of Panel Member’s answers to Round 2 Delphi questions as prepared by 
Mahomed Patel, Anna-Lena Arnold and Fiona May 
Question Facilitators’ synthesis and conclusion 
Q 1: What incubation period could be 
considered consistent with a causal 
association between propofol 
administration and bacteraemia? 
There were many potential confounders that 
could impact on the duration of the incubation 
period. To maintain a high index of suspicion 
that the eight cases may all have been 
associated with the administration of propofol, 
we retained all cases for further consideration in 
this analysis. 
Q 2: If we assumed that propofol 
administration was causally associated 
with bacteraemia, can we conclude that 
pre-existing contamination of the 
propofol solution was unlikely and that 
the vial cap and/or rubber stoppers were 
more likely to have been the source of 
the Ralstonia? 
The vial cap and/or rubber stoppers rather than 
the propofol solution was the more likely source 
of the Ralstonia, but other sources of the 
bacteria cannot be excluded. 
Q 3: How confidently can we exclude 
other possible sources of exposure 
(apart from propofol administration) to 
Ralstonia in some or all the cases?  
Vial cap/rubber stopper was a likely source in 
the SA cases (if supported by WGS), but other 
sources of Ralstonia spp cannot be excluded for 
the other cases. 
Q 4: How likely is it that a patient with 
Ralstonia bacteraemia but without signs 
of a pulmonary infection may have 
transmitted Ralstonia to another patient 
as an explanation of why the same strain 
of Ralstonia was isolated from the 
sputum or tracheal aspirate of a patient 
who never received propofol? 
Environmental contamination is the more likely 
source. 
Q 5a: How should we interpret the finding 
of the Ralstonia isolate from the vial cap, 
noting the caveat from SA Pathology?  
 
Three members consider the isolation of 
Ralstonia from the vial cap to be significant, and 
one of them awaits confirmation with the results 
of the WGS. 
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Question Facilitators’ synthesis and conclusion 
Three members do not appear to be as 
convinced of the clinical significance of the 
finding in making a causal association. 
Q 5b: How should we interpret the TGA 
result of contamination of the internal 
surface of flip-off seal and rubber 
stopper with other bacteria?  
 
Vial cap/rubber stopper were contaminated with 
environmental bacteria. 
The plastic flip-off lid does not maintain sterility 
of the outer surface of the rubber stopper (61, 
62)  
Q 5c: How do these interpretations 
influence your judgement of the 
hypothesis that propofol administration 
is causally associated with Ralstonia 
bacteraemia? 
 
Similar to our summary in 5a: two members 
support the hypothesis, and one of them awaits 
confirmation with the results of the whole 
genome sequence (WGS). Three members 
appear not to be as convinced, and the sixth 
member did not respond to this question. 
Q 6: Can we confidently implicate or 
exclude propofol administration as the 
cause of Ralstonia bacteraemia in some 
or all the cases? 
 
Two members suggest propofol administration is 
a likely cause for the cases in SA, and one of 
them awaits confirmation with the result of WGS. 
One member suggests that contamination of the 
vial at the manufacturing site could explain the 
diverse genotypes - two genotypes in SA cases, 
and one genotype each in the case from QLD2 
and VIC1. 
Q 7: Noting the genetic similarity 
between the R. mannitolilytica isolate 
from the propofol vial cap and the 
clinical isolates from the two cases in 
different SA hospitals, and the distinctive 
R. pickettii isolate from the second 
patient in the same neurosurgical unit of 
SA1, can we conclude that Ralstonia 
bacteraemia in all three cases was 
causally associated with the 
administration of propofol, and that the 
propofol/vial did not become 
contaminated in the respective clinical 
unit? 
One member accepts propofol administration 
was the source, three accept this explanation for 
the two cases with R. mannitolilytica (one of 
them accepts if this was confirmed with WGS).  
Three members are uncertain about the source 
for the case with R. pickettii. One member says 
there is insufficient evidence to implicate 
propofol, although this is possible.  
Three members agree that it is unlikely that 
contamination occurred in the clinical unit. 
Q 8: How confident can we be that the The source of infection in the two bacteraemic 
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Question Facilitators’ synthesis and conclusion 
cases reported in QLD and/or VIC with 
diverse genetic strains were also 
causally associated with the 
administration of propofol because all of 
them had received propofol? 
cases at QLD3, and possibly of the first case 
reported from QLD1 in May was unlikely to be 
propofol. 
Source of the infection in the case from VIC1 is 
uncertain. 
Q 9: Based on the DiversiLab results and 
on the uncertainty of the batch number of 
propofol vials used in SA, VIC and QLD, 
what plausible hypotheses could we 
formulate on the likely site/s of 
contamination? More specifically, how 
likely is it that the propofol/vial may have 
been contaminated (a) at some stage 
before delivery to the clinical unit and (b) 
after arrival in the clinical unit? 
One member considers contamination at the 
factory as “the only plausible explanation” and 
another member considers this acceptable if 
clonality can be confirmed with WGS. One 
member considers contamination occurred at 
some point before propofol was distributed to SA 
hospitals. Two other members are open-minded 
about the locality where the vial may have been 
contaminated. 
Q 10: What is the likelihood the 
propofol/vial was contaminated at the 
site of manufacture? 
 
One member considers this “highly likely” and 
another “most likely”. Three members say there 
is insufficient information to answer the question. 
One member considers this possible “if we 
assume the cases in different states are linked”. 
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Discussion 
Despite using a number of different epidemiological techniques, including case series 
analysis, simulation of analytical studies, assessment of causation and application of 
the Delphi Method, we were unable to conclusively determine the source of this cluster 
of cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia, or even if all cases were associated with a common 
exposure. Although common in the environment (32-34), Ralstonia is not a commonly 
reported cause of bacteraemia, so it was surprising that so many cases were reported 
within a short time. However, it is not often tested for by laboratories as a routine, and 
anecdotal reports suggest that if Ralstonia is isolated in pathology laboratories, and 
there is no obvious reason to associate it with illness, it is often considered “a 
contaminant” (personal communication, Dr Gary Lum).  
The average number of cases reported by PHLN member labs in previous years was a 
mean of four cases per year, suggesting that detection of eight cases in just over a 
month was higher than expected and worthy of further investigation. There were a 
further three reports of Ralstonia bacteraemia in July and August. However, due to 
heightened national awareness, this may be an artefact of pathology laboratories 
actively looking for Ralstonia, and genetic typing has not been provided for two of the 
three. These latter three cases were identified during or after the conclusion of this 
investigation, and were therefore not considered in the analysis as presented to the 
CDNA-WG. 
In response to the detection of Ralstonia in both bacteraemic and non-bacteraemic 
patients at QLD3, QLD Health conducted an independent investigation, and identified 
the source of these cases as a brand of bottled water provided to patients (personal 
communication, Dr Heidi Carroll, QLD Health). An isolate of R. mannitolilytica of the 
same genotype as that from the cases at QLD1 and QLD3 (Clade 3a) was obtained 
from a sample of the water. QLD Health provided the Ralstonia CDNA-WG with 
information about this investigation in June, and has not shared the final outcome of 
the investigation. While this investigation was ongoing concurrently with our 
investigation, a lack of information flow to the working group meant that these cases 
were unnecessarily considered as having the same exposure as the remaining cases 
throughout the entire epidemiological investigation and through the first three rounds of 
the Delphi. On 11 July 2014, Dr Jeanette Young, the Chief Health Officer of QLD, 
released a memorandum to chief executives at QLD Health and Hospital Services, 
recommending against providing bottled water to immunocompromised patients. This 
source of Ralstonia infection is consistent with a previous study that found Ralstonia 
species in bottled water in France (71).  
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The percent similarity obtained with rep-PCR (repetitive sequence-based polymerase 
chain reaction) techniques such as DiversiLabTM should be analogous to the true 
genetic relationships between isolates since differences in rep-PCR patterns are due to 
the underlying genetic sequence (i.e. isolates that are more similar to each other than 
to other isolates by rep-PCR analysis are more genetically similar to each other (67)). 
However, rep-PCR relationships are not directly related to genetic identity. Indeed, a 
comparison of WGS with rep-PCR showed that they result in similar classifications for 
different strains but rep-PCR doesn’t have the same sensitivity as WGS for highly 
similar isolates (67). Similarly, in this study, the phylogenetic tree obtained by WGS 
shares some of the same basic structure as the DiversiLabTM dendrogram but they 
differ as the isolates become increasingly closely genetically related (genotypes of 
species) and the clades identified by WGS are slightly different from those identified by 
DiversiLabTM. DiversiLabTM analysis relies on kits designed for specific bacterial 
genera. As there is no Ralstonia kit, the Pseudomonas kit was used for these samples 
as this was the genus most closely related to Ralstonia. The effect this had on the 
results of the analysis is unknown.  
The most striking difference between the DiversiLabTM dendrogram and the WGS 
phylogenetic analysis is the classification of the VIC1 isolate as being genetically 
indistinguishable from the two SA clinical isolates and lid isolate in Clade 3b.  This 
evidence suggests a common source for the VIC1 isolate and the two SA isolates. The 
isolate from the lid of a vial of propofol suggests propofol as this common source. This 
classification was unknown during the Delphi process, and as such any conclusions 
based on genetic relatedness did not take this into account. The WGS results only 
became available after conclusion of the investigation. Rapid access to WGS data 
would have provided evidence to link the propofol with cases from two states, and may 
have negated the need for a Delphi. The singleton isolate from QLD2 is not closely 
related to any other isolates and may be representative of sporadic Ralstonia infection. 
If the propofol vial was contaminated with Ralstonia, it is impossible to confirm if it 
became contaminated during manufacture, during storage and use in the clinical unit or 
elsewhere along the distribution chain. It is unlikely that contamination occurred in the 
clinical unit since the three genetically related cases in SA and VIC occurred in different 
hospitals. Conversely, if the contamination occurred during manufacture, we would 
expect a much higher incidence of Ralstonia bacteraemia across Australia than 
reported, and we would expect the pattern of distribution of the genotypes to be more 
uniform. If the cases in SA were associated with propofol, the most parsimonious 
explanation is that contamination occurred after the propofol was distributed to SA. 
However, this explanation does not account for the case in VIC. The hospital in which 
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the VIC1 case occurred is in the south west of VIC, and services patients from SA in 
addition to south west VIC. Whether the propofol used in this hospital was sourced 
from the same stocks as the SA hospitals is unknown. 
More than 4800 vials of propofol of the implicated brand are used across Australia daily 
(personal communication, Vladimir Illievski, AFT Pharmaceuticals), and even more 
across the world. If contaminated at the manufacturer, one explanation for the low 
number of reported cases is patchy external contamination of the vials in combination 
with good clinical practice, including swabbing of rubber stoppers and immediate 
administration of propofol after drawing into the syringe, and the low virulence of 
Ralstonia. This theory is supported by evidence that disinfection of rubber stoppers on 
similar styles of vials have shown that this can reduce the rate of contamination of 
needles used to enter the vial (62, 63) and studies examining growth of bacteria in 
contaminated propofol shows that the bacteria grow to detectable levels after a lag of 
approximately 6 hours (43, 72, 73).  
The Delphi method was used in this investigation. It was chosen as a more formal 
method to achieve consensus than the informal discussions in the CDNA-WG 
teleconferences. The anonymous nature of the responses in the Delphi method is a 
useful way of getting the participant’s true opinions about a topic without feeling 
pressured to conform to the prevailing opinion of the group. By conducting the rounds 
by email, we were able to include participants from almost all jurisdictions. However, 
although we were aiming only for consensus and not unanimity, we were not able to 
achieve this after three rounds of questions. By the third round, only five participants 
responded, and not all of the responding participants answered all questions. The 
comment common to all respondents was that there was insufficient information to 
make conclusions about many of the topics under consideration. Not all Delphi 
processes result in consensus, and depending on subject matter, this is not always 
expected or desirable (2, 74). Two major limitations of this study were not knowing that 
QLD were conducting a separate investigation, and not having WGS results until many 
months after the investigation was concluded. Both of these factors would have 
provided valuable information that may have resulted in achieving consensus.  
The expert panel achieved consensus on only one question. They agreed that the 
propofol solution was unlikely to be contaminated, but that the outer surface of the 
rubber stopper should not be considered sterile. Only two studies have assessed the 
protection provided to the rubber stopper by the plastic flip off lid of glass vials. Buckley 
et al. (2004) tested vials of sterile saline for contamination after removal from sterile 
packaging (note that propofol is not shipped in secondary sterile packaging). They 
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found that even though the vials are shipped in sterile packaging, 1% of the vials (1 of 
100 tested) were contaminated with Staphylococcus aureus when swabbed 
immediately after the flip off lid was removed (62). Hilliard et al. (2013) intentionally 
contaminated vials with the flip off lid in place (the lid was disinfected before removal to 
prevent cross contamination from the lid itself). Two out of 12 control vials (not 
immersed in E. coli solution) had contaminated rubber stoppers (specific contaminants 
were not identified), while after immersion in the liquid culture of E. coli with the flip off 
lid in place, contamination was detected on the rubber stoppers of seven out of 10 
vials. None of the vials treated with aerosolised E. coli was contaminated (61). Most 
infection control guidelines for clinicians and health care workers recommend swabbing 
of the rubber stoppers of all vials before inserting the needle (for example (65)). The 
Australian Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Infection in Healthcare only 
advise “adherence to practices that prevent contamination of injection equipment and 
medication” (75). However, surveys of health care workers (76) suggest that this does 
not always happen. Indeed, two previous outbreaks associated with propofol (48, 53) 
identified failure to disinfect the rubber stopper as a potential source of infection.  
This investigation was complicated by its multijurisdictional and multi-organisational 
nature. Although regular teleconferences of the Ralstonia CDNA-WG were held, 
sharing of information was not as open or as efficient as it could have been, and roles 
were not well defined. Through OzFoodNet, Australia has a good system for 
investigating multijurisdictional foodborne outbreaks, but this was the first non-
foodborne point source multijurisdictional outbreak/cluster investigated using some of 
the principles used for OzFoodNet multijurisdictional outbreak investigation. We 
adapted the OzFoodNet methods for this cluster investigation, but a formal guiding 
document for all multijurisdictional outbreaks of all types would be useful. 
Other limitations of this investigation included the restrictive case definition and the 
assumption of an exposure from the beginning of the investigation. Restricting the case 
definition to only bacteraemic cases ignored the non-bacteraemic cases that were at 
the same hospital and of the same genotype as two of the bacteraemic cases. By 
including these cases, we may have recognised the distinct nature of the cases in QLD 
earlier, allowing us to focus the investigation only on the remaining cases. Similarly, 
propofol was the focus of the investigation from very early on, despite there being little 
evidence to implicate it. Indeed, the only “evidence” was an absence of other common 
sources identified between the case at SA2 and the cases at SA1. Despite these 
limitations and the lack of consensus about the resolution to the national outbreak, the 
source of the cases in QLD was elucidated (bottled water) and no new cases of 
Ralstonia bacteraemia have been reported in Australia between August 2014 and 
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August 2015, despite an agreement from CDNA members to continue reporting of 
cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia. CDNA is now considering developing guidelines for 
non-foodborne multijurisdictional investigations. 
Finally, this cluster of cases of Ralstonia bacteraemia with at least two distinct sources 
was unexpected. On the surface, it seems unlikely that there would be two separate 
outbreaks or clusters with different sources of exposure of such a rarely isolated 
species of bacteria. However, the true incidence of nosocomial Ralstonia bacteraemia 
or colonisation is unknown in Australia and elsewhere, suggesting that at least some of 
these cases may have been background, and gone unnoticed in a year without greater 
awareness of Ralstonia. 
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Appendix 1: Targeted literature search and synthesis 
How commonly is contamination on the stoppers of glass medicine vials 
reported in the literature? 
How frequently and how easily are the rubber stoppers of glass vials 
contaminated with the flip off lid in place?  
After a comprehensive search of the literature, only two papers have been identified 
that assessed the frequency of contamination of rubber stoppers of any glass medicine 
vials immediately after the plastic flip-off lid has been removed (1, 2). One of these 
studies also assessed how well the lid protects the rubber stopper from intentional 
contamination with a bacterial solution. No studies have examined where this 
contamination is likely to have occurred along the chain of distribution. However, this is 
likely to be difficult given that environmental contamination is possible at any point from 
exiting the steriliser at the manufacturer to opening the vial in the clinical unit. 
Although the style of packaging of saline vials is different to that of propofol (sterile 
vials are provided in a pack of five in a plastic bag), and indeed the vials are less likely 
to have become contaminated during distribution, Buckley et al (1994) found that 1% (1 
of 100 tested) of rubber stoppers of saline vials were contaminated (with 
Staphylococcus epidermidis) when swabbed immediately after the flip off lid was 
removed (1). 
A study by Hilliard et al (2013) intentionally contaminated the rubber stoppers with 
cultures of E. coli before removing the flip off lid (the lid was disinfected before removal 
to prevent cross contamination from the lid itself). Two out of 12 control vials (not 
immersed in E. coli solution) had contaminated rubber stoppers (specific contaminants 
were not identified), while after immersion in the liquid culture of E. coli with the flip off 
lid in place, contamination was detected on the rubber stoppers of seven out of 10 vials 
Interestingly, none of the vials treated with aerosolised E. coli were contaminated (2).  
Although we could not identify other studies that specifically assessed the frequency of 
contaminated rubber stoppers or the internal surface of the vial cap at the time the flip-
off cap is removed in the clinical setting, the plastic flip off lid should not be expected to 
maintain sterility of the rubber stopper. 
  
 310 
 
Does contamination of the rubber stopper result in contamination of the solution 
or transfer to the needle?  
Only two studies were identified that assessed what would happen on the syringe 
needle if the rubber stopper was contaminated. Simon’s study (1993) was triggered 
when rubber stoppers on multi-dose vaccine vials became contaminated after they 
were stored on benches on which blood cultures were performed. The rubber stoppers 
of a vial of DTP vaccine were intentionally contaminated with a solution of 
Streptococcus. The contents of the vials remained sterile, even after puncturing them 
five times with a needle. However, the needles they used to puncture these rubber 
stoppers did become contaminated (3) suggesting a mechanism for the contamination 
and potential transmission of the infection to patients.  
Another study assessed contamination of a variety of solutions with differing bacterial 
growth potential (including sterile water, heparin and insulin) (4). The sterility of the 
rubber stoppers of these vials were tested by entering the vial without swabbing the 
rubber stopper or intentionally contaminating the rubber stopper with a mix of bacteria 
before the stopper was punctured with a needle. They found low levels of 
contamination of the solution in each of these scenarios (4). They did not test whether 
the needles became contaminated. These studies suggest that if the rubber stopper is 
contaminated, it is possible for this contamination to be transferred to the patient 
through injection of the product either via contamination of the solution or the needle. 
Does disinfection of the stoppers prior to use prevent transfer of contamination 
to the solution or needle? 
Although disinfection of the rubber stopper is considered standard infection control 
practice (as outlined in the Delphi Round 2 document and reported in in reference (5) 
below, few studies have assessed how well alcohol disinfection of rubber stoppers 
remove contamination. Two studies that examined the results of swabbing 
contaminated rubber stoppers with 70% isopropyl alcohol found that this removed the 
contamination from the stopper and resulted in no needles becoming contaminated 
after piercing the stopper (1, 3). 
In contrast, a study comparing routine handling of propofol with strict adherence to the 
manufacturer’s recommendations reported no difference in levels of contamination. 
However, this study only examined use of an infusion pump rather than bolus doses 
(6). 
These studies appear to suggest that standard infection control technique, including 
disinfection of rubber stoppers before piercing with a needle, can protect against 
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environmental contamination of the stopper, and therefore protect against transmission 
of the microbe to the patient. 
Search terms use for this review: 
Vial, stopper, diaphragm, septum, contaminat*, bacteria*, disinfect*, alcohol, isopropyl 
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Appendix 2: Case report form  
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Appendix 3: ProMED post requesting information about 
contamination of propofol 
 
Published Date: 2014-05-22 02:52:11 
Subject: PRO/EDR> Ralstonia pickettii, sepsis - Australia: contaminated propofol, alert  
Archive Number: 20140522.2489978 
RALSTONIA PICKETTII, SEPSIS - AUSTRALIA: CONTAMINATED PROPOFOL, ALERT 
********************************************************************* 
A ProMED-mail post 
http://www.promedmail.org 
ProMED-mail is a program of the 
International Society for Infectious Diseases 
http://www.isid.org 
 
[1] 
Date: Tue 20 May 2014 
From: Claire Behm <si.coordinator@tga.gov.au> [edited] 
 
Increase in cases of ralstonia bacteremia associated with propofol in Australia 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Therapeutic Goods Administration of Australia (TGA) is gathering information about 
cases with ralstonia bacteremia that are potentially related to administration of propofol. 
 
A multijurisdictional investigation has identified 8 cases of ralstonia bacteremia with a 
common link to administration of propofol. The most recent Australian case was reported on 
4 May 2014. 
 
Investigations are ongoing. We look forward to hearing if colleagues in other countries have 
noticed any unusual increase in clinical isolations of ralstonia associated with propofol or 
other medical products or devices. 
 
-- 
Dr Claire Behm 
Signal Investigation - Medicines 
Office of Product Review 
Therapeutic Goods Administration 
Australia 
<si.coordinator@tga.gov.au> 
 
[ProMED-mail thanks Dr Behm for bringing this outbreak to our attention. - Mod.ML] 
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Appendix 4: TGA testing 
Complete testing summary as provided by TGA, available at 
http://www.tga.gov.au/safety/alerts-medicine-provive-mct-lct-
140707.htm#.VBUJPGPiuSo  
Testing results update 
The TGA and three external laboratories have tested samples from 25 batches of 
propofol 1% emulsion for injection supplied to Australia and New Zealand for sterility 
and bacterial endotoxins. Samples from more than 1680 vials from these batches were 
tested for compliance with sterility requirements and a further 97 vials were tested for 
the presence of bacterial endotoxins. All samples passed the criteria for the tests for 
sterility and bacterial endotoxins. 
The external surfaces of injection vials, including the outer surface of the rubber 
stopper and the inner surface of the vial lid, are not required to be sterile and so might 
not be free from microbial contamination. Nevertheless, one laboratory undertook 
testing of the outer surface of rubber stoppers and the inner surface of vial lids and 
reported a positive test result for Ralstonia mannitolilytica from a single test pool of five 
lids and rubber stoppers. As indicated in the Table, the laboratory has placed several 
caveats on this test result. 
To further investigate this finding the TGA and an external laboratory also tested the 
outer surface of rubber stoppers and the inner surface of vial lids for microbial 
contamination. In total, stoppers and lids from 524 vials across 15 batches of propofol 
1% emulsion for injection have been tested. While this additional testing has revealed 
microbial contamination on a low number of lids and rubber stoppers, this 
contamination did not include Ralstonia mannitolilytica. 
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Table A1: Propofol 1 % emulsion for injection - results of microbiological 
testing 
Batch 
number Laboratory
1 
Test for 
Sterility2 
(vials 
tested) 
Test for 
Bacterial 
Endotoxins3 
(vials tested) 
Microbial 
Contamination 
Test4 - vial 
contents 
(vials tested) 
Microbial Contamination 
Test - flip-off lid and 
rubber stopper external 
surfaces5 
No. positive 
for bacterial 
growth/no. 
tested 
Bacteria 
isolated 
A030906 A Pass (20) Pass (1) Pass (3) 12/80 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (80) Pass (4) - - - 
C - - Pass (12) 10/14 
pools 6, 7 
(total 70 
tested) 
Bacillus 
species x 
10 
Coagulase
-negative 
staphyloco
cci x 3 
A030907 A Pass (20) Pass (1) Pass (3) 7/80 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (80) Pass (4) - - - 
C - - Pass (10) 15/18 pools6, 
7 
(total 90 
tested) 
Bacillus 
species x 
10 
Coagulase
-negative 
staphyloco
cci x 5 
Ralstonia 
mannitolily
tica(1 
pool)7 
A031266 A - Pass (1) - - - 
B Pass (61) Pass (4) - - - 
D Pass (20) Pass (1) Pass (20) 0/20 - 
A031267 A - Pass (1) - - - 
B Pass (61) Pass (4) - - - 
D Pass (20) Pass (1) Pass (20) 0/20 - 
A040081 A - Pass (1) - - - 
B Pass (61) Pass (4) - - - 
D Pass (20) Pass (1) Pass (20) 0/20 - 
A031282 B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
E Pass (20) Pass (2) - - - 
A031283 B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
E Pass (20) Pass (2) - - - 
A030021 A - Pass (1) - - - 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A030146 A - Pass (1) - - - 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A030293 A - Pass (1) Pass (3) - - 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A0308728 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
A0308398 B Pass (40) Pass (4) - - - 
A0308408 B Pass (40) Pass (4) - - - 
A0309328 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
A0309368 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
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Batch 
number Laboratory
1 
Test for 
Sterility2 
(vials 
tested) 
Test for 
Bacterial 
Endotoxins3 
(vials tested) 
Microbial 
Contamination 
Test4 - vial 
contents 
(vials tested) 
Microbial Contamination 
Test - flip-off lid and 
rubber stopper external 
surfaces5 
No. positive 
for bacterial 
growth/no. 
tested 
Bacteria 
isolated 
A0309378 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
A031027 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
A031069 B Pass (60) Pass (4) - - - 
A030504 B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031202 B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A030288 B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031203 A - - - 0/5 - 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031210 A - - - 1/5 Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A030085 A - - - 2/20 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031195 A - - - 1/20 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031196 A - - - 2/20 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031256 A - - - 5/18 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A031110 A - - - 4/20 Bacillus 
species, 
Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A020647 A - - - 0/2 - 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A020648 A - - - 1/19 Bacillus 
species 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
A030071 A - - - 1/15 Gram-
positive 
cocci 
B Pass (60) Pass (3) - - - 
Notes 
1. Laboratories 
A. TGA 
B. Manufacturer 
C. External laboratory7 
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D. External laboratory 
E. External laboratory 
2. The Test for Sterility is a standard pharmacopoeial batch release test for an injectable 
medicine. A 'Pass' result means that no microbial contamination was detected in the 
portion of the samples that were tested. Each test uses 20 vials. 
3. The Test for Bacterial Endotoxins is a standard pharmacopoeial batch release test for 
an injectable medicine. A 'Pass' result means that bacterial endotoxins were not 
detected in the portion of the samples that were tested. 
4. The Microbial Contamination Test is not applicable to a sterile medicine. It was 
performed only as an adjunct test to estimate the level of microbial contamination 
should vial contents be contaminated. A 'Pass' result means that no microbial 
contamination was detected in the portion of the samples that were tested. 
5. Flip-off lid and rubber stopper external surface swab tests were performed to assess 
bacterial contamination on these surfaces. 
6. Testing was performed on pooled samples. Each pool contained the flip-off lids and 
swabs from the external surface of rubber stoppers from 5 vials. 
7. Laboratory C has placed the following caveats on their test results: 
o The laboratory holds accreditation for testing of human diagnostic samples and 
for testing of clinical, non-human specimens for investigation of nosocomial 
infections in outbreaks and/or individuals, e.g. gastrointestinal endoscopes, 
vascular catheter tips and transfusion bags. The laboratory has limited 
accreditation for environmental testing 
o Testing of the flip-off lids and external surface of the rubber stoppers included 
testing of the entire flip-off lid after disinfection of the outer surface of the lid 
with 70% alcohol. Aseptic techniques were used; however, removal of vial lids 
was difficult and adventitious contamination might have been introduced during 
the sampling and testing processes, e.g. the detection of coagulase-negative 
staphylococci in some pools. Isolation of Bacillus species from some pools 
might reflect lack of sporicidal activity of 70% alcohol used for disinfection of 
external surfaces of vial lids. 
o Test methods were adapted in-house. Test methods have not been fully 
validated and results should be interpreted accordingly. 
o Ralstonia mannitolilytica was isolated from 1 of 32 pools. Ralstonia species are 
rarely recognised as contaminants in this laboratory. 
 These batches were not supplied to Australia or New Zealand 
 Where a laboratory did not perform a test as part of the investigation the cell 
has a hyphen and is shaded. 
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Prologue 
Study rationale 
On 12 February 2015, OzFoodNet Victoria (VIC) informed the OzFoodNet national 
network that three cases of locally acquired hepatitis A had been notified between 
3 January 2015 and 6 February 2015, all with a single common exposure to a 
popular brand of frozen mixed berries. On 13 February 2015, OzFoodNet New 
South Wales (NSW) reported an additional locally acquired case of hepatitis A with 
onset of illness 30 January 2015. The NSW case also reported consumption of the 
implicated frozen mixed berries. On 14 February 2015, the distributor of the 
implicated frozen mixed berries announced a voluntary consumer level recall of the 
product. On 16 February, the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) 
recommended that OzFoodNet initiate a multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation 
(MJOI) into the cluster of cases of hepatitis A, and on 17 February 2015, the 
National Incident Room (NIR) was activated. OzFoodNet conducted a case control 
study to identify risk factors associated with illness in this outbreak of hepatitis A.  
My role 
I attended the Australian Government Department of Health Rapid Assessment 
Team (RAT) meeting on 16 February 2015, the result of which was the activation 
of the NIR on 17 February 2015. As a result of the activation, I relocated to the NIR 
to assist Ben Polkinghorne (OzFoodNet co-ordinating epidemiologist) as part of the 
“epi team” for the MJOI. My role included scientific literature reviews and 
situational awareness activities, minute taking at the regular teleconferences and 
the Structured Audit, contributing to question time briefs, Situation Reports and 
other advice, and developing and managing the NetEpi database tools used for 
recording of case information and the results of the case control study. 
I also assisted OzFoodNet Queensland (QLD) by conducting telephone interviews 
of controls for the case control study, and analysing the QLD case control data to 
compare with the national data. This chapter will focus on the QLD case control 
sub-study. 
Lessons learned 
Having a planned and organised MJOI response with guidelines to follow made 
this outbreak a completely different experience compared with the Ralstonia 
outbreak. In addition, having a formal debrief (structured audit) at the OzFoodNet 
face-to-face in Adelaide on 24 June 2015 was very informative, and hopefully the 
learnings from the structured audit will be applied to future MJOIs.  
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Most of the comments from the structured audit could be summarised under 
themes of effective communication and knowing roles. Effective communication is 
incredibly important in investigations where multiple people and multiple agencies 
are involved. Similarly, knowing roles makes getting things done much easier as 
people know what is required of them, and tasks don’t get missed or replicated.  
Even though the berries were the suspected source from the beginning of the 
investigation, I learned about the dangers of ill-considered case definitions, 
especially those that include the suspected exposure. In reporting to ministers and 
the media, it was decided early on to report the number of cases that had eaten 
the implicated frozen mixed berries. However, this became problematic as 
secondary and apparently outbreak-related non-berry cases were identified. It got 
very complicated as there were three different case definitions for different 
contexts. 
In general, this outbreak was a real eye-opener about the conflict between what 
information is required for epidemiology and what is required for pol itical 
communications. And then there is what the media reports, which is often 
completely unrelated to the facts! 
As this was the first time I had participated in a case control study, I learned a lot 
from listening to all the discussions about control selection and inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. There are so many options for control selection, and it was great 
to listen to all the experienced OzFoodNet epidemiologists discuss the pros and 
cons of each. I also discovered, somewhat to my surprise, that I  really enjoy 
interviewing people. Most people are lovely and happy to help out. During the 
analysis of the case control data, I also learned how to deal with zero cells to be 
able to calculate an approximate Odds Ratio. 
Public health implications of this work 
Learnings from this MJOI will be added to the MJOI Guidelines document currently 
being drafted. Future MJOIs will benefit from these learnings. 
An unforseen outcome of this outbreak was a greater awareness in the public 
about the origins of foods. Although these berries were labelled as a product of 
China, many people seemed to not be aware that these frozen berries were not a 
product of Australia. Indeed, an indirect outcome of this outbreak will be changes 
to country of origin labelling of food.  
  
 327 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to all the OzFoodNet members involved in this outbreak, especially Ben, 
for his guidance in the NIR, and Russell Stafford (OzFoodNet QLD) for enabling 
me to assist with the QLD interviews and then analyse the Queensland data. 
Thanks also to Anna-Lena Arnold and Lisa McHugh (MAE scholars) for their 
assistance with interviewing. 
Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) core activity 
requirement 
Investigate an acute public health problem or threat. 
A relevant report on the project (no more than 2 pages) to a non-scientific 
audience such as the community or other stakeholder, as a press release or in the 
form of a ministerial brief Appendix 1. 
Abstract 
As part of a national investigation into a 2015 multi-jurisdictional hepatitis A outbreak, a 
case control study was conducted by all jurisdictions that reported cases to identify risk 
factors for illness. Since QLD had more cases than any other jurisdiction, OzFoodNet 
QLD conducted an independent analysis of the data from QLD only. 
Hepatitis A cases included in the case-control study were unambiguously locally 
acquired (i.e. they had not travelled outside Australia during their exposure period), had 
an onset of illness on or after 21 January 2015 and were notified in QLD. Cases were 
excluded if the genotype was not IA or if the sequence was different from the outbreak 
sequence (if known). Controls were cases of Salmonella notified in QLD and were 
matched with cases based on age group and local government area at a ratio of two 
controls to a case. Cases and controls were interviewed by telephone using a 
questionnaire with defined questions. Analysis of data was performed using StataSE 
13. 
Twelve cases meeting the case definition were notified in QLD. The adjusted OR 
calculated by exact logistic regression for consumption of frozen mixed berries was 
41.9 (95% CI 5.5 – ∞, p-value <0.001) providing strong evidence that the implicated 
frozen mixed berries were the source of the outbreak. No other food was associated 
with illness. 
The positive association between consumption of frozen mixed berries and hepatitis A 
infection in QLD cases supports the evidence from national microbiological and 
traceback studies. 
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Introduction 
Most cases of hepatitis A notified in Australia are in returned travellers who acquired 
the illness in an endemic country overseas. In 2012, only 18% of hepatitis A 
notifications in Australia were locally acquired and the majority of these were 
secondary cases who had close contact with primary cases who contracted their 
infection overseas (1). Hepatitis A is transmitted via the faecal-oral route, and in 
developed countries transmission is often via food contaminated by either infectious 
food handlers or in the case of fresh produce, via infectious workers or contamination 
of the water used in production (2). Hepatitis A virus is resistant to many forms of 
decontamination used in food production, such as chlorination, and can survive in 
frozen produce for years (3). The incubation period can vary from 15 to 50 days, but is 
usually 28 to 30 days. Symptoms of hepatitis A include fever, malaise, anorexia, 
nausea, abdominal discomfort, pale faeces and jaundice (2). Severity can vary from a 
mild illness lasting 1 to 2 weeks, to severe disease requiring a liver transplant in rare 
cases. Hospitalisation is common (4). 
In Australia, previous outbreaks of hepatitis A have been associated with poor 
sanitation or food handling and have included imported semi-dried tomatoes (5) and 
locally grown oysters (6), mussels (7) and prawns (8). In recent years, fresh and frozen 
berries have been implicated in outbreaks of hepatitis A worldwide (9-19). 
From 16 February to 27 May 2015, a multi-jurisdictional outbreak investigation 
(MJOI) was conducted to investigate cases of locally acquired hepatitis A. From the 
beginning of the MJOI, a single brand of frozen mixed berries was implicated as the 
likely source of infection due to four cases of locally acquired hepatitis A (three in 
Victoria and one in New South Wales) reporting eating this food product and having no 
other common exposures. By the completion of the voluntary recalls on Monday 16 
February 2015, QLD had notified four cases of hepatitis A that had also reported eating 
the implicated berries. Sequencing of isolates from these four QLD cases returned 
genotype 1A with an identical sequence, providing further evidence to support the 
hypothesis that imported frozen mixed berries were the source of infection for this 
outbreak. This sequence was later shown to be identical to that of other cases from the 
national investigation. OzFoodNet decided to conduct a national case control study to 
provide additional analytical evidence to support implication of the mixed berry product 
and document the magnitude of the association. As QLD reported more outbreak 
associated cases of hepatitis A than any other state, OzFoodNet QLD performed a 
sub-analysis on QLD data only.  
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The aim of this study was to assess the association between hepatitis A and a variety 
of food exposures among cases notified in QLD, and compare associations with the 
results of the national case control study. 
Methods 
Study design 
The case control study was frequency matched on both age group (0-4 years, 5-17 
years, 18-49 years and 50 years and older) and local government area (LGA) or health 
region. Two controls were interviewed per case. 
Case definition and exclusion criteria 
For the purposes of the case control study, a confirmed case was defined as a case of 
hepatitis A (meeting the national case definition (20)) notified in QLD, with a Genotype 
1A virus isolate of an identical genome sequence to the outbreak strain, with onset of 
illness on or after 21 January 2015 and before 14 May 2015, who had not travelled 
outside of Australia during their exposure period.  
Cases of hepatitis A were excluded from the study if they had travelled overseas during 
their exposure period (2 to 7 weeks before onset of symptoms), did not speak English 
or were unable to give coherent answers to questions, were unable to provide a date of 
onset of illness, or had close contact with a person known or suspected to have had 
hepatitis A during the case’s exposure period (possible secondary transmission).  
Permission for cases under 18 years of age was required from a parent or guardian. 
For cases under 15 years of age, the parent or guardian was interviewed; for cases 15 
to 17 years of age, the parent or guardian decided if they or the case were to be 
interviewed. All interviews were conducted via telephone. 
Control selection and exclusion criteria 
Two controls were selected for each case. Controls were sourced from notified cases 
of Salmonella infection in QLD with a notification date in the two weeks prior to onset of 
the hepatitis A case to which the control was matched. Controls were selected to 
frequency match with cases based on age group (0-4 years, 5-17 years, 18-49 years 
and 50 years and older) and local government area (LGA) or health region.  
Controls were excluded from the study if they had travelled overseas during the two 
months prior to infection, did not speak English or were unable to give coherent 
answers to questions, had close contact with a person known or suspected to have had 
hepatitis A during the control’s exposure period, had past infection or symptoms 
consistent with hepatitis A, had received vaccination for hepatitis A, had received 
normal human immunoglobulin (NHIG) during the two months prior to illness, lived in a 
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country or region with high or very high hepatitis A endemicity for a year or more during 
the first five years of their life, or were not contactable by telephone. Controls who were 
part of a Salmonella outbreak investigation were excluded. 
A list of possible controls was randomised and contact via telephone was attempted. 
All controls were called four times on at least two different days. At least two calls were 
made before 9am or after 5pm on weekdays, or on a weekend. No message was left if 
an answering machine picked up the call. If no contact was made after four calls, the 
next person in the list was contacted. Permission for contacts under 18 years of age 
was required from a parent or guardian. For those under 15 years of age, the parent or 
guardian was interviewed; for those 15 to 17 years of age, the parent or guardian 
decided if they or the control were to be interviewed. 
Case control study and data analysis 
The questionnaire used for cases and controls is shown in Appendix 2 (case) and 
Appendix 3 (control). Cases were interviewed as soon as possible after notification and 
interviews with controls were conducted in March and April 2015. Case interviews 
included the national hepatitis A questionnaire in addition to the case control 
questionnaire. After completing the interview for the hepatitis A case control study, 
controls were asked if they would like to answer additional questions specific for their 
Salmonella illness. Responses to questions were entered onto hard copy 
questionnaires and were later entered into the NetEpi hepatitis A case control 
questionnaire. NetEpi is a password protected online outbreak management database 
managed by the Australian Government Department of Health. All QLD data was 
downloaded to a comma separated values (.csv) file from NetEpi for analysis. 
All data cleaning, recoding and analyses were performed using the statistical package 
StataSE 13. The free text descriptive variables entered after an answer of “other” were 
visually examined for common responses. New variables to accommodate those 
responses were created with responses of yes, no or unknown. These new variables 
included a symptom category of “headache”, a food category of “fish” and a package 
size and brand of “implicated frozen mixed berries 1kg”. 
For ease of interviewing, sub-questions after a response of “no” for having eaten a 
particular food type (for example any seafood or any berries) were skipped during the 
interview, resulting in missing responses to the specific foods in the category (such as 
fish after any seafood, or strawberries after any berries). If a recorded response was no 
to the overall category, the responses for the specific foods within the category were 
changed from missing to no, allowing a more accurate analysis of the individual 
exposures. All other missing data was excluded from the analysis.  
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A new composite variable was created to show those who ate any berry product. This 
variable had yes/no/unknown categories. A yes for this exposure category included any 
person who reported eating any fresh berry, frozen berry or berry containing food 
(dessert or drink). 
To assess potential recall bias due to awareness of the national voluntary recall of the 
implicated frozen mixed berries, a series of questions were asked to both cases and 
controls, including whether they were aware of the food recall, and if they remembered 
the brands and types of berries recalled. These questions were included at the end of 
the questionnaire to avoid further bias of the exposure data. 
The statistical significance of differences in the demographic variables (p-values) was 
calculated using Fisher’s Exact method. Odds ratios (ORs) and associated 95% 
confidence intervals (CIs) and p-values were calculated for all exposures. ORs were 
calculated both with and without controlling for matching variables (age group and 
LGA) where possible to adjust for the matched analysis. Fisher’s Exact method was 
used to calculate p-values where at least one value was below 5. Chi-square was used 
to calculate all other p-values. Associations were considered significant when the CI 
did not include 1 and the p-value was less than 0.05. To obtain an estimated OR for 
categories where one or more values were zero, a value of one was added to each cell 
of the two by two table. In addition, the “exlogistic” command in StataSE13 was used to 
conduct an exact logistic regression, providing an OR even when one or more values 
are zero. 
Results 
Descriptive epidemiology 
A total of 12 cases of hepatitis A that were notified in QLD met the case definition. 
Onset of illness ranged from 22 January 2015 to 31 March 2015 (Figure 1). Case ages 
ranged from 13 years to 54 years, with a median of 31 years, and ten cases (83%) 
were male. Cases were reported from Brisbane (seven cases, 58%), Gold Coast (three 
cases, 25%), North QLD (one case, 8%) and Central QLD (one case, 8%). 
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Figure 1: Epidemiological curve of outbreak cases of hepatitis A in QLD by week of symptom 
onset, 2015 
Case control study 
Although the study design included matching on age group and LGA, sufficient controls 
were unable to be matched to two cases; one child from the Gold Coast and one adult 
from North QLD. As matching on sex was not done, and the demographics of this 
hepatitis A outbreak skewed towards males, the ratio of males to females in the 
controls was different to cases. However, this difference was not significant (Table 1).  
Table 1: Comparison of the demographics of cases of hepatitis A in QLD notified between 21 
January 2015 and 14 May 2015 with frequency matched controls* 
Case (n=12) Control (n=22) p-value 
Gender 
Male 10 (83%) 10 (45%) 
0.07 
Female 2 (17%) 12 (55%) 
Age group* 
5-17 years 3 (25%) 5 (23%) 
1.0 18-49 years 7 (58%) 13 (59%) 
50+ years 2 (17%) 4 (18%) 
LGA* 
Brisbane 7 (58%) 14 (64%) 
1.0 
Cairns 1 (8%) 1 (5%) 
Central QLD 1 (8%) 2 (9%) 
Gold Coast 3 (25%) 5 (23%) 
* Controls were frequency matched (2:1) to cases based on age group and LGA 
In the univariable analysis, the only foods that showed a significant association with 
illness were those involving frozen berries (Table 2 and Table 3). All cases consumed 
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frozen mixed berries and although the OR and upper bound of the 95% CI were unable 
to be calculated, the lower bound for the association was 10.5 with a p-value of less 
than 0.001 in unmatched analysis. The estimated OR for frozen mixed berries was 46.8 
(95% CI 4.4 – 2094.2, p-value <0.001). The OR calculated by exact logistic regression 
was 53.6 (95% CI 7.1 – ∞, p-value <0.001). When adjusted for the gender and age 
group, the OR for consumption of frozen mixed berries was 41.9 (95% CI 5.5 – ∞, p-
value <0.001). The adjusted exact OR for Brand 1 (the implicated brand) of frozen 
mixed berries was 48.1 (95% CI 6.8 – ∞, p-value <0.001). A similar estimation for 
Brand 2 frozen mixed berries resulted in an OR of 6.7 (95% CI 0.7 – ∞, p-value 0.01). 
Multivariable analyses on multiple food exposures were not performed because all 
exposures with statistically significant increased ORs were subcategories of the same 
food and were therefore collinear.  
All cases and controls were aware of the recall, and only one case (8%) and eight 
controls (or their guardians; 36%) were unable to remember the specific brand. 
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Discussion 
All cases of hepatitis A in QLD that met the case definition for inclusion in the case 
control study and 29% of controls consumed frozen mixed berries during their potential 
exposure period. The association between illness and consumption of frozen mixed 
berries was significant with an OR of 41.9, meaning that the odds of developing a 
hepatitis A infection was 41.9 times higher in people who had consumed frozen mixed 
berries (of any brand) than those who had not. A similar calculation for the specific 
exposure of Brand 1 frozen mixed berries resulted in an estimated OR of 48.1. These 
values are comparable to the ORs calculated in the national analysis, 48.7 (95% CI 6.2 
– 2073, p-value <0.001) and 440 (95% CI 31.7 – 18531, p-value <0.001) respectively 
(M. Easton, unpublished data). These results support the microbiological and case 
series evidence (all cases ate the implicated brand of frozen mixed berries) implicating 
Brand 1 frozen mixed berries as the source of this outbreak in Queensland. Berries are 
a biologically plausible exposure for hepatitis A, as a number of berry-related hepatitis 
A outbreaks have been reported worldwide (9-19) and freezing has no impact on 
virulence of hepatitis A virus (3).  
The questionnaire used in this study included a range of food products that have been 
associated with hepatitis A outbreaks in the past, including seafood (6, 8), berries (9-
19) and semi-dried tomatoes (5). However, the potential for experimenter bias was 
unavoidable as many questions were focused on berries and berry products, making it 
obvious to interviewees that berries were of interest. Given the wide press coverage of 
this outbreak from the time the Australian distributor recalled the implicated frozen 
mixed berries on 14 February 2015, exposure suspicion bias (21) affecting the memory 
recall of consumption of berries was unavoidable for both cases and controls. Indeed, 
all cases and controls (or their guardians) in the QLD study were aware of the food 
recall. Given this, cases would be more likely to recall eating berries, while controls 
would be less likely to recall eating berries, biasing the association away from the null. 
The extent of this measurement bias is unknown.  
Controls for this study were selected from among those who had been diagnosed with 
Salmonella in the two weeks prior to notification of the hepatitis A case to which they 
were matched. This source for selection was chosen after long discussions among the 
members of OzFoodNet. Although Salmonella controls are convenient, and already 
have a valid phone number available through the pathology report (in most cases), 
people who have been sick with Salmonella may not be representative of the true 
population at risk of developing hepatitis A in this outbreak due to eating patterns 
associated with subsequent Salmonella infection which is most commonly egg 
associated in Australia (22) as opposed to hepatitis A which is associated with 
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international travel, seafood and berries. This bias was mitigated by only including non-
outbreak cases so infection was more likely attributable to a habitually eaten food 
rather than a one-off restaurant meal. Additionally, controls who have recently been 
diagnosed with gastroenteritis meet the requirement for control selection from the same 
study base as the cases in that they would have been diagnosed and notified to the 
national notifiable diseases surveillance system as cases if they had hepatitis A, as 
they have a similar health seeking behaviour as cases. This method of control selection 
should mitigate selection bias (23).  
In order for the period of food exposure for controls to approximately match that of the 
case, controls were selected from those within the same age group and LGA who were 
notified in a two-week period before the matching case. This time period was used so 
that the period of food consumption among the controls was similar to the period of 
food consumption for the case, therefore matching the same period of risk. The period 
of food consumption surveyed was five weeks. Since interviews were conducted during 
late March and early April, and some cases and controls were asked for food histories 
from early December 2014, four months earlier, recall bias was considered to be an 
issue. However, as both cases and controls were sick after the period of exposure, 
both groups will have greater recall of the foods eaten prior to their illness than people 
who have not recently been ill, particularly for foods they think were responsible for 
their illness so the bias should be non-differential. 
An advantage of selecting controls from among people who have been ill with a 
different disease is that they were more willing to participate than people who have not 
been ill, and were particularly eager to talk about their illness. The information collected 
about their Salmonella illness provides some insight into sporadic Salmonella and has 
been recorded in NetEpi. Similarly, the advantage of a high profile outbreak such as 
this is that participants are more likely to understand why the study is being done. 
A possible source of measurement bias in this study was interviewer bias. Cases were 
interviewed by staff from their local public health unit, and controls were interviewed by 
three MAE students. However, the questionnaire was designed with defined wording of 
questions so interviewers were less likely to ask leading questions.  
A limitation of this study was the difficulty conducting matched analysis due to low 
numbers of participants in the study combined with universal exposure of all cases to 
the implicated frozen mixed berries. Analysing data without adjusting for matching in a 
frequency matched case control study will bias the OR towards the null (24). However, 
the unmatched association between the implicated frozen mixed berries and illness is 
large; suggesting that even with confounders unaccounted for the berries would still be 
associated with illness.  
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In conclusion, this case control study was able to identify a significant association 
between illness and consumption of the implicated frozen mixed berries as the likely 
source of hepatitis A infection for the Queensland sub-analysis for the multi-
jurisdictional outbreak in the first half of 2015. 
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Appendix 1: Lay summary for OzFoodNet website 
Outbreak of hepatitis A associated with imported mixed berries, 
Australia 2015 
OzFoodNet is a national network of people who investigate foodborne disease 
outbreaks (epidemiologists). On 12 February 2015, OzFoodNet in Victoria reported 
that three people sick with locally acquired hepatitis A had all eaten the same brand of 
imported frozen mixed berries in the months before they became ill. These people also 
reported no other common exposure that could explain the source of their infection. 
Hepatitis A is a gastrointestinal illness caused by exposure to food or drink 
contaminated with the hepatitis A virus, but it takes 15 to 50 days after consumption of 
the contaminated food before people become sick. Transmission from person to 
person can also occur. Common symptoms of hepatitis A include fever, nausea, 
abdominal discomfort and jaundice (yellowing of the eyes and skin). The national 
guidelines that health departments follow to investigate and to respond to people with 
hepatitis A infections can be found here: 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/cdna-song-hepa.htm 
Since the successful introduction of the hepatitis A vaccine in the late 1990s, it is very 
rare to become infected with hepatitis A in Australia. For further information on 
vaccination for hepatitis A see: 
http://www.immunise.health.gov.au/internet/immunise/publishing.nsf/Content/Handboo
k10-home~handbook10part4~handbook10-4-4 
Most Australian residents with hepatitis A were infected during recent overseas travel. 
Previous foodborne hepatitis A outbreaks in Australia have been linked to 
contaminated foods, including seafood and semi-dried tomatoes. All people reported to 
health departments in Australia with hepatitis A are interviewed about risk factors 
including overseas travel and about specific foods they may have eaten that were 
identified as the cause of previous outbreaks. Consumption of berries was recently 
added to the list of foods asked about at these interviews as they have been identified 
as a cause of several hepatitis A outbreaks overseas. It is very unusual for three 
people with hepatitis A who hadn’t been overseas to report eating the same brand of 
frozen mixed berries before they became sick. This made investigators suspect that 
berries were the cause of their infection.  
On 13 February 2015, OzFoodNet epidemiologists in New South Wales reported that a 
person with hepatitis A had also eaten the implicated frozen mixed berries.  
The Victorian Department of Health and Human Services then recommended that a 
consumer level recall of the berries should take place, and on 14 February 2015 the 
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parent company began a nationwide voluntary recall of the frozen mixed berries and 
several related products that were packed in the same factories. 
As cases had now been identified in two different states, OzFoodNet commenced a 
nationwide epidemiological investigation, known as a multi-jurisdictional outbreak 
investigation or MJOI. Over the next few months, several different types of 
investigations were undertaken to identify the cause of the increase in people 
diagnosed with hepatitis A, including:  
x Testing faeces (poo) specimens in a pathology laboratory is the way most 
gastrointestinal diseases including hepatitis A are diagnosed. Faeces 
specimens were provided by the people with hepatitis A, and hepatitis A virus 
was detected in the specimens. Public health reference laboratories tested the 
genetic material of the hepatitis virus that was found and it became quickly 
apparent that these hepatitis A virus specimens were indistinguishable. This 
means that it is highly likely that the cause of illness in all of the people 
diagnosed with hepatitis A came from the same source. 
x If they hadn’t already, OzFoodNet investigators in all states and territories re-
interviewed people diagnosed with hepatitis A that had been reported in the 
months before the recall to find out if they had eaten berries, even if they had 
been overseas. These people had been previously interviewed about other 
foods consumed and overseas travel during the period two to seven weeks 
before their illness.  
x An open package of the implicated frozen mixed berries that was in the freezer 
of one of the outbreak cases was obtained, and hepatitis A virus was detected 
in the berries. The genetic material of this virus was indistinguishable to that 
found in the faeces of someone sick in the outbreak. This means that it is likely 
that the illness in the people was from the contaminated product. 
x Hepatitis A virus was also detected in an unopened bag of the implicated frozen 
mixed berries that had been recalled. Unfortunately, there was not enough virus 
to determine if this virus was the same as the viruses from the people with 
hepatitis A. As this was an unopened package of berries, the virus was present 
in the berries before the package was sealed and was more evidence that 
contaminated berries were the cause of the outbreak. Food products should 
have no hepatitis A in them. 
x OzFoodNet performed a case control study which measures the risk associated 
with eating specific foods and getting infected with hepatitis A virus. In this case 
control study, the same series of questions about foods eaten were asked to 
both cases (people diagnosed with hepatitis A) and controls (people without 
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hepatitis A). The responses were compared to identify foods that were more 
commonly eaten by people with hepatitis A. This study showed that the odds of 
contracting a hepatitis A infection was more than 400 times higher in people 
who ate the implicated frozen mixed berries than for people who did not eat 
them. No associations were identified between illness and any other foods.  
x When the MJOI ended on 27 May 2015, a total of 33 people across six states 
and territories had the outbreak strain of hepatitis A. Of those, 28 people had 
eaten the implicated frozen mixed berries in the 15-50 days before they became 
ill. Of the seven people who couldn’t remember eating the frozen mixed berries, 
three people probably got their infection from a person who ate the frozen 
mixed berries. The source of illness for the remaining four people was unable to 
be determined. 
The combination of these investigations provides compelling evidence that the 
implicated frozen mixed berries were the source of this outbreak of hepatitis A. The 
contamination occurred during growing, harvesting or packaging of the berries most 
likely due to a breakdown in procedure. It is likely that the rapid recall of this product 
prevented more people becoming infected. 
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Appendix 2: Case questionnaire 
Hepatitis A Case Control Study 
Case questionnaire – to be completed for cases who are still eligible for the case control study after 
completing sections 1-6 of the standard Hep A questionnaire. 
Jurisdictional Case number:  ______________________  Date of case interview: ___ / ___ /____            
 
Age  ____       Sex:  M  /  F   
                                                           
Local Government Area/PHU: ____________                 Post Code: _______ 
 
Name and telephone details……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Exclusion Criteria Summary– Please tick if Excluded 
  
  Unable to speak English or answer questions appropriately 
  Travelled overseas in the exposure period 
  Spent > 1 year in the first 5 years of life in a country on Appendix 1 
  Close contact with a person known or suspected to have Hepatitis A 
  Unable to provide date of onset of illness or jaundice  
 
Case:       Eligible  Ineligible  
 
Eligibility questions – Please note even if the case is ineligible for the CC study, please complete 
this questionnaire as the food questions have been removed from the standard questionnaire 
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1. What was the date first symptom? (Transcribe from previous questionnaire if already interviewed)
                ___ / ___ / ______ 
 
Exposure period:     ___ / ___ / ______    to    ___ / ___ / _______ 
(Calculate 15 – 50 days prior to answer to question 1) 
 
 
2. Have you travelled overseas during the exposure period (as above)? 
 
   Yes   Travelled from :  ___ / ___ / ______  to  ___ / ___ / ______   
    Country/ies visited:  ______________________________ 
  No 
 Unknown 
3. Have you had household/close contact with any persons known or suspected to have Hepatitis A during 
your exposure period (as above)? 
 Yes  Æ  name of person and relationship to case…………………………………………. 
 No  
 Unknown 
 
4. Did you live in another country other than Australia for more than 1 year in the first 5 years of your life?  
  No   Yes, country:  ______________________________  
SECTION 2: FOOD EXPOSURES 
I would like to ask you some questions relating to the foods you ate during the period of time before you 
became unwell. This time period is: 
 
 From ____/_____/___    to      ____/_____/____ 
 
As this is a long period of time you may like to get a calendar or diary to help you remember what foods you 
may have been eating at this time. 
 
1. During this time did you eat any type of fresh seafood? 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q8 
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 Unknown 
2. Did you consume mussels? 
 Yes   Æ  Were the mussels raw?    Yes  No  Unknown  
 No   
 Unknown 
3. Did you consume crab? 
 
 Yes    No   Unknown 
4. Did you consume prawns (purchased cooked)?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
5. Did you consume prawns (purchased raw)?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
6. Did you consume oysters? 
 Yes Æ  Were the oysters raw?    Yes  No  Unknown  
 No   
 Unknown 
7. Did you consume any other seafood?  
 Yes  Please specify the type …………………………………………….. 
 No   
 Unknown 
 
8. Did you consume sushi/sashimi?  
 Yes    
 No   
 Unknown 
 
9. Did you consume smoked fish/seafood of any type?  
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q12 
 Unknown 
 
10. Did you consume smoked salmon?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
11. Did you consume other smoked fish/seafood?  
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 Yes  Please specify the type ……………………………….. 
 No   
 Unknown 
12. During this period did you consume fresh berries of any type (eaten at home and/or in a restaurant 
or cafe)?  
 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q18  
 Unknown 
13. Did you consume fresh strawberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
14. Did you consume fresh blue berries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
15. Did you consume fresh blackberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
16. Did you consume fresh raspberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
17. Did you consume any other fresh berries?  
 Yes  Please specify the type ……………………………………….. 
 No   
 Unknown 
18. Did you consume at home, any commercially packaged frozen berries of any type (this includes 
frozen berries which you may have added to a drink such as a smoothie or milkshake)?   
 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q39 
 Unknown 
19. Did you consume frozen mixed berries?  
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 23  
 Unknown 
 
20. Was the brand of these frozen mixed berries: 
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Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown  
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size………………………………………………………………… 
21. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen mixed berries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
22. Did you consume these frozen mixed berries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No        Unknown 
 
23. Did you consume frozen strawberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries)  
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 27  
 Unknown 
24. Was the brand of these frozen strawberries: 
Coles ?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Nannas ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet ?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lea ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Other ?    Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify 
brand…….. 
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Please specify packet 
size……………………………………………………………………………… 
25. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen strawberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
26. Did you consume these frozen strawberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?   
 Yes  No  Unknown 
27. Did you consume frozen blueberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries)   
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 31  
 Unknown 
28. Was the brand of these frozen blueberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size……………………………………………………………… 
29. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen blueberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
 349 
 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
30. Did you consume these frozen blueberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No  Unknown 
  
31. Did you consume frozen blackberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 35  
 Unknown 
32. Was the brand of these frozen blackberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size………………………………………………………………… 
33. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen blackberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily ?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
34. Did you consume these frozen blackberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No               Unknown 
 
35. Did you consume frozen raspberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
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 No Æ proceed to Q 39  
 Unknown 
36. Was the brand of these frozen raspberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size………………………………………………………………… 
37. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen raspberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily ?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
 
38. Did you consume these frozen raspberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No               Unknown 
 
 
39. Is there a child/children d 5 years of age living in the household?   
 Yes (if more than one child d5 years, please note here ………………………….) 
 No   Æ proceed to Q43 
 Unknown 
 
40. Did this child/any of these children consume any frozen berries at any time in the 
three months prior to your symptoms?   
 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q44 
 Unknown 
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41. What type of frozen berry would they have consumed? 
Mixed berries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Strawberries?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Blueberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Blackberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Raspberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
 
42. Would this child/these children have consumed the frozen berries raw (eg without 
cooking them in a sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No               Unknown 
 
43. Was the brand of these frozen berries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size………………………………………………………………… 
44. Did you consume any drinks such as smoothies or milk shakes or yoghurt prepared outside the 
home (such as in a juice bar or a café) where any type of  berry was an ingredient?  
 Yes   Æ provide details of the drink consumed ………………………………………… 
 No  
 Unknown 
 
 
 
 
45. Did you consume any uncooked desserts such as mousse or desserts with an uncooked topping 
(such as pavlova) prepared outside the home (eg in a café or restaurant) where any type of berry 
was an ingredient?  
 Yes  Æ provide details of the dessert consumed 
…………………………………………… 
 No  
Interviewer note:  If case answered yes please specify the name and 
address of premises. 
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 Unknown 
 
 
 
 
 
46. During this time did you eat any type of fresh tomatoes? 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q48 
 Unknown 
 
 
47. Were these tomatoes: 
Cherry tomatoes?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Roma tomatoes?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Regular round?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?    Yes  No  Unknown - Please specify the type ………………… 
 
48. During this time did you eat any type of dried or semi dried tomatoes? 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q50 
 Unknown 
 
49. Were these dried tomatoes: 
Sun dried ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Semi dried ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Other ?   Yes  No  Unknown 
 
50. During this time did you eat any type of lettuce? 
 Yes    
 No  
 Unknown 
51. During this time did you eat any spring onions? 
 Yes    
 No  
Interviewer note:  If case answered yes please specify the name and 
address of premises. 
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 Unknown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last part of this section is to ask you a few questions about the current national recall of frozen berries: 
Are you aware of the 
recent national recall 
of frozen berries?  
 Yes  
 No 
 Unsure 
 
Do you remember the 
brands of frozen 
berries that were 
included in the 
recall?  
 Yes Æ Please specify... 
 No 
 Unsure 
 
Do you remember 
what type of berries 
were included in the 
recall? 
1. Blackberries  
2. Blueberries 
3. Strawberries 
4. Raspberries 
5. Mixed berries 
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Where did you first 
learn about the recall 
of berries? 
1. Newspaper 
2. Website 
3. Facebook 
4. Twitter 
5. Television 
6. Radio 
7. Company web 
8. Friends 
9. Other 
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure    Please 
Specify…………. 
 
Interviewer note:  If case answered yes to consuming any frozen 
berries please ask whether they have any frozen berries left at home that 
could be collected for testing. 
 
Details 
here
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Continue with sections 7b -10 of the standard Hep A questionnaire if not previously interviewed or thank 
the case for their time if questionnaire already complete. 
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Appendix 3: Control questionnaire 
Hepatitis A Case Control Study 
Control questionnaire   
 
Corresponding Jurisdictional Case number:  _____________  Date of case interview: ___ / ___ /____          
 
Control ID ___________________________                            Date control notified ___ / ___ /____            
 
Control Age  ____       Control sex:  M  /  F   
                                                           
Local Government Area/PHU: ____________                 Post Code: _______ 
 
Date of control interview: ___ / ___ /______ 
 
Name and telephone contact for control……………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Exclusion Criteria Summary– Please tick if Excluded 
  
  Previous diagnosis of Hepatitis A 
  Has received two vaccinations against Hepatitis A 
  Unable to speak English or answer questions appropriately 
  Travelled overseas in the 2 months prior to notification 
  Spent > 1 year in the first 5 years of life in a country which is on the exclusion list 
  Close contact with a person known or suspected to have Hepatitis A 
 
 
Control:       Eligible  Ineligible 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Preamble 
The health department has been notified (by doctor/laboratory) that you have had a recent Salmonella 
infection and visited Dr .................. around ....../....../.......(specimen date). At the present time, your type of 
Salmonella is not part of any recognised outbreak that the health department is investigating. We would 
like to speak to you about your Salmonella infection but firstly we would like you to assist us with another 
outbreak due to hepatitis A.  We are asking people who have not had hepatitis A to participate in this study 
so that we can compare them with people who have had hepatitis A. This study is being conducted under 
the “jurisdictional” health act.  
We would like to ask you questions about some foods you have may have eaten in the 5 weeks before the 
onset of your Salmonella illness. The questions should take about 15 minutes and you can stop at any 
time if you want to. Your participation is voluntary and all responses are totally confidential. There will be 
no identifying information kept on you for this study.  
Do you agree to participate? 
 
Do you have the time right now to answer these questions? 
If NO, arrange an alternative time to phone back to conduct the interview:  Date    /    /    Time_______ 
If YES, continue: 
Eligibility questions: 
1.   Did you live in another country other than Australia for more than 1 year in the first 5 years of 
your life? 
   No   Yes , Country:  ______________________________ 
Interviewer note:  If control lived in a country on appendix 1 of the protocol list do 
not complete remainder of this questionnaire – cease interview here. 
2. Have you travelled overseas during the 2 months prior to __/__/__(control’s notification date)? 
   Yes   No    Unknown  
Interviewer note:  If control answers yes do not complete remainder of this 
questionnaire – cease interview here 
3. Have you previously been diagnosed by a doctor as having Hepatitis A or do you recall having 
symptoms of jaundice (yellow skin/eyes)? 
   Yes   No    Unknown 
Verbal consent given for interview                                       Yes   F                    No  
F
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Interviewer note:  If control answers yes do not complete the remainder of this 
questionnaire – cease interview here 
4. Have you received two vaccinations for Hepatitis A in the past? Vaccinations for Hepatitis A are called 
Havrix or Twinrix and are not part of the normal vaccination program. 
   Yes   No    Unknown 
Interviewer note:  If control answers yes do not complete the remainder of this 
questionnaire – cease interview here 
5. Have you received NHIG in the 2 months prior to the onset of your Salmonella illness.  
 Yes   No    Unknown 
Interviewer note:  If control answers yes do not complete the remainder of this 
questionnaire – cease interview here 
6. Have you had household/close contact with any persons known or suspected to have Hepatitis A 
during the period __/__/__ to __/__/__  
   Yes   No  Unknown 
Interviewer note:  If control answers yes do not complete the remainder of this 
questionnaire - cease interview here 
 
FOOD EXPOSURES 
I would like to ask you some questions relating to the foods you ate during the 5 week period before your 
Salmonella illness. So, before I commence the questionnaire, I need to ask  the onset date of your 
Salmonella illness so we can calculate this 5 week period.  
 
What was the onset date of your diarrhoea?       ___/___/___ 
 
So, the 5 week time period I will be asking you about is from ___/___/___ to ___/___/___ (onset date of 
diarrhoea).  
 
As this is a long period of time you may like to get a calendar or diary to help you remember what foods you 
may have been eating at this time. 
 
52. During this time did you eat any type of fresh seafood ? 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q8 
 Unknown 
53. Did you consume mussels? 
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 Yes  Æ Were the mussels raw?    Yes  No 
 Unknown  
 No   
 Unknown 
54. Did you consume crab? 
 
 Yes    No   Unknown 
55. Did you consume prawns (purchased cooked)?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
56. Did you consume prawns (purchased raw)?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
57. Did you consume oysters? 
 Yes  Æ  Were the oysters raw?    Yes  No  Unknown  
 No   
 Unknown 
58. Did you consume any other seafood?  
 Yes  Please specify the type …………………………………………….. 
 No   
 Unknown 
59. Did you consume sushi/sashimi?  
 Yes    
 No   
 Unknown 
 
60. Did you consume smoked fish/seafood of any type?  
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q12 
 Unknown 
61. Did you consume smoked salmon?  
 Yes    No   Unknown 
 
62. Did you consume other smoked fish/seafood?  
 Yes  Please specify the type ………………………………………….. 
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 No   
 Unknown 
 
63. During this period did you consume fresh berries of any type (eaten at home and/or in a restaurant 
or cafe)?  
 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q18  
 Unknown 
 
64. Did you consume fresh strawberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
65. Did you consume fresh blue berries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
66. Did you consume fresh blackberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
 
67. Did you consume fresh raspberries?  
 Yes   No   Unknown 
68. Did you consume any other fresh berries?  
 Yes   Please specify the type 
…………………………………………….. 
 No   
 Unknown 
 
69. Did you consume at home, any commercially packaged frozen berries of any type (this includes 
frozen berries which you may have added to a drink such as a smoothie or milkshake)?   
 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q39  
 Unknown 
 
70. Did you consume frozen mixed berries?  
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q23  
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 Unknown 
 
71. Was the brand of these frozen mixed berries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other ?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size……………………………………………………………………… 
72. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen mixed berries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
73. Did you consume these frozen mixed berries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No          Unknown 
74. Did you consume frozen strawberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 27  
 Unknown 
75. Was the brand of these frozen strawberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
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Please specify packet size……………………………………………………………………… 
76. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen strawberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
77. Did you consume these frozen strawberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?   
 Yes  No  Unknown 
 
78. Did you consume frozen blueberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 31  
 Unknown 
79. Was the brand of these frozen blueberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size……………………………………………………………… 
80. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen blueberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
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Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
81. Did you consume these frozen blueberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No  Unknown 
 
  
82. Did you consume frozen blackberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 35  
 Unknown 
 
83. Was the brand of these frozen blackberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size…………………………………………………………………… 
84. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen blackberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
85. Did you consume these frozen blackberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No                 Unknown 
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86. Did you consume frozen raspberries? (not as an ingredient of mixed berries) 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q 39  
 Unknown 
 
87. Was the brand of these frozen raspberries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size…………………………………………………………………… 
88. During the time period we are interested in (from ____/_____/___    to      
____/_____/____) which of the following categories best describes your 
consumption pattern for these frozen raspberries:   
Less than once a month?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice a month?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Once or twice per week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Three to five times a week?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Daily?     Yes  No  Unknown 
 
89. Did you consume these frozen raspberries raw (eg without cooking them in a 
sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No               Unknown 
 
90. Is there a child/children d 5 years of age living in the household?   
 Yes (if more than one child d5 years, please note here ……………………………..) 
 No  Æ proceed to Q44 
 Unknown 
 
91. Did this child/any of these children consume any frozen berries at any time in the 
three months prior to your symptoms?   
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 Yes   
 No Æ proceed to Q44 
 Unknown 
 
92. What type of frozen berry would they have consumed? 
Mixed berries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Strawberries?    Yes  No  Unknown 
Blueberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Blackberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Raspberries?   Yes  No  Unknown 
 
 
93. Would this child/these children have consumed the frozen berries raw (eg without 
cooking them in a sauce, dessert or muffin etc)?  
 Yes  No                Unknown 
94. Was the brand of these frozen berries: 
Coles?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Woolworths?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Nanna’s?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Creative Gourmet?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Sara Lee?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown  ÆPlease specify brand…….. 
 
Please specify packet size………………………………………………………………… 
95. Did you consume any drinks such as smoothies or milk shakes or yoghurt prepared outside the 
home (such as in a juice bar or a café) where any type of  berry was an ingredient?  
 Yes  Æ provide details of the drink consumed …………………………………… 
 No  
 Unknown 
 
96. Did you consume any uncooked desserts such as mousse or desserts with an uncooked topping 
(such as pavlova) prepared outside the home (eg in a café or restaurant) where any type of berry 
was an ingredient?  
 Yes Æ provide details of the dessert consumed ………………………………… 
 No  
 Unknown 
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97. During this time did you eat any type of fresh tomatoes? 
 Yes    
 No Æ     proceed to Q48 
 Unknown 
 
98. Were these tomatoes: 
Cherry tomatoes?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Roma tomatoes?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Regular round?  Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?    Yes  No  Unknown - Please specify the type……………… 
 
99. During this time did you eat any type of dried or semi dried tomatoes? 
 Yes    
 No Æ proceed to Q50 
 Unknown 
 
 
 
 
100. Were these dried tomatoes: 
Sun dried?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Semi dried?   Yes  No  Unknown 
Other?   Yes  No  Unknown 
 
101. During this time did you eat any type of lettuce? 
 Yes    
 No  
 Unknown 
102. During this time did you eat any spring onions? 
 Yes    
 No  
 Unknown 
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The last part of this section is to ask you a few questions about the current national recall of frozen berries: 
Are you aware of the 
recent national recall 
of frozen berries? 
 Yes  
 No 
 Unsure 
 
Do you remember 
the brands of frozen 
berries that were 
included in the 
recall? 
 Yes Æ Please specify .. 
 No 
 Unsure 
 
Do you remember 
what type of berries 
were included in the 
recall? 
6. Blackberries  
7. Blueberries 
8. Strawberries 
9. Raspberries 
10. Mixed berries 
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Where did you first 
learn about the recall 
of berries? 
10. Newspaper 
11. Website 
12. Facebook 
13. Twitter 
14. Television 
15. Radio 
16. Company web 
17. Friends 
18. Other 
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure  
Yes  No  Unsure    Please 
specify……… 
 
Please proceed with the usual jurisdictional investigation of the person’s Salmonella infection, if they are 
agreeable.  
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Chapter 7 
Teaching experience 
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Introduction 
This chapter outlines my teaching experiences during my Master of Philosophy in 
Applied Epidemiology (MAE). The first section is a record of my ‘Lessons from the 
Field’, with suggested answers shown in orange text. As most people in my cohort 
have little laboratory experience, I chose new technologies that are currently being 
introduced into public health pathology laboratories nationwide, including culture 
independent diagnostic testing and whole genome sequencing, as my topic. These 
new techniques will have a large impact on epidemiology through changes in the 
sensitivity of detection of pathogens, and through potential loss of subtyping 
information, as discussed in Chapter 4. Through developing the instructions for my 
lessons from the field, I learned the importance of focusing questions and giving clear 
and easy to follow instructions. It can be hard to make something that you are very 
familiar with simple enough for inexperienced people to follow.  
The second section of this chapter shows the activity and slides used for teaching the 
first year MAE cohort about measures of test performance conducted in March 2015. 
As this teaching session was prepared and conducted in a group of three people, I 
learned about cooperation and sharing of responsibilities. The three of us have 
different strengths and we were able to plan our session to take advantage of those 
strengths. The feedback from all the students involved was positive, which showed the 
benefit of having an interesting and engaging presentation and then an activity at the 
end of the session. Our session was last, and started late, but the students were happy 
to continue the activity into their lunch break demonstrating their interest. Making the 
activity fun also helped cement the concepts they learned during the session.  
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Lessons from the Field 
Lesson from the field 8 – Laboratory testing into the future 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning Objectives 
After completing this exercise, you should be able to: 
x Explain the new laboratory methods (culture independent diagnostic testing - 
CIDT) that have been recently introduced into diagnostic pathology laboratories 
and the new methods of the future (whole genome sequencing (WGS) and 
metagenomics). 
x Describe why CIDT is desired by laboratories, and why epidemiologists may be 
concerned. 
x Describe how WGS will enhance epidemiological investigations. 
x Use GenBank to find information and sequences for communicable diseases. 
 
Part 1 – the CIDT “dark ages”: 
Laboratory testing for infectious diseases in Australia and worldwide is currently 
undergoing a series of changes in response to the availability of changing 
technologies. As Zoe showed in her LFF, typing of organisms (for example MLVA) 
allows for greater discrimination between similar isolates than is possible with 
traditional phage typing or serotyping methods. Typing assists investigators to assess 
which cases in an outbreak are related to a common source, i.e. which cases are 
outbreak cases and which are unrelated sporadic cases. 
However, technology has advanced again, onwards from MLVA, as it is wont to do. 
Many laboratories across Australia have introduced culture independent methods 
(CIDT) for testing of common pathogens. In Australia, this predominantly means PCR 
testing directly from clinical samples. As the name implies, these techniques don’t 
require growth of a pure culture of the pathogen. For now, laboratories are still 
The LFF teleconference will be conducted on Wednesday 16 September 2015 between 
10:00 – 11:00 AEST.  
To join the teleconference, dial 1800 047396 and then enter the conference PIN code 
24779149#. If you have any trouble please call me on 0415 975 120 or email me on 
Fiona.May@health.gov.au 
Please save your responses to the questions in a word file and send back to 
Fiona.May@health.gov.au by COB Friday 11 September 2015. 
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performing cultures, either concurrently with CIDT testing, or reflexively, meaning for 
PCR positive samples only.  
Read the article “Effect of culture-independent diagnostic tests on future emerging 
infections program surveillance” by Langley et al. and answer the following questions 
shown in bold – dot point and short responses are fine: 
Q1. Why might laboratories and clinicians prefer to use CIDT methods like 
PCR? 
a. Faster 
b. More sensitive, especially when antimicrobial treatment has begun 
c. Less technical experience required 
d. Can detect polymicrobial infections 
e. Safer than culturing dangerous organisms 
f. Some organisms are difficult or unable to be cultured 
g. Can quantitate pathogen load 
h. Cheaper after initial cost 
Q2. Why would epidemiologists prefer culture (and subsequent culture-
requiring typing methods like MLVA) to be continued? 
a. Outbreak detection may require subtyping information, for 
example, MLVA for Salmonella can distinguish between baseline 
cases and an outbreak 
b. Can detect emergence of new strains’ 
c. Antimicrobial resistance pattern tests currently require culture 
d. PCR can’t detect the difference between dead and alive organisms 
e. Minor molecular mutations may result in decreased sensitivity of 
CIDT 
Q3. What might it mean if the results between methods are discordant – i.e. 
PCR positive, culture negative (other than false positives)? 
a. PCR is detecting dead organisms 
b. Some organisms don’t culture easily or at all, but CIDT will detect 
them 
c. Polymicrobial infection or normal flora may outcompete the 
pathogen in culture 
d. Antimicrobial therapy has made the pathogen unculturable 
Q4. Look at Table 1 showing Ralstonia isolates as identified by PCR and 
describe what you think might be going on in terms of outbreaks (i.e. 
which cases might be linked, which might not – ignore any thoughts of 
contamination with multiple different species): 
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a. Case numbers 3 to 9 are probably associated with propofol – a 
multijurisdictional outbreak with cases in QLD, SA and VIC 
Table 1: Species of Ralstonia identified by PCR, isolated from cases of bacteraemia 
and a sample of the drug Propofol 
Case number Propofol exposure Hospital Species 
1 Yes QLD2 R. insidiosa 
2 Yes SA1 R. pickettii 
3 Yes QLD1 R. mannitolilytica 
4 Yes QLD1 R. mannitolilytica 
5 Yes QLD3 R. mannitolilytica 
6 Yes QLD3 R. mannitolilytica 
7 Yes SA1 R. mannitolilytica 
8 Yes SA2 R. mannitolilytica 
9 Yes VIC R. mannitolilytica 
Propofol isolate NA NA R. mannitolilytica 
 
Part 2 – the WGS “age of enlightenment” 
The next step forward in laboratory testing is currently being planned and is beginning 
to be implemented around the world. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) is, as the 
name implies, sequencing of the whole genome of an organism. While sequencing 
technologies have been around for a long time, recent advances have made it cheaper 
and quicker to sequence large amounts of DNA or RNA in a single analysis, allowing 
multiple entire bacterial genomes to be sequenced in only hours. Of course, as with 
everything in life, sequencing is not going to solve all our problems without adding new 
ones. WGS currently requires laboratories to obtain a culture, thus losing the gains in 
sensitivity associated with CIDT.  
Read the article “Stopping outbreaks with real-time genomic epidemiology” by Tang et 
al. and answer the following questions. Again, dot point answers are fine: 
Q5. What are some advantages of WGS, particularly in relation to CIDT? 
a. Is able to be used to determine some subtypes and antimicrobial 
sensitivities. 
b. Able to discriminate between related strains and not related strains 
for outbreak detection 
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c. Can track origin and transmission dynamics of outbreaks by 
following the evolution of the pathogen 
d. The sequence of an organism is absolute – techniques for analysis 
may change (e.g. which gene to compare, how to define closely 
related isolates) but the sequence will always be the same allowing 
re-analysis of old sequences and comparison with new isolates as 
techniques change 
Q6. Can you think of any disadvantages? 
a. Currently still requires a culture – so not as sensitive as CIDT 
b. Slow and expensive – for now 
c. Technically challenging 
d. Lots of data to store – need changes in data storage practices 
Now you are going to have a look at some sequencing data that is shared publicly 
online. There are three main databases that are widely used for sequence data 
storage; The European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), DNA Data Bank of 
Japan (DDBJ) and GenBank. They were developed separately back before the internet 
was common, but are now all are linked so that if a sequence is submitted to one, it 
shows up in all. GenBank is associated with National Center for Biotechnology 
Information (NCBI) and PubMed, which I know you are all familiar with, so we will play 
with it. 
1. Go to PubMed (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) and click on the drop 
down next to the search box. 
2. Select “nucleotide” in the top left hand categorical drop down menu (as shown 
in the screenshot below). This will allow you to search all nucleotide sequences 
in the database.  
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3. Searching GenBank uses the same rules as searching on PubMed. Search for 
Ebola virus sequences, from Sierra Leone in 2014 (Ebola AND “Sierra Leone” 
AND 2014). 
4. Click on the link Zaire ebolavirus isolate Ebola virus/H.sapiens-
wt/SLE/2014/Makona-NM042.3, complete genome, accession KM233118.1 (it 
should be at or near the top, depending how many new sequences have been 
added since I wrote this! If you are having problems finding this entry, you can 
search using the unique accession number) and have a look at the entry. This 
is a beautifully annotated sequence, so there is a lot to scroll through, most of 
which you won’t need as epis, but it is good to be familiar with GenBank.  
a. Near the top there is a link to the PubMed entry for the paper this virus 
isolate was sequenced for.  
 
Q7. What is the name of the paper? 
a. Genomic surveillance elucidates Ebola virus origin and 
transmission during the 2014 outbreak 
 
b. Scroll down some more, and you’ll see a section under “Features” called 
“source”. This section contains information about the isolate, including 
country of isolation, date and host.  
 
Q8. What date was the sample collected? 
a. 12 June 2014 
 
c. The next section shows the predicted sequences of the proteins – you 
are probably not going to be interested in those. Right at the bottom is 
the nucleotide sequence. This sequence can be downloaded and used 
to search for similar sequences and make phylogenetic trees (a 
phylogenetic tree is a graphical representation of how different 
sequences are related. It is similar to a family tree. You can see an 
example of one on the next page), but we are not going to cover that 
here. 
5. Try searching for other organisms you are interested in. Have a look at some 
entries, and you’ll note how some are not as well annotated as the one we just 
looked at. 
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Q9. From our perspective as epidemiologists, what do you think should be the 
minimum information entered into this publicly accessible database? 
a. There are many discussions currently ongoing on around the 
world on this topic. The bare minimum would be: 
i. Collection date 
ii. Source (i.e. human, food) 
iii. Country 
iv. Someone to contact for more information 
But how useful is WGS? Do we really need the increased resolution provided by WGS? 
Let’s have a look at some of the additional information provided by WGS. Look at the 
Ralstonia table again, this time with WGS data added (Table 2).  
Table 2: Whole genome sequencing analysis of Ralstonia isolates. 
Case number Propofol exposure Hospital Species WGS 
1 Yes QLD2 R. insidiosa Clade 1 
2 Yes SA1 R. pickettii Clade 2 
3 Yes QLD1 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3a 
4 Yes QLD1 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3a 
5 Yes QLD3 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3a 
6 Yes QLD3 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3a 
7 Yes SA1 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3b 
8 Yes SA2 R. mannitolilytica Clade 3b 
9 Yes VIC R. mannitolilytica Clade 3b 
Propofol isolate NA NA R. mannitolilytica Clade 3b 
 
The data from Table 2 is represented as a phylogenetic tree in Figure 1. The length of 
the branches corresponds to genetic difference i.e. longer branches correspond to a 
greater genetic difference. You can see that the different groups are quite obvious. 
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Figure 1: Phylogenetic analysis of Ralstonia isolates 
Q10. What do you think about the possible outbreaks now?  
a. The QLD isolates no longer look like they are associated with the 
propofol. Only SA and VIC isolates look like they could be part of a 
propofol associated outbreak. 
 
Part 3: The future 
Two new technologies that will change epidemiology are currently being developed for 
clinical use. One is a new sequencing technology developed by Oxford Nanopore. 
Current sequencers can only sequence short bits of DNA (~300 bp – the bacterial 
genome is chopped up prior to sequencing). In order to get a whole genome sequence 
of an organism, overlapping short bits of DNA need to be put together like a jigsaw. 
This is complicated, and takes time. It can also be confused by repeat sequences. 
However, the new technologies being developed by Nanopore can sequence really 
long pieces of DNA. And even more excitingly, they’ve developed a sequencer that is 
the size of a USB drive (called MinION), and can be used in the field (see picture below 
– isn’t it cute!). If you are interested in some further reading, the paper “Rapid draft 
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sequencing and real-time nanopore sequencing in a hospital outbreak of Salmonella” 
by Quick et al. discusses an investigation of an outbreak that used both WGS and 
Nanopore MinION during an outbreak. The methods section is a little technical, but you 
can skip over it without losing the gist of the article. 
 
 
Metagenomics sounds complicated, but is just whole genome sequencing directly on 
clinical samples rather than sequencing of pure cultures. Using these methods, every 
single thing in the sample that has DNA can be sequenced (or RNA if you are looking 
for RNA viruses etc – although this requires an extra RNA to DNA step). This includes 
human DNA and the DNA from the normal human microbiome (the microorganisms 
that inhabit our bodies as normal flora), so as you can imagine, finding out which 
sequence corresponds to the organism causing the illness requires a lot more work 
(and computational power). But research groups are successfully using this technology 
in a wide variety of samples, so it is only a matter of time before it is usable in the 
clinical setting.  The paper “A culture-independent sequence-based metagenomics 
approach to the investigation of an outbreak of Shiga-toxigenic Escherichia coli 
O104:H4” by Loman et al. provides further reading for those interested, and shows the 
use of metagenomics on outbreak samples.  The study was done retrospectively, but 
provides some insight on the power of metagenomics, especially for pathogen 
discovery. Again, the methods section gets very technical, so feel free to skip it. 
Conclusion: 
We are at a critical stage for the introduction of WGS into public health. With proper 
planning, we could have a great, consistent, nationwide system that will see us into the 
future. As brand new epidemiologists with an appreciation of nationally consistent 
systems, we are perfectly placed to drive this introduction. 
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Lesson for first year MAE students – Measures of test 
performance 
Activity outline and role 
During the 2015 course block, Chatu Yapa, Zoe Cutcher and I taught the first year 
students how and why to calculate measures of test performance including sensitivity, 
specificity, positive predictive value and negative predictive value. Zoe began the 
lesson with an introduction to the measures of test performance, including how to 
calculate them. Chatu followed this up by discussing her experiences as a doctor in an 
Ebola treatment centre in Liberia, and how the measures of test performance were 
important in diagnosing and classifying patients. I finished by taking the students 
through an activity designed to calculate the measures of association in fictional 
settings with different prevalence of disease. To make the activity more fun and 
memorable, students were provided with hats to represent laboratory confirmation of 
infection (the gold standard comparison test) with measles and red stickers to 
represent symptoms consistent with measles infection. The activity used a clinical case 
definition of symptoms consistent with measles only, with no laboratory evidence 
considered. By combining the props in different ways we were able to represent true 
positives (true measles infection with symptoms – hat and stickers), true negatives (no 
hat or stickers), false positives (symptoms consistent with measles but no measles 
infection - stickers with no hat) and false negatives (true measles infection with no 
symptoms – hat but no stickers). The students were able to count the number of people 
in each category and calculate the measures of test performance. The activity sheet 
and slides for the activity are included below. 
       
Left: Darren (MAE cohort 2015) showing off his “true positive measles infection”; Right: 
students hard at work calculating measures of test performance. 
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Activity Session 
Resources required: 
1. Activity sheet for each student 
2. Answer sheets for teaching team 
3. Stickers – to represent measles case definition 
4. Party hat – to represent true measles 
 
Activity 1. 
You are working in a public health unit (PHU) in Canberra. There has been a report 
of a case of measles who attended your MAE graduation at ANU. Your PHU has 
been tasked with finding all new cases of measles in an effort to stop transmission. 
Your supervisor hasn’t done the MAE, and insists that the case definition should 
only include rash as confirmation of a measles case. You decide to see how 
accurately this case definition identifies cases of measles by doing a mini study of 
your fellow MAE attendees. 
Case definition positive = Anyone in this room with rash today (red spots) 
Truth positive = Anyone who actually has measles as determined by super 
accurate lab testing (party hats) 
1. Count the number of lab confirmed measles cases in the group and the number 
of cases determined positive by the case definition to complete the two by two 
table below. 
 
Truth (super accurate 
lab test) Total 
Positive Negative 
Case definition 
Positive 3 2 5 
Negative 1 8 9 
Total 4 10 14 
 
 
a) What is the prevalence of measles in this group? 28.6%                           
b) What is the: 
a. Sensitivity of the case definition?  75% 
b. Specificity of the case definition? 80% 
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c. Predictive value positive of the case definition?  60% 
d. Predictive value negative of the case definition? 88.9% 
 
Activity 2.  
Since measles has been eliminated in Australia and cases are rare, you want to 
compare our case definition with how it would work in a country where measles is 
endemic and therefore has a higher prevalence. You are thrilled to learn there is an 
ongoing outbreak of measles in the Philippines. You are assigned to a GOARN 
group to go over and help out with diagnosis. You decide to test out how the 
Australian case definition would work applied in this situation. 
 
Truth (super accurate 
lab test) Total 
Positive Negative 
Case definition 
Positive 6 1 7 
Negative 2 4 6 
Total 8 5 13 
 
a) What is the prevalence of measles in this group?  61.5%                           
b) What is the: 
a. Sensitivity of the case definition?  75% 
b. Specificity of the case definition?  80% 
c. Predictive value positive of the case definition? 85.7% 
d. Predictive value negative of the case definition? 66.7% 
c) How does performance of the case definition differ in this different setting? 
In what ways is it the same? Explain why it differs? 
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